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  Preface
The first microcomputer in my home came in the 1980s. Using it was not 
easy at all, certainly not when compared to using personal computers nowa-
days. At that time, it was necessary to know the commands (the source code) 
to let the computer do anything apart from blinking the command prompt. 
However, this was sufficiently intriguing to stimulate me to learn the basics 
of programming and attend a computer course at high school. During the 
course, around 1997, I first came across Free Software. It was a rough GNU/
Linux distribution assembled by my high school teacher. Well, I must admit, 
it did not catch my attention then. The reason might have been that I already 
knew that I would like to study a different type of source code – the law. 
Paradoxically, becoming a lawyer has raised my interest in Free Software. 
Surely, source codes are important and knowing them is more than fun. But 
what matters even more are rights and obligations that come together with 
the code. Indeed, during my law studies I realised that the freedoms, which 
Stallman longs for, are legal rights. As a lawyer, I also understand that these 
freedoms cannot be taken for granted. Actually, it is not so easy to obtain the 
freedoms, and it is even harder to protect them. In other words, user free-
doms tend to be very much alike other freedoms that the society struggled 
for in the past, and particularly in the recent past.
This observation has led me to setting myself a task: to design a frame-
work that is able to protect the freedoms adequately. Then, I decided to 
make my task harder in two ways. First, I thought it would be a good idea 
to learn how the law actually works. So, while doing my research I have also 
practised law. I hope that this has strengthened the thesis in the direction of 
a more practice-oriented dissertation. Second, I submitted my ideas to Pro-
fessor Jaap van den Herik and Professor Aernout Schmidt and asked them 
to become my supervisors. They willingly accepted and as a consequence 
my task became a crash-course on proper research, reasoning, and writing. 
They revised each chapter of this thesis some hundreds of times. Perhaps 
the most important thing that Jaap has taught me is to do everything to 
make the reader feel comfortable. Aernout has taught me in particular not 
to expect that problems will solve themselves. Having them both as super-
visors was a thrilling experience, which I enjoyed even more as the final 
result approached.
When I now give my work a second thought, in retrospect the task was 
much more easy. I have had the firm support of my parents and my beloved 
wife. Whenever I came to Leiden, my Dutch friends were eager to help me. 
In particular, I wish to thank Franke van der Klaauw, Hugo Kielman, and 
Wouter Koelewijn who made me feel at home. I also want to thank for the 
free (as in “freedom”) atmosphere that the partners and my colleagues at 
Grynhoff Woźny Maliński have created.
Warszawa, August 2009
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1 Introduction1
We live in a world full of information technologies. These technologies sup-
port us in an increasing number of tasks. The diversity of tasks in which they 
are able to support us is dazzling. For example, currently almost complete 
virtual worlds are created, in which everybody may play a role of their own 
choice with an entertainment scene as background. Similar technologies as 
used there may provide researchers with powerful tools for scientific data 
gathering and analysis. Additionally, the technologies facilitate smooth and 
worldwide marketing, in such a way that entrepreneurs can easily meet 
demands of distant and diverse customers. Communications and electronic 
commerce pleasantly coincide, the technologies allow us to organize team-
work efficiently. At the same time, governments all over the world use the 
technologies in an attempt to organize the governance of society, by intro-
ducing various eGovernment schemes. eGovernment may be an aid to the 
execution of our legal rights and obligations. It may also aim at promoting 
the participation of the whole society in decision-making processes in mat-
ters of public interest and at facilitating the exchange of public information. 
In many different support technologies Free Software plays an important 
role.
This thesis is based on the premise that a worldwide regulatory frame-
work should be adopted to protect users of Free Software. Such a framework 
should consist of rules (and relations between them) that protect user free-
doms as articulated by Richard M. Stallman.1 In our study, we analyse the 
protection of the users in the world of (1) software communities and (2) 
eGovernments, as both of these phenomena influence user freedoms. There-
fore, we start analysing whether and to what extent the current regulatory 
framework protects the freedoms under such influence. The players and the 
issues they are dealing with are considered as the main scene of play. It is our 
task to describe their roles and the consequences of their behaviour. If our 
analysis leads to the conclusion that the protection is not adequate, we will 
aim at proposing an improved regulatory framework.
In this chapter we provide an introduction to the analysis of the current 
framework. In Section 1.1, we describe the main scene of play, that is the 
world where human beings and computer programs cooperate. In Section 
1.2, we introduce the actors of this scene and their audience. In Section 1.3, 
we formulate our Problem Statement (PS). We do this by taking a closer look 
1 R.M. Stallman, Free Software Defi nition, at: http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.html. 
An alternative version of the same document is available at: http://www.fsf.org/licensing/
essays/free-sw.html.
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22 Chapter 1
at software communities and eGovernments in relation to user freedoms. In 
Section 1.4, we take the regulatory framework and the user freedoms as 
articulated by Stallman to formulate three Research Questions (RQs). In Sec-
tion 1.5, we present the research methodology used in the thesis in order to 
answer the RQs. In Section 1.6, we give the structure of the thesis.
1.1 The main scene of play
It is hard to imagine (1) what the possibilities will be of an increasing techno-
logical support, as well as (2) which limitations we will face. Certainly, the 
support comes in the form of intelligent computer programs. Some of the 
programs may be special or even unique and will thus perform specific 
tasks, but there will also be many tasks that may be accomplished by pro-
grams that are massively produced and do not have to be customized much. 
Some of these programs may be instructed to perform their tasks autono-
mously. Additionally, the programs may be designed to communicate with 
each other, or with our human counterparts over a network. So, we envisage 
a world where human beings and computer programs cooperate to accom-
plish any imaginable task that may be undertaken by a human alone or by a 
group of humans or by intelligent agents.2
A minimal requirement for a world of seamless cooperation between 
humans and computer programs is that all these programs work efficiently 
and properly. Below, we distinguish between two layers of such a world: (1) 
the layer related to software itself and (2) the layer related to standards used 
by software to interoperate. We would like to call these layers scenes, since it 
facilitates our description. The two scenes host a variety of activities that 
affect the working of the programs. We describe them in Subsection 1.1.1 
and 1.1.2, respectively. In Subsection 1.1.3, we complete the description by 
presenting four combinations. They result from combining two extreme 
types of the software spectrum with two extreme types of the standards 
spectrum.
1.1.1 The software scene
It is well known that so far (1) every software contains errors (“bugs”) and 
(2) no software possesses all features that users need. Hence, if programs are 
to work efficiently and properly, their development should be organized in a 
2 In general, an agent can be a human or a computer. The notion “intelligent agents” origi-
nates from the domain of Artifi cial Intelligence. An intelligent agent is a collection of 
software that is able to take intelligent decisions, and to act intelligently. Most agents do 
so autonomously (for lawyers this is a diffi cult point to understand). In computer science, 
research aims at the development of BDI agents (i.e., agents with a belief, a desire, and an 
intention), see, e.g., Wikipedia, BDI software agent, at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
BDI_software_agent.
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23Introduction
way that minimizes the occurrences of bugs. Also, in the ideal case all neces-
sary features should be included in programs before users start using them. 
However, many bugs are revealed only after software is already distributed 
to users. Similarly, only then it often becomes apparent that some features of 
the program are not in place. This means that appropriate repairs (“patches”) 
should be developed while the program is already serving its supportive 
purpose. Additionally, appropriate procedures for the development of fea-
ture upgrades (or updates) of the already used programs should be provided 
for. Moreover, after a patch, an upgrade, or an update (jointly: an improve-
ment) is developed, it should be swiftly distributed to users so that they can 
benefit from the improved support and not have to continue using software 
that works improperly.
The need of correcting bugs and including new features in a dynamic 
environment means that it is not possible to use a given program unmodi-
fied for a significantly long time. Usually, every now and then the program 
has to be improved to remove its bugs or add new features. Since improve-
ments require modifications, virtually all software is under continuous mod-
ification. For the time being, modification of software requires access to 
human-readable source codes.3 Conversely, to use a program in its support-
ive function, a machine-readable object code (“binary”) has to be made avail-
able to the user. After modification, source codes are translated into binaries 
in a process called “compilation”.4 Binaries may be distributed and used 
separately from source codes. Theoretically, if source codes are not available, 
a sufficiently skilled person may use binaries to fix bugs or include new fea-
tures (e.g., by way of decompilation).5 But in practice, the most preferable 
way to modify a program is to access its source codes.6
Here, we may conclude that access to source codes is the first necessary 
condition for the ability to control the working of a program. In passing, we 
note that additional access to binaries is not necessary, since they may be 
3 In the future, it may be left to autonomous non-human agents (see, e.g., Wikipedia, Self-
modifying code, at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-modifying_code).
4 We refer here to source codes written in compiled languages. There are also other pro-
gramming languages that allow to execute source code directly, without compilation 
(interpreted languages). Programs written in interpreted languages are sometimes deli-
berately obfuscated in order to prevent users from accessing source codes. For the purpo-
ses of this thesis such an obfuscated code in an interpreted language may be considered 
as a “binary” as well. For more details see: Wikipedia, Programming language, at: http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Programming_language.
5 Decompilation is a way of reverse engineering a program, which leads to a reconstruc-
tion of source codes of the decompiled program from its binaries. See: Wikipedia, Decom-
pilation, at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Decompilation.
6 One reason why decompilation is usually not preferred is the law. For example, under 
Art. 6 of the Software Directive, decompilation of a program is only allowed if it is indis-
pensable to obtain the information necessary to achieve the interoperability of an inde-
pendently created computer program with the decompiled program, and provided some 
other strict conditions are met at the same time.
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rather easily produced using source codes.7 By looking at (the number or 
weight) of the conditions on the access to source codes, it is possible to dis-
tinguish many different types of software. For our study we would like to 
identify the following two extreme types of software.
(1) Proprietary software. Computer programs are developed in private 
(the process of eliminating bugs and including new features is sub-
ject to exclusive control). This means that access to source codes is 
restricted to certain persons only. Also, only certain persons are al-
lowed to distribute proprietary software. Additionally, there are re-
strictions on the use of proprietary software.
(2) Free Software. The participation in the development of computer 
programs is not restricted (the process of eliminating bugs and in-
cluding new features is not subject to exclusive control). This means 
that access to source codes is not restricted. Also, there are no restric-
tions as to who is allowed to distribute Free Software. Obviously, 
there are no restrictions on the use of Free Software.8
Between these two extreme types we observe a spectrum of possibilities, all 
of which we call the software scene. It would be impractical to attempt to con-
struct a regulatory framework for all of these possibilities and to analyse 
such a framework successfully. Thus, for the sake of clarity, in this thesis we 
would like to downsize the spectrum of the types of software to the two 
extremes mentioned above.
1.1.2 The standards scene
Usually, a computer program is not used in a vacuum. Currently, most pro-
grams are used together with other programs. For example, they communi-
cate over a network. A program works efficiently and properly in such a situ-
ation if only it is able to interoperate with other programs. Programs 
interoperate using protocols, interfaces, and data formats. For one program 
to interoperate with another program, the program has to support a proto-
col, an interface, or a data format that the other program also supports. In 
other words, both programs have to use a common standard to interoperate. 
To make a program use the common standard, it has to be developed accord-
7 Assuming that a user has access to compilers or interpreters, as well as suffi cient engi-
neering skills. Since average user usually does not have such access or skills, access to 
binaries can be considered as necessary for such users to control the working of programs 
to the same extent as the access to source codes.
8 We consider Free Software simultaneously as a name and as a concept that should be 
written with capital letters. We concur with the majority of publications and will capita-
lize the concept throughout the text. We do not capitalize proprietary software. We pre-
sent a more elaborate defi nition of Free Software in Section 2.1.
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ingly. Thus, access to the program’s source code is the first necessary condition 
of interoperability, since without source codes it is not possible to develop 
programs. However, it is not a sufficient condition.
Apart from having access to the program’s source codes, one also has to 
know what is the common standard exactly. This information (usually 
referred to as “interoperability information”) should most preferably be pro-
vided in a way accessible and understandable for a human being, in a docu-
ment called “standard specification”. If the information is not provided in 
such a way, it might still be possible for a sufficiently skilled person to reverse 
engineer another program that uses the standard in order to reconstruct the 
interoperability information. Reverse engineering can be performed in par-
ticular by (1) analysing the output of another program that already supports 
the standard, (2) decompiling the binaries of such a program, or (3) studying 
its source codes. However, reverse engineering is usually impracticable. The 
preferred method is to use the standard specification. Thus, the second nec-
essary condition of interoperability is access to the standard specification.
Here, we may conclude that there are two necessary conditions for a pro-
gram to work efficiently and properly with other programs: (1) access to the 
source codes of the program, and (2) access to the specification of a standard 
(a protocol, an interface, or a data format) used by other programs. Only 
then a working interoperable program can be developed and distributed to 
users. In passing, we note that access to source codes or binaries of such oth-
er programs is not necessary, as long as the standard specification is avail-
able.9 By looking at (the number or weight) of the conditions on the access to 
standard specifications, it is possible to distinguish many different types of 
standards. We would like to identify the following two extreme types.
(1) Closed standards. Protocols, interfaces, and data formats are de-
signed in private and subject to exclusive control. The control en-
compasses who may use, develop, and distribute programs that 
comply with a closed standard. This means that access to specifi ca-
tions of closed standards is restricted to certain persons only.
(2) Open standards. The participation in the design of protocols, inter-
faces, and data formats is not restricted, and no-one is precluded 
from using, developing, and distributing programs that comply with 
an open standard. This means that access to specifi cations of open 
standards is not restricted to anyone.10
9 Sometimes, standard specifi cations are accompanied by a reference implementation, that 
is a piece of source code of a program that uses the standard. The availability of  the refe-
rence implementation is an additional aid in understanding of the specifi cation and the 
implementation of the standard in other programs.
10 We present a more elaborate defi nition of open standards in Section 2.3.
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As is the case in the software scene, between these two extreme types of stan-
dards we observe a spectrum of possibilities. We call this spectrum the stan-
dards scene. Later on, we will explain that any standard which does not meet 
the definition of an open standard as given in this thesis (see Section 2.3) is to 
be considered a closed standard, at least from the point of view of the Free 
Software users. Thus, in the remainder of the thesis we would like to down-
size the spectrum of standards to the two extremes only.
1.1.3 Four combinations of software and standards
In the two subsections above, we split the main scene of play into a software 
scene and a standards scene. Each subscene consists of a spectrum with two 
extreme types. Based on these four extremes we may distinguish four com-
binations that will guide our research throughout the thesis. They are given 
in Table 1.1.
Closed standards (CS) Open standards (OS)
Proprietary software 
(PS)
PS CS PS OS
Free Software 
(FS)
FS CS FS OS
Table 1.1: Four combinations of software and standards
Theoretically, all of the above four combinations are equally possible. The 
proprietary software approach does not exclude a possibility that a proprie-
tary program uses an open standard (PS OS). In such a case, although the 
development and distribution of such a program is restricted, the develop-
ment and distribution of Free Software programs that are able to interoper-
ate with such a program is not restricted. As a result, users can freely use 
such Free Software. However, many developers of proprietary software 
design it to use closed standards only (PS CS). In such a case, the ability of 
other developers to develop interoperable software is restricted. There are 
also restrictions in distribution of software that uses closed standards.11 The 
use of such programs is restricted as well. Nevertheless, Free Software devel-
opers sometimes attempt to make their programs interoperable with other 
programs that use closed standards (FS CS).12 But the most preferred way of 
developing Free Software is to design it according to open standards (FS OS). 
The distribution and use of FS OS is also the least-restricted one.
11 For example, such a distribution can constitute a violation of a patent material to the 
closed standard. See: Subsection 3.2.1.
12 We elaborate on such a situation in Subsection 3.2.2.
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1.2 Actors and their audience
There are many persons that attempt to bring us closer to the world of seam-
less cooperation between computer programs and human beings. They play 
various roles in all of the four combinations of Table 1.1 by developing or 
distributing software. For the purpose of this thesis, it is desirable to take a 
closer look at these actors and to describe their roles. We will also pay some 
attention to their audience. We first discuss (1) actors and their audience in 
the software scene, and then (2) actors and their audience in the standards 
scene.
1.2.1 Actors and their audience in the software scene
Generally speaking, proprietary software (PS OS and PS CS) results in a 
strong dichotomy between the actors and the audience. Conversely, Free 
Software (FS OS and FS CS) blurs the line between the actors and the audi-
ence. Important actors in the Free Software scene are software communities. 
eGovernments play important roles both in the proprietary software scene 
as well as in the Free Software scene. The roles of eGovernments are impor-
tant, mostly because of the impact that activities such as software procure-
ment have on all other actors and the audience in the software scene.
Below, we discuss (1) actors and their audience of proprietary software, 
and (2) actors and their audience of Free Software.
(1) Actors and audience of proprietary software
The working of proprietary software is under exclusive control of a limited 
number of persons (copyright holders). Only they have access to source 
codes of this software and decide who may play an active role in its develop-
ment and distribution, as well as who may use it. Conversely, users do not 
have individual control over proprietary software.13 Their role is restricted 
to the consumption of binaries as delivered by the distributors. Certainly, 
this is not to say that a user demand for bug fixes and new features is not 
met. It rather means that users have to rely on copyright holders of a given 
piece of proprietary software to have their demand for properly working 
programs satisfied. So, we may definitely refer to all users of proprietary 
software as “audience”. Consequently, only the copyright holders of propri-
etary software, and the developers and distributors appointed by them can 
be referred to as “actors”.
We illustrate the above findings in Figure 1.1.
13 It is possible to provide examples of proprietary software that is delivered in a form high-
ly customizable for users. Nevertheless, such customization is either performed by per-
sons authorized by the copyright holder, or the copyright holder (not the user) controls 
the degree of the possible customization.
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Figure 1.1: Actors and audience in proprietary software
In Figure 1.1 we see black dots illustrating actors that play an active role in 
the scene of proprietary software. They are the developers and distributors 
employed or otherwise contracted by the copyright holder (usually, the 
copyright holder is a firm). Grey dots illustrate users of the program, the 
consuming audience. The boundary between the former group and the latter 
group is solid. The users may not easily cross it, since they neither have 
access to source codes, nor they are allowed to develop or distribute the soft-
ware by its copyright holders.
Some governments choose to introduce eGovernment based on proprie-
tary software. However, government procurement of a proprietary program 
does not remove the control of the program from the hands of its copyright 
holder. In particular, the copyright holder may still control the development 
of this software and control who may become a distributor of this program. 
Consequently, the government on their own may not control the working of 
this program. Also, the government may not freely choose between various 
distributors of a given proprietary program. The government may only 
choose between the distributors appointed by the copyright holder. Thus, 
the government can only play a passive role as all other users of proprietary 
software.
(2) Actors and audience of Free Software
The line between actors and audience is much more blurred on the Free Soft-
ware scene.14 Copyright holders release this software from their exclusive 
control (although they retain copyright protection). They allow any user to 
step into an active role of a developer by eliminating bugs or including new 
features. Also, anyone is allowed to become a distributor of a given piece of 
Free Software. This means that both developers and distributors of this soft-
14 As of now, thousands of programs are being developed as Free Software. In August 2008 
there have been approx. 85,000 projects under one of the most popular Free Software 
license, the GNU GPL v2, at a popular repository SourceForge (http://Sourceforge.net).
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ware are generally self-appointed. So, everyone can become an “actor” in the 
Free Software scene. However, nobody is required to play such an active 
role. Thus, a user may remain passive and form a part of the “audience”. 
Still, even members of the audience can entrust the roles of developers or 
distributors to any person of their choice.
Probably the most active actors of the Free Software scene are “hackers”.15 
Generally speaking, hackers are technologically-savvy users who value the 
possibility of developing and distributing useful software tools without 
restrictions. They do so because they like to control the working of software 
and they are motivated to improve it, and to enable other users to use the 
improvements. Hackers are motivated for many different reasons. Some of 
the reasons are: (1) ethical reasons, (2) economic reasons, and (3) personal 
reasons. First, some hackers develop or distribute Free Software because 
they simply believe it is the right thing to do. Second, some hackers do so 
because they are getting paid for it.16 Third, some hackers develop or distrib-
ute Free Software because it solves their problem (performs a particular 
task), because by doing so they gain peer recognition, or because they other-
wise improve their social status in such a way.
Firms are also important actors in the Free Software scene. Firms do not 
exercise exclusive control over Free Software as it is the case with firms in 
the proprietary software scene, at least not directly. Still, firms contribute to 
the development of Free Software, as well as they distribute it. They are 
attracted to developing and distributing Free Software in particular by the 
fact that in such a way they support their business  models. The term “Open 
Source Software” has been promoted to convey the technical superiority and 
commercial benefits of Free Software (see Section 2.2).
Many actors in the Free Software scene (including hackers and firms) 
work alone,17 but some of them participate in communities. Communities 
are groups of actors who cooperate in fixing bugs and in including new fea-
tures of a given program (see Section 2.4). Communities may also organize 
distribution of Free Software and provide guidance on its use. An important 
community has been originated by Stallman, under the name of “GNU 
Project”.18 Since the 1980s, many other programs have been developed and 
distributed as Free Software, not necessarily related to GNU. Most promi-
nent examples of Free Software include, e.g., the Linux Kernel, Debian 
15 A hacker is properly defi ned as “a person who delights in having an intimate under-
standing of the internal workings of a system, computers and computer networks in par-
ticular.” (RFC1392, at: http://rfc.net/rfc1392.html).
16 For example, according to some studies more than 70% of Linux kernel developers are 
getting paid for their work on Linux (See: The Linux Foundation, Linux Foundation Pub-
lishes Study on Linux Development, http://linux-foundation.org/weblogs/
press/2008/03/31/linux-foundation-publishes-study-on-linux-development-statistics-
who-writes-linux-and-who-supports-it/).
17 In Chapter 4 we refer to this as the “individual development and distribution of Free 
Software” or “individual exercise of the freedoms”.
18 See: http://gnu.org, http://savannah.gnu.org.
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GNU/Linux, Apache, or Mozilla.19 Many Free Software programs have 
attracted large and well organized communities.
Outside of the communities there are other actors who at their choice 
may: (1) develop Free Software on their own, privately; (2) form a group of 
active developers outside of the existing community of a given program; (3) 
become an individual distributor of Free Software.
Apart from the above-described actors, there is also the audience in the 
Free Software scene. The audience is formed out of such users of Free Soft-
ware who are not copyright holders, developers, or distributors of this soft-
ware. Such users do not participate in software communities as well. The 
audience uses Free Software in a manner similar to proprietary software (by 
simply running the binaries on their computers, without paying attention to 
source codes). Still, there is a difference between the users who form the 
audience of Free Software and the users who form the audience of proprie-
tary software. The difference is that the former have a choice whether to 
remain passive or become actors, while the latter do not have such a choice.
From the above we may conclude that users are not bound to play pas-
sive roles in the Free Software scene. Many users of Free Software actively 
develop the software or distribute it to other users. Such users play active 
roles, either individually (such as by becoming a hacker), by using a firm, or 
within a software community. We illustrate this in Figure 1.2.
Figure 1.2: Actors and audience in Free Software
In Figure 1.2 we see black dots that illustrate users (i.e., developers or dis-
tributors) who play an active role in the development or distribution of a 
Free Software program. They are, for example, individual hackers or firms. 
Some of them form a software community. Others develop or distribute the 
same program individually, outside of the community, or in a “competing” 
community. Grey dots illustrate passive users of the program (the audience). 
19 See respectively: http://kernel.org, http://debian.org, http://apache.org, http://mozilla.org.
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The boundary between the actors and the audience is dashed. Users may 
easily cross it, since source codes of the program are available to them for 
development or distribution.
The government may procure Free Software for use in eGovernment. As 
a result of such a procurement, control over Free Software is not given to any 
particular entity on an exclusive basis. The government and other users are 
allowed to continue using the same Free Software developed or distributed 
by actors of their free choice. The government could as well remain a passive 
user of Free Software, but they may also undertake software development or 
become distributors of this software to other users. In particular, the govern-
ment can participate in software communities or develop Free Software on 
their own. Also, the government might stimulate proactive individuals to 
become developers or distributors. For example, the government can do so 
by collaborating with the communities in many different ways.
1.2.2 Actors and their audience in the standards scene
We start by recalling the two conditions necessary for the ability to control 
the working of a program. They are: (1) access to source codes, and (2) access 
to interoperability information, most preferably as included in specifications 
of standards. In Subsection 1.2.1 we analysed the actors and their audience 
in the software scene, i.e., in the use of source codes. In this subsection we 
take a closer look at the actors and audience in the standards scene, i.e., in the 
use of interoperability information (standard specifications).
Governments play an important role in the standards scene. In particu-
lar, government-procured software allows to use eGovernment services. In 
order to be able to use these services, users have to obtain programs that 
interoperate with programs used by the government.20 Thus, whether the 
programs used in eGovernments are designed to interoperate using an open 
or a closed standard is a material factor.21
Below we focus on the roles of the actors that use Free Software (both FS 
CS and FS OS). We analyse two situations in the standards scene: (1) a situa-
tion wherein a Free Software program is required to interoperate with anoth-
er program designed according to a closed standard (FS CS), and (2) a situa-
tion wherein a Free Software program is required to interoperate with 
another program designed according to an open standard (FS OS).22
20 A user of eGovernment services may be an individual, a fi rm, a public agency, a non-
governmental organization, or another entity.
21 Cf. Table 1.1 and accompanying text.
22 In both of these situations, the other programs may be proprietary software or Free Soft-
ware. The other programs may be also programs used by governments to provide 
eGovernment services.
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(1) Actors and audience of closed standards
Closed standards are protocols, interfaces, and data formats that are exclu-
sively controlled. Usually, the exclusive control is exercised by the firm that 
designed a standard (the “designer”). The designer may refuse to reveal 
interoperability information to the developers of a Free Software program. 
In such a case, Free Software developers could still be able to access this 
information using various techniques (we discuss them in detail in Subsec-
tion 3.2.2). If they succeed, it leads to the development of a Free Software 
program that uses a closed standard. Then, the Free Software developers and 
distributors may be referred to as actors. However, perfect interoperability is 
rarely reached in such a situation. Also, the development, distribution, or 
even use of programs that use closed standards can be restricted, because 
designers could impose conditions on the use of these standards (e.g., by 
enforcing a patent). So, in practice only the designers of closed standards are 
actors. The designers may allow other persons to become actors, but they 
may also decide to put everyone else in the position of the audience.
For eGovernment, some governments procure software designed to use 
a closed standard. The government does not become an actor in such a way, 
since the control over the working of programs which use that standard 
remains in the hands of the designer of the standard. In particular, the 
designer of such a standard retains exclusive control over who is authorized 
to develop programs which are able to interoperate using that standard. 
Obviously, users have to procure programs that interoperate with eGovern-
ment software, since otherwise they may not use the services of eGovern-
ments. But only the developers authorized by the designer of closed stan-
dards used in eGovernment software can develop properly interoperable 
programs. Sometimes, only the authorized distributors can distribute such 
programs. This allows the designer to stimulate users to procure selected 
software only.
In some cases eGovernments based on closed standards may even (1) 
effectively isolate a particular distributor from its competitors, (2) direct 
users to play the role of passive consumers, and (3) prevent the developers 
of Free Software from developing this software. In other words the use of a 
closed standard in eGovernments contributes to making the audience con-
sisting out of everyone but the designer of this standard or persons appoint-
ed by the designer.
(2) Actors and audience of open standards
Open standards are not exclusively controlled. By definition, no-one is able 
to restrict anyone in developing their programs to use an open standard. In 
particular, Free Software developers that intend to make their programs 
interoperate using open standards may do so freely. Also, Free Software dis-
tributors may then distribute such interoperable programs without restric-
tions that may apply to closed standards. When using open standards a high 
degree of interoperability is possible. This means that anyone may become 
an actor in the scene of open standards. No-one, however, is required to play 
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an active role and everyone may remain the audience by simply using soft-
ware designed according to open standards (either proprietary or Free Soft-
ware).
If the government chooses software based on open standards for eGov-
ernment, both proprietary and Free Software developers may continue to 
develop programs that interoperate with such software. Anyone could 
become a distributor of such interoperable Free Software either for the gov-
ernment or for users of eGovernment services. Certainly, the development of 
proprietary software that interoperates with eGovernment remains possible, 
and the distributors of proprietary software are still able to distribute it to 
their users. Consequently, users may use eGovernment services by choosing 
between Free Software and proprietary software. Additionally, anyone 
(including the government) may become an actor by undertaking develop-
ment or distribution of programs that interoperate with eGovernment and 
that are Free Software.
1.3 Problem statement
Below we formulate our Problem Statement. We start by recalling that we 
envisage a world where humans and computer programs cooperate. We aim 
at a seamless cooperation which in particular implies that computer pro-
grams should work efficiently and properly. In order to reach this goal, we 
believe that the working of programs should be controlled. For this purpose 
we identified two necessary conditions: (1) access to the program’s source 
codes and (2) access to the specifications of the standards used by the pro-
gram to interoperate with other programs. A person who meets these two 
conditions is able to bring us closer to the world envisaged. This leads to an 
important question, namely: “Who is allowed to control the working of com-
puter programs?”
(1) Two extreme approaches
In Table 1.1 we presented four combinations of software and standards: (1) 
FS OS, (2) FS CS, (3) PS OS, and (4) PS CS. In each combination, the control 
over the working of computer programs is assigned differently. Under the 
FS OS, attempts are made to give the control to every user. Under the remain-
ing three combinations control is retained by certain individuals. The latter 
three combinations differ as to the degree of control that such individuals 
have. Yet, what they have in common is that under each of them the control 
cannot be exercised by every user. So, for the formulation of our Problem 
Statement, we will consider the three latter combinations together, which 
brings us to two extremes: (1) the FS OS (henceforth called “the Free Soft-
ware approach”), and (2) the three other combinations together (henceforth 
jointly addressed as the “proprietary approach”).
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(2) The Debate
There has been a fierce debate about which of the two approaches is better. 
Various participants in the debate have presented their positions. Stallman’s 
position is an example of the set of positions that oppose the proprietary 
approach.23 It may be summarized in its considering the proprietary 
approach as morally unacceptable. A second example of positions that 
oppose the proprietary approach is the position of the advocates of “Open 
Source Software” (as we explain below, Open Source Software can be con-
sidered as closely related to Free Software). In a nutshell, they consider that 
the proprietary approach should not be followed because it is less efficient.24 
Supporters of the proprietary approach present their positions as well. 
A popular position amongst them is that most users only want to use soft-
ware which serves their purposes of the moment, and they have no need to 
control their working. According to this position, the proprietary approach 
in itself can bring us closer to the world where humans and computer pro-
grams cooperate seamlessly.
(3) Our Position in the Debate
We describe our position below. It takes into account the following three 
issues: (1) Stallman’s rejection of the proprietary approach on moral grounds, 
(2) negative evaluation of the efficiency of the proprietary approach made by 
the Open Source advocates, and (3) assessment of the needs of users as made 
by the supporters of the proprietary approach.
Our position is as follows. Ad (1) The proprietary approach may be mor-
ally unacceptable to many people. Such morality may lead them to abandon 
the proprietary approach. If so, then that possibility should be adequately 
covered by the law. In our opinion, everyone should be allowed to follow their 
own moral standard as long as they do not act against the law. Ad (2) Free Soft-
ware programs are often of good quality. This means that the Free Software 
approach is generally efficient. We believe that there is no evidence for the 
proprietary approach to be unable to deliver good quality software for a com-
parable price. Here we remark that the economic competition, if any, should 
also be covered by the law. Ad (3) Users who wish to control the working of 
software do not constitute a majority. But the law should cover adequately 
the goals of all users, i.e., the goals of laymen who only want to use software
“as is”, as well as the goals of the knowledgeable persons (specialists).25
23 See, e.g., R. M. Stallman, The GNU Project, at: http://www.gnu.org/gnu/thegnuproject.html.
24 See, e.g., Open Source Initiative, Open Source Case for Business, at: http://www.open-
source.org/advocacy/case_for_business.php.
25 Notably, even users who do not wish to control the working of software often prefer 
to use Free Software above using proprietary software. For example, while proprietary 
software still holds the majority of the market for desktop operating systems and offi ce 
applications, Free Software is often chosen in the server market and as the basis for web 
applications. Free Software is also quite popular amongst manufacturers of embedded 
devices.
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In summary, we state the following. Many Free Software programs bring 
us closer to the world as envisaged. The proprietary approach is aiming to 
do the same. Users may have different points of view depending on their 
technical qualifications, moral attitude, etc. Our position is that everyone 
should be allowed to choose an approach which they consider best for them-
selves. For this purpose it is necessary that both approaches are sufficiently 
protected by an adequate regulatory framework.
(4) Point of Departure: The Free Software Approach
In the thesis, we will analyse the protection of the Free Software approach. 
We find such an analysis appealing for the following two reasons.
First, we are not aware of any material threats to the proprietary 
approach. Indeed, there exist various laws that enable individuals who wish 
to control software exclusively to do so. The legal tools available to them 
definitely succeed in preventing the users of proprietary software to exercise 
the degree of control which is proposed under the Free Software approach. 
So, there is little risk that the proprietary approach will be displaced by the 
Free Software approach in the foreseeable future. Consequently, there is no 
apparent need for a legal research directed at the preservation of the propri-
etary approach.
Second, the Free Software approach faces many more threats than the 
proprietary approach. The preservation of the Free Software approach 
requires material efforts. Examples of threats mentioned above are software-
related patents or eGovernments based on closed standards. Although there 
is already an impressive body of literature on the Free Software approach, 
such problems have not been addressed to an extent necessary to guarantee 
that a choice between the two approaches will exist in the long run.
(5) The Research Goal
Our concern is that the regulatory framework for protecting the Free Soft-
ware approach needs further scrutiny, especially under the current condi-
tions, where governments (e.g., Germany, the Netherlands) specify policies 
supporting it and yet often find them difficult to implement. This issue leads 
to the following question: “To what extent is it possible to give every user 
control over the working of computer programs?” An answer to such a ques-
tion could provide valuable information about limitations and restrictions of 
the current regulatory framework of Free Software.
The information could then be used, for example, in the development of 
an improved framework, which would make it easier to follow the Free Soft-
ware approach. In particular, this would facilitate the governments to sub-
stantiate their policies. It would also benefit everyone in the pursuit of a 
world of seamless cooperation between computer programs and humans. 
We believe that an improved framework would protect the Free Software 
approach from threats which often make the proprietary approach the only 
realistically possible approach. So, we find the above question accurate for 
the purpose of the formulation of our Problem Statement. Moreover, we 
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stress that the development of an improved framework is to be considered 
as the Research Goal of this thesis.
(6) The Free Software Definition
For the formulation of a Problem Statement that can be dealt with in a scien-
tific way towards the Research Goal, we need to focus on a clearly defined 
notion of Free Software. In the preceding sections, we already provided a 
general understanding of this notion, but not a precise definition. There are 
two precise definitions that deserve consideration: (1) the “Free Software 
Definition” (hereinafter “FSD”), and (2) the “Open Source Definition” (here-
inafter “OSD”). In this thesis we decided to follow the FSD. Below, we per-
form a brief assessment of both definitions, and explain why FSD is better 
suited for the purpose of our research. A detailed analysis of the FSD and the 
OSD is presented in Chapter 2.
The FSD has been drafted by Stallman.26 It specifies the following four 
freedoms of software users (we only quote the parts most relevant for our 
study).
Freedom 0: “The freedom to run the program, for any purpose.”
Freedom 1: “The freedom to study how the program works, and adapt it to 
your needs. (...)”
Freedom 2: “The freedom to redistribute copies so you can help your neigh-
bor.”
Freedom 3: “The freedom to improve the program, and release your improve-
ments to the public, so that the whole community benefi ts. (...)”27
If a given program is subject to all the freedoms specified above, it is Free 
Software. Otherwise, the program is proprietary software. We find that the 
FSD is an accurate definition for the following two reasons.
First, user freedoms as specified in the FSD mean in particular that users 
are able to modify a Free Software program by removing bugs, including 
more features, and designing or modifying it in such a way that it interoper-
ates with other programs. The four freedoms allow users also to develop 
programs, and to distribute them, so that other users are able to use them as 
well. It is hard to imagine what else could be necessary for users to control 
the execution of software.
26 R.M. Stallman, Free Software Defi nition, op. cit.
27 Id.
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Second, in Chapter 2 we conclude in particular that the FSD requires that 
users are allowed to exercise all activities covered by copyright. Indeed, if a 
user were not able to exercise all these activities, the control would still 
require the copyright holder’s consent. So, any degree of control lesser than 
the degree specified in the FSD would mean in fact that the control is not 
given to users.
(7) The Open Source Definition
The OSD formulates certain requirements for a program to be considered 
Open Source. But Open Source programs and Free Software programs do 
not constitute separable classes. Both definitions contain essentially the same 
or similar requirements, although they use different wording. They both 
have been applied to scrutinize model software licenses with results that are 
to a large extent similar (the most popular Free Software licenses are also 
considered Open Source licenses).28 As a result, most (if not all) programs 
that are considered Free Software are at the same time considered Open 
Source.29 So, it seems that we could as well adopt the OSD as the definition 
that guides our research. But the FSD is better suited for the purposes of 
legal research. It specifies freedoms. “Freedom” is a legal notion, capable of 
being analysed using legal methodology, which is the main methodology 
used in this thesis.
(8) Consequences of following the Free Software Definition
The reader should be aware that by following the Free Software Definition we 
do not necessarily adopt Stallman’s moral position as mentioned above. Nei-
ther do we explicitly reject or identify ourselves with the position of Open 
Source advocates. Here we reiterate that both the Free Software approach 
and the proprietary approach are able to bring us closer to a world where 
humans and computer programs cooperate. Our position is that everyone 
should be allowed to choose an approach which they consider best for them-
selves. Precisely speaking, the fact that we follow the Free Software Defini-
tion means that we consider as “Free Software” only computer programs 
over which users can exercise control as specified by Stallman.
28 For details the reader should refer to Chapter 2.
29 It might be the case that some software licenses that do not meet the FSD can still satisfy 
the OSD (allegedly, the OSD requires that a lesser degree of control is given to users). 
According to Stallman, the OSD is “a little looser in some respects, and they have accep-
ted a few licenses that we consider unacceptably restrictive of the users.” (R. M. Stallman, 
Why “Free Software” is better than “Open Source”, at: http://www.fsf.org/licensing/
essays/free-software-for-freedom.html). So, there is some risk that if we followed the 
OSD in our research we would find a given level of protection of the Free Software 
approach adequate, while actually users would not be able to exercise control over soft-
ware at that level. Although we do not fi nd arguments that this is a material risk (see 
Chapter 2), it is an additional reason to follow the FSD in this thesis.
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(9) Two Conditions of User Freedoms
The reader is obviously aware that, as a default legal rule the control over 
who may use, develop, and distribute software lies in the hands of the copy-
right holders. Ceteris paribus, the existence of the freedoms is possible, only if 
the copyright holders decide to change the default arrangement. Therefore, 
their affirmative action (consent) is required in order to allow users to exercise 
the freedoms, in particular to develop or distribute a given piece of software.
Here, a new question arises, namely whether the consent of copyright 
holders to software is sufficient for users to exercise the freedoms. Stallman 
notes correctly that access to source codes (a source code is a copyrightable 
expression of software) is a condition for Freedom 1 and Freedom 3.30 How-
ever, given our previous findings, a program may be developed to interoper-
ate properly with other programs and then it may be distributed without 
restrictions if both (1) its source codes and (2) the specifications of standards 
used by other programs with which the program has to interoperate are 
accessible.31 It means that the relaxation of private control over software (in 
particular over the program’s source codes) is only the first necessary condi-
tion of user freedoms. The relaxation of private control over standards (in 
particular the interoperability information expressed in standard specifica-
tions) is the second necessary condition of user freedoms. So, we will analyse 
the protection of user freedoms by analysing whether both these conditions 
are satisfied and to what extent.
(10) Protection of User Freedoms
User freedoms are brought into existence by the copyright holders and 
designers of standards who follow the Free Software approach by relaxing 
their control over software and standards, respectively. The freedoms con-
tinue to exist as long as they are properly protected over time. The protection 
necessary to sustain a situation wherein every user is able to control the 
working of Free Software. In other words, the protection is necessary for the 
Free Software approach to be possible in the long run. Whether the freedoms 
are sufficiently protected depends on the rules that regulate the use, devel-
opment, and distribution of software. These rules (and the relations between 
them) can be arranged into a regulatory framework. In this thesis, we call 
such a framework “the regulatory framework of Free Software”, or “the 
framework” in short. We reconstruct a model of the current regulatory 
framework of Free Software in Chapter 3.
(11) The Focus on Software Communities and eGovernments
The model of the current regulatory framework can be used in a search for 
an answer to the question: “To what extent is it possible to give every user 
30 R.M. Stallman, Free Software Defi nition, op. cit.
31 By “accessible” we mean here not only available without limitations but also free from 
any legal restrictions.
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control over the working of computer programs?” But the extent of research 
necessary to perform such a task outgrows the resources gathered for the 
preparation of this thesis. At the same time, such a research would not be 
focussed on issues that are materially relevant. To make our task practica-
ble, we need to formulate a Problem Statement tailored to circumstances, 
in which the Free Software approach experiences restrictions and limita-
tions of material importance. From this point of view, software communi-
ties and eGovernments are of particular interest. As follows from previous 
sections they affect the use, development, and distribution of Free Software 
to a large extent. So, in the formulation of our Problem Statement we focus 
on the relations between software communities, eGovernments, and user 
freedoms.
Software communities evolve as a result of individual decisions of vari-
ous actors. By exercising their exclusive rights, using contractual freedom, 
and the freedom of association, the holders enable other individuals to form 
communities. Within the communities, the participants are guided and sup-
ported in their efforts to use, develop, and distribute Free Software. This is 
done by organizing relations between copyright holders and other actors. 
By organizing these relations, the communities affect the protection of user 
freedoms. Essentially, software communities influence the Free Software 
framework. The role of the communities will later be analysed in detail in 
Chapter 4.
eGovernments affect the relations between all actors in the scenes of soft-
ware and standards and their audience. Holders of rights to software, hold-
ers of rights to standards, software developers, software distributors, and 
users are all affected by eGovernments. They affect software communities as 
well. Government procurement of software has the most important impact, 
but other activities of eGovernments also influence the ability of all the actors 
to control the working of programs. Consequently, eGovernments affect the 
protection of user freedoms and they influence the Free Software framework. 
The role of eGovernments will be analysed in detail in Chapter 5.
(12) Formulation of the Problem Statement
So, in this thesis, we undertake an analysis of the roles of software communi-
ties and eGovernments in the protection of user freedoms. This leads us to a 
twofold Problem Statement (PS).
PS 1: What are the relations between user freedoms and software communi-
ties?
PS 2: What are the relations between user freedoms and eGovernments?
These problems are intriguing but difficult to answer on their own. There-
fore, we formulate three additional Research Questions in the next section.
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1.4 Research questions
Our Research Goal is to develop a new, improved regulatory framework that 
would be capable of resolving the inefficiencies in the protection of user free-
doms identified by analysing the Problem Statement. To achieve this goal, 
we formulate the following three Research Questions (RQs) that guide us 
throughout the analysis.
RQ 1: In what way do software communities affect the current regulatory 
framework concerning the protection of user freedoms, as articulated by 
Stallman?
RQ 2: In what way do eGovernments affect the current regulatory framework 
concerning the protection of user freedoms, as articulated by Stallman?
RQ 3: How to improve the regulatory framework so that it adequately protects 
user freedoms, as articulated by Stallman, in the world of software com-
munities and eGovernments?
We analyse the Problem Statement using a model of the current regulatory 
framework, within which software communities and eGovernments operate. We 
follow Stallman’s Free Software Definition in the analysis. In Section 1.6 we 
indicate in which chapter the Research Questions are addressed.
1.5 Research methodology
In order to answer the Problem Statement it is necessary (1) to reconstruct 
the current regulatory framework of Free Software in such a way that it can 
deal with our Research Questions. Then, it is necessary (2) to analyse how 
software communities and eGovernments affect the ability of the framework 
to protect the freedoms. Thereafter, we have (3) to identify the elements of 
the framework that protect the freedoms inadequately, and (4) to design the 
necessary amendments and propose specific modifications to the frame-
work.
The framework consists of (1) rules that regulate the use, development, 
and distribution of Free Software, and (2) the relations between the rules. So, 
we need to identify the rules and the relations by analysing their sources. In 
this thesis, we adopt a broad concept of regulation that may be the source of 
rules and relations between them. We identify the following four means of 
regulation, as specified by Lawrence Lessig:32 (1) the law, (2) the architecture, 
(3) the norms, and (4) the market. First, the law regulates by executing sanc-
32 Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 The Journal of Legal Studies 661 (June 
1998).
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tions for infringing rights or not performing obligations.33 Second, the archi-
tecture consists of natural limitations, as well as of restrictions created by 
humans. The architecture regulates by making some actions impossible or 
impracticable.34 Third, the norms regulate by using non-legal sanctions, as 
they are the creation of a social culture.35 Fourth, the market regulates by the 
price mechanism.36 We use these four concepts in our research methodology. 
Moreover, we adopt from Lessig the observation that regulation takes place 
both directly through these four means and indirectly by interactions 
between the means themselves.37
In the thesis we concentrate mostly on the rules created by the first regu-
lator, the law. Thus, the main methodology used to answer the research ques-
tions is the examination of sources of law. The objects of this examination are 
primary and secondary sources of law that regulate access to source codes 
and to standards to the extent this access is necessary to use, develop, and 
distribute software. The most relevant body of law is copyright law. How-
ever, we also refer to many other laws, because they affect the protection of 
the freedoms in some other way. In the analysis of a particular body of law, 
we concentrate on the black letter law (statutes and case law), and we also 
refer to legal commentaries and other examples of jurisprudence. We restrict 
our research to the laws of the European Union and Poland, but we often 
refer to the American law for a clear comparison. The research methodology 
uses logical legal reasoning to infer legal rules that form the regulatory 
framework and relations between the rules.
Our research is extended beyond the legal research in order to determine 
relations between legal rules and the rules that are created by the other three 
regulators: the architecture, the norms, and the market. Thus, we analyse the 
regulating power of law in relation to the regulating powers of: (1) the archi-
tecture of software and standards; (2) the norms that have evolved in the 
development of software and standards (in particular in the hacker culture); 
and (3) the markets of software and standards (in particular under the theo-
ries of transaction costs, network externalities, lock-ins etc.). In the thesis, the 
research in these three other means of regulation is directed mostly at the 
identification of the practical impact that legal rules of the framework may 
have on the freedoms under various circumstances.
In summary, our research methodology will consist of: (1) reconstruct-
ing a model of the current regulatory framework by using logical legal rea-
soning in the analysis of primary and secondary sources of law, as well as 
by analysing non-legal regulators of software and standards; (2) using the 
model to identify inefficiencies of the current regulatory framework from
33 Cf. id. at 662.
34 Id. at 663.
35 Id. at 662.
36 Id. at 663.
37 Id. Figure 2 at 667, and accompanying text.
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the point of view of user freedoms as exercised in the world of software com-
munities and eGovernments, and (3) formulating improvements to the 
framework.
1.6 Structure of the thesis
In order to answer the Problem Statement, we start by focussing on the 
Research Questions. The following structure guides our research. In Chapter 
2, we provide definitions and basic notions that are used throughout the anal-
ysis. In Chapter 3, we reconstruct a model of the current regulatory frame-
work by identifying the main sets of rules and relations between them. In 
Chapter 4, we focus on software communities and we formulate an answer to 
the Research Question 1. In Chapter 5, we focus on the eGovernments and we 
formulate an answer to the Research Question 2. In Chapter 6, we use the 
results of the analysis to formulate a proposal for an improved framework, 
which constitutes an answer to the Research Question 3. In Chapter 7 we pro-
vide the conclusions of the thesis and speculate on the provisional impact of 
our proposed framework. Moreover, we formulate directions for further 
research.
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2 Definitions and basic notions
This chapter contains definitions of the most important terms and presenta-
tions of the basic notions used throughout the thesis. All of them were 
already briefly introduced in the previous chapter. We start elaborating on 
“Free Software” (in Section 2.1) and on “Open Source Software” (in Section 
2.2); it is followed by an explanation of the relationship between these two 
notions. Thereafter, in Section 2.3 we elaborate on “open standards” and in 
Section 2.4 on “software communities”. Finally, in Section 2.5 we discuss 
“eGovernments”.
2.1 Free Software
Free Software is software that is available to any interested party together 
with the rights to control the working of the software. In order to allow for 
an effective control, the rights to Free Software encompass source codes, not 
only the binaries.38
Three practical implications of granting all these rights and making 
source codes available are as follows.
(1) Users may use a Free Software program.
(2) Users may actively develop it by removing its bugs and including 
new features.39 They may undertake the development either in a 
software community, or outside it.
(3) Users may become distributors of Free Software by sharing it with 
other users. They can share non-commercially, but they can also 
offer on the market both the program and any additional services 
that other users might want to bargain for.
38 As we already explained, a source code is a human-readable expression of a program that 
allows for its effective modifi cation. It also allows to study the program and understand 
its structure. For the purpose of using a program it has to be translated into a machine-
readable object code (also referred to as a “binary”). Binaries are impracticable to study 
and modify; this makes access to source codes necessary for the purpose of modifi cation. 
The latter constitutes a major part of a software development process. The need for modi-
fi cations is caused by (1) the existence of errors (“bugs”), (2) the lack of necessary fea-
tures, as well as (3) the need to provide for interoperability with other programs.
39 The may also provide means for interoperability of the program with other programs, 
assuming that apart from source codes they also have the necessary interoperability 
information (standard specifi cations).
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There are the following three common misinterpretations.
(1) Free Software should not be mistaken for “non-commercial”. The 
defi ning criterion of Free Software is the scope of the user’s rights, 
not price.
(2) Free Software should also not be mistaken for “freeware”, which is 
proprietary software given away gratis. Free Software may cost a 
price and it comes with certain signifi cant rights that users of free-
ware do not obtain.
(3) Free Software should not be mistaken for “public domain” soft-
ware, which is software not covered by copyright. Free Software is 
usually copyrighted, although licensed under specifi c terms. Pre-
cisely speaking, software released into the public domain together 
with its source codes is an example of Free Software, but not all 
Free Software is public domain software.
Stallman40 has defined a minimum scope of rights that have to be granted to 
users of a program in order for it to be considered Free Software. This mini-
mum scope embraces the four freedoms that have been expressed in the for-
mal Free Software Definition (“FSD”),41 and that we already listed in Section 
1.3. We repeat them here for a clear reference.
Freedom 0: “The freedom to run the program, for any purpose.”
Freedom 1: “The freedom to study how the program works, and adapt it to 
your needs. (...)”
Freedom 2: “The freedom to redistribute copies so you can help your neigh-
bor.”
Freedom 3: “The freedom to improve the program, and release your improve-
ments to the public, so that the whole community benefi ts. (...)”42
In order to understand the FSD precisely we have to know what the subject 
matter is, to which its requirements apply (see Subsection 2.1.1). Then, we 
have to know what these requirements exactly are (see Subsection 2.1.2). 
Afterwards, we have to identify the addressees of the requirements (see Sub-
section 2.1.3). Finally, we formulate conclusions on the FSD (in Subsection 
2.1.4).
40 R.M. Stallman, Free Software Defi nition, op.cit.
41 Id.
42 Id.
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2.1.1 Subject matter of the Free Software Definition
The subject matter of the FSD is software. Precisely speaking, the FSD 
extends to both source codes and binaries. Namely, it makes access to source 
codes a necessary condition of the freedoms (Freedom 1 and Freedom 3). It 
also requires that users should be free to redistribute binaries as well. Con-
versely, the FSD is silent on the specifications of protocols, interfaces, and 
data formats. Thus, a program may be Free Software even if its users do not 
have access to specifications of standards used by this program to interoper-
ate with other programs.43
Given the fact that both (1) access to source codes and (2) access to speci-
fication of standards are necessary for the protection of user freedoms, the 
satisfaction of the requirements of the FSD by a program is only the first 
(albeit necessary) step on the way towards the protection of the freedoms of 
users of that program.
2.1.2 Requirements of the Free Software Definition
The requirements of the FSD can be divided into (1) positive requirements, 
(2) negative requirements, and (3) optional requirements.44 Positive require-
ments are obligations to include certain items for a program to be Free Soft-
ware. Negative requirements are prohibitions to introduce certain items in 
relation to a Free Software program. Optional requirements are permissions 
for certain items as long as they are formulated in specific way, but nothing 
is required if they are absent. Below, we analyse all three types of require-
ments of the FSD.
(1) Positive requirements
We identify the following positive requirements. The FSD states that the 
freedoms should apply to every user. It also requires that the freedoms are 
irrevocable “as long as you do nothing wrong”. Additionally, the FSD speci-
fies activities that should be free to undertake for users of a program, for the 
program to be considered Free Software. These activities are: (1) running, (2) 
studying, (3) adapting, (4) redistributing, (5) improving, and (6) releasing.45 
43 A separate issue is whether it is practically possible to develop a Free Software program 
without access to such specifi cations. Usually, it is either impossible, or the resulting pro-
gram cannot interoperate properly with other programs.
44 The distinction between positive, negative, and optional requirements is for the conven-
ience of the reader only. We are aware of the fact that any requirement which is here pre-
sented as positive could be expressed in a way that makes it a negative one, and vice versa.
45 In the whole FSD document close synonyms of these words are also used. For example, it 
also mentions “using”, “modifying”, “publishing”, “changing”, “copying”, “selling”. In 
this thesis, for the sake of clarity, we will consider only the six activities mentioned in the 
list of the freedoms as covered with the FSD. These are: (1) running, (2) studying, (3) 
adapting, (4) redistributing, (5) improving, and (6) releasing.
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Not surprisingly, according to the FSD all these six activities should be free, 
not just some of them.
A question arises how these requirements translate into legal notions. 
The requirement that the freedoms should apply to every user means that 
every user should have rights specified in the FSD. The requirement that the 
freedoms be irrevocable “as long as you do nothing wrong” means that users 
should have their rights terminated only upon a breach. A breach is possible 
only if there are any obligations that can be breached. We note that the FSD 
does not specify exactly what these obligations are and what constitutes 
their breach.
The translation of the requirements that the six activities should be free 
for users requires a more elaborate analysis. According to copyright law, it is 
possible to restrict (at least) the following three activities: (1) copying, (2) 
distribution, and (3) modification of software.46 So we have to determine 
what the relations are between the six activities that the FSD requires to be 
free to undertake by users and the three activities that may be restricted 
using copyright. We observe the following relations.
(1) Running software typically involves at least copying.
(2) Studying software is theoretically possible without undertaking any 
activities covered by copyright law. However, effi cient studying of 
software usually involves running it, which brings us back to point 
(1) above and involves copying. Additionally, if source codes of a 
program are not available, the program may have to be decompiled 
to allow a person to study it effi ciently. Decompilation involves 
copying and modifi cation.
(3) Adapting and improving software requires modifi cation, and some-
times also copying.
46 Generally, there are two approaches in copyright law worldwide. Under the fi rst approach 
all imaginable activities with regard to the copyrighted work are subject to exclusive 
right. Under the second approach, the exclusive rights cover only activities enumerated 
in the respective law. The Software Directive includes in the exclusive copyrights of pro-
grams: reproducing, altering, distributing (to the public) including renting. The word 
“include” in its art. 4 together with reference to Berne Convention in Art. 1 allows to con-
clude that additional activities can be covered by exclusive rights by the Member States, 
but otherwise both the Software Directive and Berne Convention follow the second 
approach. Polish Copyright Act Art. 74.3 that implements the Software Directive, does 
not contain an open list, but according to some authors it should be interpreted to include 
activities not expressly mentioned therein (See e.g., J. Barta, R. Markiewicz, Prawo 
autorskie [Copyright] (Wolters Kluwer 2008), 133). At the same time, the Polish Copy-
right Act expressly extends the protection granted in the Software Directive by including 
all kinds of lending in exclusive distribution rights (whereas the recitals of the Software 
Directive expressly leave public lending outside of its scope); this can be regarded as an 
implementation of the Rental Directive. Under U.S. Copyright Act software-related copy-
rights cover: reproducing, preparing of derivative works, distributing. For sake of simpli-
city, in this thesis we assume that copyright covers copying, modifying, and distributing, 
which generally corresponds to the scope of copyright under all laws known to us.
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(4) Redistributing  and releasing software constitutes a form of distribu-
tion. Sometimes it may be possible to release a program without 
distributing it, but we fi nd it hardly possible without copying.47
We illustrate the relations between the six activities covered by the FSD and 
the three activities covered by copyright in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Relations between the FSD and copyright law
In Figure 2.1 thick circles represent aggregates of activities that involve copy-
ing, modification, or distribution (all three aggregates covered by copyright). 
Thin circles represent activities that involve running, studying, adapting, 
redistributing, improving, and releasing (all six aggregates covered by the 
FSD). Aggregates covered by copyright (copy, modify, distribute) do not have 
any overlap between themselves, but the six activities covered by the FSD do 
overlap with the three aggregates. Notably, under some circumstances (which 
we generally find unlikely), a user could undertake the running, studying, 
adapting, or improving of software without involving copying, modifying, 
or distributing. Conversely, we are not aware of any type of redistribution or 
release that would not involve any activities covered by copyright.
It follows that each of the six activities covered in the FSD usually 
requires at least one of the activities that may be restricted using copyright. It 
also follows that the exercise of all six activities covered in the FSD (i.e., the 
exercise of all user freedoms) requires the exercise of all three activities cov-
ered by copyright. This means that if we restrict at least one of the activities 
covered by copyright the users are not able to exercise all six activities cov-
ered by the FSD.
47 A program may be released as a web application, which is not distributed. However, in 
such a case, the program has to be copied on a server.
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Here, we may conclude that the positive requirements of the FSD can be 
translated into legal notions in the following way. A program is Free Soft-
ware if every user of the program has rights specified in the freedoms. These 
rights can terminate only upon a breach of some (unclear) obligations. The 
rights referred to in the FSD should allow users to exercise all six activities 
mentioned therein. Using the copyright notions of (1) copying, (2) modify-
ing, and (3) distributing one can conclude that the rights required by the FSD 
for users are copyrights. In other words, the FSD requires that users are free 
to exercise all activities covered by copyright. Nevertheless, the FSD does 
not require to release software from copyright protection, such as by trans-
ferring it to the public domain. In particular, the FSD does not forbid exercis-
ing one’s copyright in software by licensing. Indeed, the FSD has been 
applied in practice by the Free Software Foundation (hereinafter the “FSF”)48 
to scrutinize whether various software licenses meet the criteria for Free 
Software. As a result, the FSF has held many different licenses as FSD-com-
pliant. Programs released under these licenses are Free Software.
(2) Negative requirements
The FSD generally prohibits to impose restrictions on Free Software. Particu-
lar attention is given to contract restrictions. The basic rule of the law of con-
tracts is the freedom of parties. It means that there are almost no limitations 
on the restrictions that a party to a contract may impose on the other party, 
provided that there is an agreement. Consequently, the FSD states that it is 
impossible to list all possible contract restrictions and it reserves to the FSF 
the right to scrutinize each case separately. According to the FSD, “[i]f a con-
tract-based license restricts the user in an unusual way that copyright-based 
licenses cannot, and [such a way] isn’t mentioned here as legitimate, we will 
have to think about it, and we will probably decide [that the license] is non-
free.” So, we have to note that the list of negative requirements in the FSD is 
not exhaustive, it contains examples only.
We identify the following negative requirements explicitly indicated in 
the FSD. The FSD prohibits to impose three conditions on the exercise of the 
freedoms: (1) payment, (2) notification, and (3) export control. First, under 
the FSD the payment for Free Software cannot be used to extend the rights of 
the users who paid for Free Software as compared to the rights of users who 
received it without payment. Remarkably, this does not prohibit selling Free 
Software or otherwise develop or distribute it against remuneration. The 
FSD explicitly states that commercial use of Free Software has to be always 
allowed. Second, the FSD requires that users have to be allowed to exercise 
their freedoms without having to notify anyone. Third, the FSD does not 
48 The Free Software Foundation is a non-profi t organization established by Richard M. 
Stallman. It promotes Free Software and it maintains the FSD. In particular, it scrutinizes 
various software licenses in order to determine whether they are compliant with the FSD. 
See, http://www.fsf.org.
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allow to demand that the user observes any export control regulations to be 
able to exercise the freedoms.49
(3) Optional requirements
We identify four optional requirements of the FSD. First, the FSD allows to 
demand that the users distribute a Free Software program in a specific way, 
as long as they “don’t conflict with the central freedoms” (we would like to 
refer to this requirement as “distribution rules”). Second, the FSD allows to 
demand that users package modified versions of Free Software in a particu-
lar way. However, this cannot block the freedom to release modified versions 
(Freedom 3) (we would like to refer to this requirement as “packaging 
rules”). Third, the FSD allows to demand that if a program is made available 
in a certain way, it also has to be made available in some other way (we 
would like to refer to this requirement as “publishing rules”). Fourth, the 
FSD allows to demand from a user who distributes a modified version to 
send a copy to a previous developer or to provide identification (we would 
like to refer to this requirement as “reporting rules”).50
The FSD permits to impose the above mentioned rules provided some 
limits are observed. However, the FSD does not specify where exactly these 
limits are. Most probably, the limits have to be interpreted from the overall 
goal of the FSD and from the practice of its application. First, the whole 
phrasing of the FSD suggests that its goal is to safeguard the interest of users. 
This means that any ambiguities should not be used to decrease user free-
doms. Second, from the licenses approved by the FSF as FSD-compliant it 
follows that in practice it is not possible to impose any material obligations 
on users.51 We may conclude from the above that optional requirements are 
of minor importance. User freedoms have to remain practically unaffected 
by them, otherwise a program could not be called “Free Software”.
2.1.3 Addressees of the FSD
A natural question that arises here is: to whom are all the requirements of the 
FSD addressed? In other words, who is required to observe that some items 
are present (positive requirements), who is not allowed to restrict users (neg-
49 The FSD notes that this would not make the export control regulations inapplicable. It 
would only allow users, who are outside of the jurisdictions where these regulations 
apply, to exercise their freedoms.
50 A careful reader should ask how can such reporting rules be consistent with the negative 
requirement to be allowed to exercise the freedoms without having to notify anyone. The 
FSD does not provide a clear guidance on this issue.
51 Free Software licenses usually require to provide users with certain information (copyright 
notices, license text), and pass through liability limitations and warranty disclaimers. Some 
licenses contain also so-called copyleft clauses, which require not to restrict user freedoms 
and provide them with source codes. For a good overview of notice requirements in vari-
ous Free Software licenses see: Heather J. Meeker, The Open Source Alternative 
Understanding Risks and Leveraging Opportunities (Wiley, 2008), 83 et. seq.
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ative requirements), and who has to observe certain limits while demanding 
some performance from users (optional requirements)?
Obviously, all these requirements are addressed to copyright holders. 
However, there are many other entities that are able to restrict users in a way 
contrary to all the requirements of the FSD. For example, some Free Software 
distributors conclude contracts whereby users undertake to use certain 
short-listed software only, or to refrain from modification or distribution.52 
The distributors can alternatively attempt to restrict users by making a Free 
Software program a part of a device or a service (i.e., by using the architec-
ture). Also, some patent holders could enforce their software-related patents 
against users of Free Software, restricting their freedoms as a result. How-
ever, the FSF has not declared that programs subject to such third-party 
restrictions are non-Free Software. The FSF makes the FSD applicable only to 
licenses that regulate a relationship between users and copyright holders. 
So, only copyright holders are the addressees of the requirements of the FSD. 
We illustrate this in Figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2: Addressees of the FSD
In Figure 2.2 we see a black dot that represents a copyright holder to a Free 
Software program (licensor). Other dots (grey and white) represent users 
bound by the license granted by the licensor and, possibly, with some con-
tract restrictions that accompany the license. These relations with the licen-
sor are represented by solid arrows and only these relations are regulated by 
the FSD. As we already explained in the previous chapter, some users (grey 
dots) become software distributors and distribute Free Software to other 
users. Users (white dots) that obtain a Free Software program from distribu-
52 See: Slashdot, Hans Reiser Speaks Freely About Free Software Development, at: http://devel-
opers.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=03/06/18/1516239&tid=156&tid=11. (“You do all 
understand that while the GPL doesn’t permit tying by license, distros have now moved 
to using threats of invalidating support contracts to achieve the market leverage they 
need to exclude competitors, yes? By doing this they can exclude mainstream offi cial 
kernels from being used, exclude rival fi lesystems, exclude whatever might lead to less 
customer lockin.”)
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tors still remain in a direct relation with the licensor.53 They are also in rela-
tion with the distributors, usually based on a contract concluded with the 
distributor, based on an additional distributor’s license, or because they use 
the distributor’s service or device. The relations with distributors are repre-
sented using dashed arrows. None of the user-distributor relations results in 
the program becoming non-Free Software. The FSD does not regulate the 
relations between distributors and users.54
Here, we may conclude that all requirements of the FSD are addressed to 
copyright holders only. They are not addressed in particular to distributors 
or other third parties such as patent holders.
2.1.4 Conclusion on Free Software Definition
From the above analysis we may conclude that the subject matter of the FSD 
is software. Programs are “Free Software” as defined in the FSD as long as 
their source codes (most preferably together with the binaries) are made 
available under a license that allows not only to use the software, but also do 
develop and distribute it. Any restrictions on standards used by a program 
do not affect compliance with the FSD at all.
Also, we may conclude that for a software license to be FSD-compliant it 
has to allow users for all three activities covered by copyright (copying, 
modification, distribution). The license cannot impose any material restric-
tions, in particular contract restrictions. The FSD does not contain any 
exhaustive list of forbidden restrictions, but it specifically forbids to condi-
tion the freedoms upon (1) payment, (2) notification, and (3) compliance 
with export control regulations. Nevertheless, it is allowed to impose some 
minor conditions specified in the optional requirements of the FSD. We iden-
tify them as: (1) distribution rules, (2) packaging rules, (3) publishing rules, 
and (4) reporting rules. These conditions are of minor importance, because 
the overall goal of the FSD and the practice of its application do not allow to 
use them to affect user freedoms materially.
Additionally, we may conclude that the addressees of the FSD are copy-
right holders (licensors) only. This means that an FSD-compliant license 
granted by the copyright holder in a program is sufficient for the program to 
become Free Software. Any restrictions applied by third parties, such as dis-
tributors or patent holders, escape the scrutiny. Thus, it is possible to call a 
program “Free Software” even though it would be subject to restrictions out-
side the FSD. In other words, compliance with the FSD means that the free-
doms have been granted, but it does not mean that they are protected under 
all circumstances, and that they may be exercised in a particular context.
53 See FN 86.
54 Such a relation may be regulated by a Free Software license (e.g., using copyleft), but there 
are licenses that do not contain such regulations (e.g., non-copyleft licenses), which are still 
FSD-compliant.
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In this thesis we follow the FSD and treat as “Free Software” any soft-
ware that is subject to an FSD-compliant license. Subsequently, we analyse 
how the freedoms in such software are protected in a particular context of 
software communities and eGovernments. Therefore, we do not adopt 
another possible approach, which would be to treat software as “Free Soft-
ware” only if users may exercise all their freedoms under any circumstance.
2.2 Open Source Software
Essentially, Open Source Software is available to any interested party togeth-
er with the rights to control its working. The rights encompass source codes, 
not only the binaries. Thus, a question arises whether “Open Source Soft-
ware” is the same as “Free Software”. In order to answer this question and to 
explain the relationship between these two terms, it is necessary at least to 
analyse the formal Open Source Definition (“OSD”).55 The OSD is used by 
the Open Source Initiative to award certification marks for software licenses 
that fulfil ten minimum criteria for the scope of rights set thereto. These min-
imum criteria are as follows.56
(1) Free redistribution
(2) Access to source code
(3) The right to prepare and distribute derived works
(4) Protection of integrity of the author’s source code
(5) No discrimination against persons or groups
(6) No discrimination against fi elds of endeavor
(7) Distribution of license as an adhesive standard form
(8) License must not be specifi c to a product
(9) License must not restrict other software that is distributed along
(10) License must be technology-neutral.
The FSD and the OSD cannot be easily compared. Certainly, it is possible to 
indicate the following relations. For example, “free redistribution” corre-
sponds with Freedom 2, the freedom to redistribute. “Access to source codes” 
and “the right to prepare and distribute derived works” each correspond 
with both Freedom 1 (the freedoms to study and adapt) and Freedom 3 (the 
freedoms to improve and release). “No discrimination against persons or 
groups”, “no discrimination against fields of endeavor”, “license must not 
restrict other software that is distributed along”, and “license must be tech-
nology-neutral” all correspond to some extent with Freedom 0 (the freedom 
55 Open Source Initiative, Open Source Defi nition, at: http://opensource.org/docs/defi ni-
tion.php.
56 See: the Open Source Defi nition, op.cit.. The document elaborates on all these 10 criteria. 
For a good commentary on the OSD see: Andrew M. St. Laurent, Understanding 
Open Source and Free Software Licensing (O’Reilly, 2004), 8 et seq.
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to run the program). The remaining conditions of the OSD do not correspond 
with the FSD in such a direct way. It follows that the OSD covers all require-
ments of the FSD and probably some additional requirements.
However, in practice the OSD has been applied in the evaluation of 
licenses in a similar manner as the FSD. All most popular model Free Soft-
ware licenses are certified as “Open Source”.57 Thus, it seems reasonable to 
assume that there are no substantial normative differences between software 
referred to as “Free” and “Open Source”.58 Additionally, since this thesis is 
about the protection of user freedoms as defined in the FSD, there is no need 
to undertake any further analysis of the OSD.
2.3 Open standards
The notion of “open standards” is closely related to Free Software. We have 
highlighted this relation already when discussing the combinations between 
software and standards in Subsection 1.1.3. The essence is that a Free Software 
program may be required to interoperate with other programs. Such other 
programs may use a closed standard, or an open standard. Either way, the 
choice of a standard affects the capability of Free Software programs to inter-
operate with such other programs.59 Consequently, the choice of a standard
57 Compare: Free Software Foundation, Various Licenses and Comments About Them, at: 
http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/license-list.html with: Open Source Initiative, The 
Approved Licenses, at: http://opensource.org/licenses/.
58 See: Richard M. Stallman, Why “Free Software” is better than “Open Source”, at: http://
www.fsf.org/licensing/essays/free-software-for-freedom.html.
59 Interoperability is often defi ned as the capability of different elements to exchange infor-
mation, to understand it and reuse. There are three levels of interoperability: (1) technical 
interoperability means the set of technical requirements that have to be observed in order 
to allow the exchange of information between IT systems; (2) semantic interoperability 
means the ability to understand the information exchanged; and (3) organizational inter-
operability, which is the ability to use and reuse the information across the systems (Euro-
pean Commission, IDABC, Linking up Europe: the Importance of Interoperability for eGovern-
ment Services, Commission Staff Working Paper, 7 (EC 2003), at: http://europa.eu.int/
idabc/servlets/Doc?id=1675). For example, in order for an application to interoperate 
properly with an operating system, it has to use the interfaces of the system. With the 
help of interfaces, it is also possible for one application to interoperate with another one. 
Network protocols provide for the interoperability of the layers of a network. (On “lay-
ers” see: Wikipedia, OSI Model, at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OSI_model) In case of 
the Internet, its interoperability is strongly dependent on the design of its standard proto-
cols according to the layer transparency principle and the end-to-end principle. (On “lay-
er transparency” see: Lawrence B. Solum, Minn Chung, The Layers Principle: Internet 
Architecture and the Law, 79 Notre Dame Law Review 815, 816 (2004); on “end-to-end” 
see: J.H Saltzer, D.P. Reed, D.D. Clark, End-to-End Argument in System Design, 2 ACM 
Transactions in Computer Systems 277 (1984), at: http://web.mit.edu/Saltzer/www/
publications/endtoend/endtoend.pdf). As far as the data formats are concerned, two 
given applications would not be capable of interoperation unless the sender’s application 
provided the data in a format supported by the recipient’s application.
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by developers of other programs indirectly affects user freedoms in the Free 
Software program. Below, we explain this indirect relation between open 
standards and Free Software in more detail.
In this thesis we refer to standards of (1) interfaces, (2) protocols, and (3) 
data formats.60 Interfaces may be defined as communication methods 
between all elements of a computer (i.e., its hardware, operating system, and 
applications). Protocols usually refer to the methods of communication 
between programs (and other elements of IT systems) that interoperate over 
a network, such as the Internet. Data formats refer to the representation of 
the information constituting the communication itself. Thus, standards 
should not be mistaken for software. Rather, they only specify how software 
should work (precisely speaking, how it should interoperate). As we already 
explained, in practice interoperability depends on the access to “standard 
specifications”. Specifications are documents that contain the information 
necessary to develop a program that is able to interoperate using the stan-
dard in question.61
For a standard to be open, its specification should not be just available, 
but also contain as much quality information as possible. The quality influ-
ences the degree of interoperability of programs and the number of different 
programs that may interoperate.62 Additionally, there should be only mini-
mum restrictions on the use of the information necessary to implement an 
open standard, and on the use of the implementations. It is possible to imag-
ine multiple sources of such restrictions,63 but the ones most commonly 
referred to in discussions about the openness of standards are patents that are 
60 For a widely accepted defi nition of a “standard” in general see: ISO/IEC Guide 2:2004 
Standardization and related activities – General vocabulary.
61 If the specifi cation of a standard is ambiguous or incomplete, access to the standard’s 
reference implementation may also be necessary. If a standard is implemented in soft-
ware the access to its reference implementation would encompass making available its 
source codes. Conversely, if there is no specifi cation available, the knowledge of source 
codes or decompiled binaries of a program that implements a standard, theoretically 
allows a suffi ciently skilled person to enable a program to interoperate by using this 
standard. However, reconstructing interfaces, protocols, and data formats by studying 
binaries or even source codes, without access to specifi cations is extremely ineffi cient and 
impracticable.
62 Bruce Perens indicates that open standards must allow a wide range of implementations 
that may be created by various entities (businesses, academia, public projects). See: Bruce 
Perens, Open Standards Principles and Practice, at: http://perens.com/OpenStandards/
Defi nition.html.
63 For example, the practice of “embrace-and-extend” is based on offering standard imple-
mentations together with extensions that themselves are not standard-compatible. See: 
Bruce Perens, Open Standards Principles and Practice, at: http://perens.com/OpenStan-
dards/Defi nition.html.
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material to the standard.64 All these elements depend in practice (1) on design-
ers of standards who prepare their specifications and (2) on holders of mate-
rial patents. The designer and the patent holder may occasionally be the 
same person.
In this thesis, we would like to follow the definition of open standards 
included in the European Interoperability Framework v. 1.0 (henceforth the 
“EIF”).65 The EIF defines open standards as:66
(1) adopted and maintained by a not-for-profi t organization, with its 
development process occurring on the basis of an open decision-
making procedure available to all interested parties;
(2) published with the specifi cation available for free or at a nominal 
charge, with the right to copy, distribute, and use it;
(3) the intellectual property of the standard made irrevocably available 
on a royalty-free basis; and
(4) without constraints on the re-use of the standard.
From the above we may conclude that the indirect relation between open 
standards and user freedoms is as follows. The less restrictions on a stan-
dard, the more programs may use it to interoperate. In particular, an open 
standard may be implemented in Free Software without any major prob-
lems. This allows to use such software in an environment consisting of other 
programs based on the open standard. Thus, it allows to make such software 
work better. Undoubtedly, this reinforces the freedoms, because it makes it 
more easy and practical to use, adapt, distribute, and improve programs, 
especially in a networked environment. Otherwise, these activities would be 
either impractical, or lead to an infringement of somebody’s right (e.g., 
a material patent). Therefore, it is necessary to analyse the notion of open
64 See, e.g., Janice M. Mueller, Patent Misuse Through the Capture of Industry Standards, 17 
Berkeley Technology Law Journal 623 (2002) (arguing that “patent owners should 
have a mandatory obligation to disclose the existence of any patents or pending applica-
tions that are material to the standard during their participation in the standards-setting 
process” (at 630)).
65 At the moment of this writing (2009), the consultations of the EIF 2.0 have fi nished. See: 
http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/en/document/7728. For a good overview of other under-
standings of the notion of “open standards” see: WIPO (Standing Committee on the Law 
of Patents), Standard and Patents, (18 February 2009, SCP/13/2), at: http://www.wipo.
int/edocs/mdocs/scp/en/scp_13/scp_13_2.pdf.
66 The European Interoperability Framework (EIF, at: http://europa.eu.int/idabc/serv-
lets/Doc?id=19528), is the document that “represents the highest-ranking module of a 
comprehensive methodological tool kit for implementing pan-European eGovernment 
services” (id. at 5). EIF defi nes open standards at page 9. See: Nicos L. Tsilas, The Threat to 
Innovation, Interoperability, and Government Procurement Options From Recently Proposed 
Defi nitions of “Open Standards”, Special Issue Global Flow of Information, Autumn 
2005 (at: http://www.ijclp.org/10_2005/pdf/ijclp_08_10_2005.pdf).
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standards while discussing the protection of user freedoms. In this thesis we 
will undertake such an analysis in particular in the context of eGovernments 
(see Chapter 5).
2.4 Software communities
The beneficiaries of freedoms granted to Free Software may be individuals, 
firms, government agencies, etc. Many such users remain passive and exer-
cise only Freedom 0, by using Free Software for a purpose of their choice. 
Other freedoms are exercised by active users only. Many such active users 
organize themselves in communities. In this thesis, we use the term software 
community, or simply community, to describe a group of entities that collabo-
rate in the development of a Free Software project and that may also distrib-
ute the project to other users, as well as that provide guidance on its use.67
We use the word project, not program, in the description of software com-
munities because not all software communities are organized around single 
Free Software programs (such as the Linux kernel community). There are 
many communities of gathered around combinations of programs organized 
in a functional whole (such as GNU/Linux distributions, desktop environ-
ments, office suites, etc.). Strictly speaking, we should refer to at least three 
types of software communities: (1) communities of single Free Software pro-
grams, (2) communities of combinations of programs, and (3) the overall 
“Free Software Community”.
Because there are many Free Software programs and the differences 
between them are large, there are many Free Software communities, and the 
overall “Free Software Community” is not homogeneous. In our research we 
focus on communities of hierarchical and quite formalized structures. They 
may be communities that maintain single programs (such as the Linux ker-
nel) or communities that maintain combinations of programs (such as of a 
GNU/Linux distribution). We anticipate that such communities would have 
the strongest possible impact on user freedoms. Additionally, such commu-
nities may have developed the most significant and advanced Free Software 
projects. So, we do not include in the analysis less organized communities 
and one-person projects, as we assume that they do not involve any major 
qualitative change in the way user freedoms are exercised or protected. 
67 This defi nition may not be in compliance with the strict sociological meaning of “com-
munity”. For some sociological analysis, see, e.g.: Margaret S. Elliot, Walt Scacchi, Free 
Software Development: Cooperation and Confl ict in A Virtual Organizational Culture, in: S. 
Koch (ed.), Free/Open Source Software Development (Idea Publishing, 2004), book 
chapter at: http://www.ics.uci.edu/~wscacchi/Papers/New/Elliot-Scacchi-BookChap-
ter.pdf (referring to the concept of a community of practice, defi ned as “a group of people 
who share similar goals, interests, beliefs, and value systems in a common domain of 
recurring activity or work”).
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We also do not analyse the overall Free Software Community, since we do 
not find that it has developed any organization sufficient for our analysis, 
but in passing we mention how the overall community affects user free-
doms. It follows that there are projects and communities not referred to in 
this thesis, to which our findings and conclusions may not apply.68
We discuss how software communities affect user freedoms in Chapter 4.
2.5 eGovernment
We use the following understanding of eGovernment. It is any communica-
tion directed to or originating from public administration that is carried out 
with the use of information technologies, in particular with the use of com-
puter programs, usually interoperating over a network such as the Inter-
net.69 The notion of eGovernment should not be limited to internal commu-
nications of public administration only. Here, we would like to adopt a 
broader understanding and even focus on communications with the indi-
viduals, firms, and other users of government services.
The types of communications that we would like to include in eGovern-
ment are:
(1) making available various public information, e.g., on the WWW,
(2) making it possible or sometimes even making it mandatory to use 
information technologies in order to exercise rights or perform obli-
gations vis-à-vis the state, and
(3) realizing the notion of open society by initiating public consultations 
on draft laws or on any other decisions that affect public interest.
As we already indicated in Chapter 1, the government significantly affects 
all other actors in the scene of software and standards. This is mostly due 
to the fact that the government generates significant demand impulses in 
the software market, namely the demand for software to be used in eGov-
ernment. The government does that by exercising the dominium, i.e., activi-
ties such as procurement and performance of contracts. The government 
can also interfere using the imperium, i.e., the power of the executive to issue 
regulations that bind the actors or the audience in the scene of software or 
68 See: Kevin Crowston, James Howison, The social structure of free and open source software 
development, Firstmonday, at: http://www.fi rstmonday.org/issues/issue10_2/crow-
ston/index.html; Sandeep Krishnamurthy, Cave or Community? An Empirical Examination 
of 100 Mature Open Source Projects, Firstmonday, at: http://www.fi rstmonday.org/issues/
issue7_6/krishnamurthy/index.html.
69 Compare: EC Communication, The role of eGovernment for Europe’s future, (COM(2003) 567, 
not published in OJ); See also: Wikipedia, eGovernment, at: http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/eGovernment.
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standards. The dominium and the imperium are exercised by the executive 
branch of the government. Additionally, the government can interfere on the 
scene of software or standards using its two remaining branches: the legisla-
tive and the judiciary. In this thesis we would like to focus on the govern-
ment (the executive branch) acting within its dominium. Precisely speaking, 
we will closely analyse the impact on user freedoms of the dominium when 
exercised in order to introduce eGovernment. Only after we find that as a 
result of using the dominium user freedoms are affected negatively, or the 
dominium is unable to affect them positively, we will discuss using the impe-
rium, as well as the legislative or the judiciary, in the construction of an 
improved framework.
By using the standards as a criterion, it is possible to enumerate two vari-
ants of eGovernment:
(1) eGovernment based on closed standards (henceforth called “Closed 
eGovernment”);
(2) eGovernment based on open standards (henceforth called “Open 
eGovernment”).
In Chapter 5 we introduce sub-variants of eGovernments and discuss how 
all of them affect user freedoms.
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3 Regulatory framework of Free Software
In this chapter we reconstruct a model of the current regulatory framework 
of Free Software. The framework consists of (1) rules that regulate user free-
doms (i.e., rules for using, developing, and distributing Free Software) and 
(2) relations between the rules. Below, we recall our findings so far and then 
stipulate a working programme.
In Chapter 1 we identified two subscenes of a world where humans and 
computer programs cooperate. These are (1) the scene of software itself and 
(2) the scene of standards used by software. We concluded that there are two 
necessary conditions for a person to be able to control the working of a pro-
gram. There should be: (1) access to source codes of the program, and (2) 
access to specifications of the standards used by the program to interoperate 
with other programs. We also concluded in Chapter 1 that the conditions of 
the protection of user freedoms are the same as the conditions of the control 
over the working of programs. Consequently, (1) access to source codes and 
(2) access to specifications of standards are both necessary for the protection 
of user freedoms. So, we should identify rules for both software (in particu-
lar source codes) and standards (in particular specifications of standards).
In Chapter 2 we stated that Free Software is software that is available to 
any interested party together with certain rights. The rights allow anyone to 
distribute an original Free Software program.70 Also, anyone is allowed to 
develop an improvement71 of such a program, and distribute improve-
ments.72 This means that a user can obtain either (1) an original Free Soft-
ware program, or (2) an improvement of such a program. Additionally, this 
70 In fact no-one usually distributes the original program per se. Rather, copies of the pro-
gram are distributed, while the original is kept by the copyright holder. Here, we use the 
term “original” to indicate a verbatim copy of the original program. Sometimes, when 
speaking in the context of copyrights and proprietary software, “original” is also used to 
mean “authorized by the copyright holder”, not necessarily verbatim. We do not use this 
meaning of “original” in this thesis, since Free Software licenses contain such an authori-
zation and it would be quite hard to indicate a “non-original” Free Software in this mea-
ning. Nevertheless, it is possible to talk about “offi cial versions” of Free Software pro-
grams (see Section 4.2).
71 Certainly, anyone is also allowed to make the program worse. For practical reasons, we 
focus only on such manipulations with programs that result in improvements.
72 An improvement may be a modification of the program (a patch, an update, or an 
upgrade). An improvement may also consist of the program combined together with 
another program to make a new product. Here, we include improvements that are made 
by combining one’s own material with the program, as well as by combining the program 
with a third party program. By “combining” we intend to cover many different software 
engineering techniques, such as linking, interaction through APIs, creating plug-ins, etc. 
Different combinations can have different legal consequences.
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means that a developer or a distributor of Free Software can be either (1) its 
copyright holder, or (2) a third party. There are numerous combinations 
between who develops and distributes Free Software, and what kind of Free 
Software is developed and distributed. These combinations form various 
development and distribution chains. We illustrate example development 
and distribution chains in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1: Example development and distribution chains
It is possible to imagine an unlimited number of additional development 
and distribution chains other than the ones presented in Figure 3.1. Yet, we 
need to construct a model of the framework applicable to all the chains. In 
order to do so, we have to group all of them into a limited number of classes. 
In Figure 3.1 we can see that certain chains are similar, at least from the point 
of view of the user (i.e., at the last point of the chain). The similarity is that in 
each chain (1) the user obtains either an original or an improved Free Soft-
ware program and (2) the user obtains them either from their copyright 
holders or from third parties. This means that any development and distri-
bution chain can be assigned to one of four classes. There are four classes, 
because there are only four combinations between who distributes and what 
is distributed. We present these combinations in the following Table 3.1.
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copyright holder third party
original
a user obtains an original Free 
Software program from the 
copyright holder of the original
a user obtains an original Free 
Software program from a third 
party
improvement
a user obtains an improvement 
of a Free Software program 
from the copy right holder of 
the improvement
a user obtains an improvement 
of a Free Software program 
from a third party
Table 3.1: Four combinations between who distributes and what is distributed
Some clarifications are necessary with regard to Table 3.1. The bottom row 
refers to improvements of Free Software. Given the unencumbered distribu-
tion of Free Software, there can be a case that someone distributes improve-
ments copyrighted (developed) by someone else. Actually, this is a common 
situation in the Free Software scene. All these situations are represented in 
the bottom-right cell of Table 3.1. We remark that this cell covers both a situ-
ation when the improvement is distributed by a third party that has no copy-
right title to the improvement at all, as well as a situation when the improve-
ment is distributed by the copyright holder of the original (who is then a 
third party from the point of view of the user and the copyright holder of the 
improvement).
Consequently, the bottom-left cell represents only a situation when the 
improvement is distributed by its copyright holder (the copyright holder of 
the improvement). As far as the top row is concerned, the top-left cell repre-
sents only a situation when the original is distributed by its copyright holder 
(copyright holder of the original). The top-right cell represents both a situa-
tion when the original is distributed by a third party without any copyright 
title, as well as a situation when the original is distributed by the copyright 
holder of an improvement of the original (who is a third party from the point 
of view of the user and the copyright holder of the original).
In each of the four combinations presented in Table 3.1 user freedoms 
could be affected. So, in this chapter we reconstruct a model of the current 
regulatory framework that includes rules (and relations between the rules) 
that regulate user freedoms in all these four combinations. Our process is as 
follows.
(1) We identify the rules for software and relations between them (see 
Section 3.1).
(2) We identify the rules for standards and relations between them (see 
Section 3.2).
(3) We reconstruct a model of the current framework for further analy-
sis (see Section 3.3).
(4) Finally, we present chapter conclusions (see Section 3.4).
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Below, whenever we include a rule or a relation in the model of the frame-
work, we assign it with a number. For the sake of clarity we separately num-
ber rules and relations. “RUx” stands for a number of a rule, where x is a 
consecutive integer number. “REy” stands for a number of a relation, where 
y is a consecutive integer number.
3.1 Identification of rules for software and relations between them
We start the identification of rules for software by identifying the default rule. 
Then, we identify the remaining rules. The default rule can be identified by 
taking a closer look at the requirements of the FSD vis-à-vis the current copy-
right law. Essentially, the FSD requires to grant users their freedoms. More 
specifically, the FSD requires that all users of a program should be free to 
perform six activities with source codes and binaries of the program. These 
activities are: (1) running, (2) studying, (3) adapting, (4) redistributing, (5) 
improving, and (6) releasing. According to current copyright law, copyright 
holders have exclusive control over programs. Basically, they control the fol-
lowing three activities: (1) copying, (2) modification, and (3) distribution of 
programs. The exclusive control means that persons not authorized by copy-
right holders are not allowed to perform any of these three activities.73 Nota-
bly, the six activities covered by the FSD are included in the three activities 
that may be restricted using copyright.74 This means that by default copy-
right holders have exclusive control over the six activities covered in the 
FSD.75 So, the freedoms do not exist as a default, and the default rule is as fol-
lows.
The default rule: Under the current copyright law, users are allowed to exercise all six 
activities covered by the FSD only if copyright holders authorize them to perform all 
three activities covered by copyright law. This means that copyright holders are allowed to 
prevent users from exercising all six activities covered by the FSD.
In particular, no-one can become a user, developer, or a distributor of a program unless 
the copyright holder of the program agrees.
73 The exclusive control has certain exceptions, such as the idea/expression dichotomy, time 
bar, fair use, fi rst sale, and no prohibition against independent creations of copyrighted 
works. Additional exceptions are provided for by some software-specifi c regulations, 
such as the limited decompilation right. These exceptions, however, do not affect the 
exclusive nature of control materially.
74 Cf. our fi ndings in Subsection 2.1.2.
75 Nowadays, copyright protection applies automatically and without any formalities from 
the moment an original program is written. Also, owing to international law, such as the 
Berne Convention, TRIPS, and WIPO Copyright Treaty, copyrights have been signifi cant-
ly harmonized over the world. Copyright laws are imposed by governmental regulation. 
In the broadest sense, this rule is imposed and enforced by all government branches: the 
legislative, the executive, and the judiciary. Such regulation is generally binding. Thus, 
currently copyright holders easily obtain exclusive rights to software that are effective 
erga omnes in a signifi cant number of jurisdictions all over the world.
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A user can obtain an original Free Software program if only the copyright 
holder of the original agrees to make it available as Free Software. It follows 
that the default rule covers both combinations presented in the top row of Table 
3.1 (i.e., combinations related to original programs). The remaining two com-
binations (bottom row) are related to improvements. Improvements are usu-
ally derivative works or collective works based on the original program.76 Under 
the current copyright law, the exercise of the freedoms in such improvements 
requires both (1) the consent of the copyright holder of the original, and (2) the 
consent of the copyright holder of the improvement. It follows that the default 
rule covers also both combinations presented in the bottom row of Table 3.1 
(i.e., combinations related to improvements). In all four combinations the 
respective copyright holders have to agree to the exercise of user freedoms. 
Thus, the default rule regulates all four combinations presented in Table 3.1.
We include the default rule as the first rule in the model of the framework 
(RU1). In the remainder of this section we identify other rules and relations 
between them that we also include in the framework. We first identify the 
rules and relations that follow from Free Software licenses (3.1.1). Then, we 
identify the other rules for software (3.1.2). Finally, we formulate our conclu-
sions on rules for software and on relations between them (3.1.3).
3.1.1 Free Software licenses
Below, we analyse four issues related to Free Software licenses and we iden-
tify rules and relations that follow from these issues. The issues are: (1) the 
grant of freedoms, (2) the right to fork, (3) copyleft, and (4) the hacker immunity.
(1) The grant of freedoms
Consent of copyright holders is necessary for users to exercise their freedoms 
in all four combinations presented in Table 3.1. In case of an original Free 
Software program, the copyright holder of the original has to agree. In case 
of an improvement of a Free Software program, both the copyright holder of 
the original and the copyright holder of the improvement have to agree. As 
the reader may understand, copyright holders that follow the Free Software 
approach do agree that users exercise their freedoms. The usual form used 
76 Theoretically, some improvements are neither derivative nor collective works based on 
the original program. In such a case they are either independent works of copyright, or 
they are do not qualify as copyrightable subject matter. Some copyrighted improvements 
can also constitute joint works. Here, we focus on such improvements that are copyright-
able and are derivative or collective works based on the original program. For the sake of 
simplicity, we do not cover development of programs made in a direct collaboration of 
various copyright holders, which would lead to a creation of joint works. We address the 
joint work issue in more detail in Chapter 4.
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by the copyright holders is a copyright license.77 This means that software is 
coined Free Software by copyright holders themselves,78 by licensing it in a 
way that conforms with all the requirements of the FSD. In Subsection 2.1.4 
we concluded that any FSD-compliant license allows users to exercise all 
three activities covered by copyright (copying, modification, distribution). 
Every such license removes copyright restrictions and does not impose any 
additional material restrictions. This means that Free Software licenses con-
tain a rule that can be expressed in the following way (we call this rule “the 
grant of freedoms”).
The grant of freedoms : Under a Free Software license, users (licensees) are allowed by the 
copyright holder to undertake all six activities covered by the FSD. This means that the 
copyright holder is not allowed to prevent users from undertaking these activities.
In particular, any person (including hackers, fi rms, and governments) or group (e.g., 
a software community) is allowed to use, develop, or distribute a Free Software program.
The relation between the grant of freedoms and the default rule is as follows. If a 
copyright holder,79 who granted a Free Software license to a given original 
or improved Free Software program (the licensor), attempts to prevent a 
user, a developer, or a distributor (a licensee) from exercising the freedoms 
by invoking the exclusive copyright, the licensee may rely on the Free Soft-
ware license as a legal defence.80 Obviously, this is possible if only the license
77 Licenses are used also by copyright holders who follow the proprietary approach. Howe-
ver, proprietary licenses are used to maintain the exclusive control of copyright holders 
over their programs.
78 Such a method is usually referred to as “private ordering”. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, An 
Unhurried View of Private Ordering in Information Transactions, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 2063, (2000); 
J.H. Reichman, Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated Intellectual Property Rights: Recon-
ciling Freedom of Contract with Public Good Uses of Information, 147 U. Pa. L. Rev. 875 (1999); 
Amitai Aviram, A Network Effects Analysis of Private Ordering, (April 15, 2003), Berkeley 
Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series. Paper 80, http://repositories.
cdlib.org/blewp/art8.
79 Third parties generally do not have standing as far as copyrights are concerned, i.e., they 
cannot invoke the default rule unless they also hold a copyright title in the program.
80 A Free Software license does not exclude the possibility of invoking the default rule (copy-
right law) in case the licensee is in breach of the license. This issue is differently regulated 
in various laws. For example, under the U.S. law licensor can rely on copyright law in 
case of a license breach provided that the breached provisions are conditions not cove-
nants (see: Jacobsen v. Katzer 535 F.3d 1373 (2008) and Lawrence Rosen, Bad Facts Make 
Good Law: The Jacobsen Case and Open Source, at: http://www.rosenlaw.com/BadFacts-
MakeGoodLaw.pdf). Conversely, under Polish law it is generally believed that licensor 
cannot invoke exclusive copyrights against a breaching licensee, only contract-related 
claims. However, for uses outside of the license, copyright claims seem admissible. (See: 
the decision of the Polish Supreme Court of 20 May 1999, I CKN 1139/97, see also: 
J. Barta et al., Ustawa o prawie autorskim i prawach pokrewnych. Komentarz [Act 
on copyright and neighbouring rights. Commentary] (Dom Wydawniczy ABC 
2001), commentary to art. 79).
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is binding the licensor. If the license is not binding, the default rule is not 
affected and copyright holders can prevent the exercise of the freedoms. Free 
Software licenses attempt to bind automatically from the moment a person 
undertakes an activity covered by the freedoms. Namely, the consent for the 
exercise of the freedoms expressed in the licenses comes in a non-negotiable 
(“take-it-or-leave-it”) form. If a person does not accept the license, the per-
son cannot exercise the freedoms, since a consent of the copyright holder is a 
necessary condition of the freedoms.81 Nevertheless, there is a legal question 
whether the license binds the user in all circumstances, even if it was not 
expressly negotiated and agreed upon. This definitely depends on the par-
ticular circumstances and the applicable law.82 Here, we assume that most 
users as well as every developer and distributor of a Free Software program 
81 A license is not the only possible legal basis for the mere use of a program. Various laws 
could provide alternative legal bases, such as fair use. For example, under Polish Copy-
right Act, Art. 75 (which implements the Software Directive Art. 5) a person who legally 
obtained a program can use it without a license, but only to the extent necessary to per-
form its purpose (unless contractually agreed otherwise). The provision does not in par-
ticular authorize to distribute the program, and it does not allow the person to access 
source codes of the program otherwise than after reverse engineering (which is further 
constrained in the law). Obviously, the exercise of the freedoms on the basis of Art. 75 
alone is not possible.
82 Usually, Free Software licenses are included together with source codes (it has become a 
common practice to put a LICENSE or COPYING fi le in plain text together with fi les that 
contain the program proper). In case of binary packages, a license may be presented as a 
“click-wrap” but more often it is a part of the program’s documentation or help fi le. For 
the validity of such a way to conclude a license under the U.S. law see, e.g., ProCD v. Zei-
denberg (86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) holding that a reference to a license outside of the box 
that contained software was suffi cient to bind the user with the license, M.A. Mortenson 
Co. v. Timberline Software Corp. (970 P.2d 803 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999), aff’d, 998 P.2d 305 
(Wash. 2000)) holding that agreement with license terms was suffi ciently manifested by 
the installation and use of software by the buyer, even if it were not individually negotia-
ted beforehand. A particularly interesting case in the Free Software context is Microstar v. 
Formgen, Inc. (942 F. Supp. 1312 (S.D. Cal. 1996), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other 
grounds, 154 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1998).) which concerned a level editor program of a popu-
lar computer game, Duke Nukem 3D. Neither reading nor accepting the license was the 
precondition of using the program. The license was contained in LICENSE.DOC fi le on 
the disk together with other program’s fi les and was only referred to in the opening 
screen of the program. It was not presented on the computer screen, there was no notice 
on the box, and no fi xed period to return and withdraw. The defendant argued that no 
average user would access the license fi le, but the court did not fi nd this persuasive. For 
more U.S. caselaw analysis see: Kevin W. Grierson, Enforceability of „Clickwrap“ or „Shrink-
wrap“ Agreements Common in Computer Software, Hardware, and Internet Transactions, 106 
American Law Reports 5th 309. For case law related specifi cally to Free Software licen-
sing see: Wallace v. Free Software Foundation, at: http://www.groklaw.net/pdf/WallaceFS-
FGrantingDismiss.pdf, Harald Welte v. D. GmbH, at: http://www.jbb.de/judgment_dc_
frankfurt_gpl.pdf, or Jacobsen v. Katzer 535 F.3d 1373 (2008).
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(original or improved) are licensees (while the copyright holder of the pro-
gram is the licensor).83
The grant of freedoms  in a Free Software license allows users to exercise 
their freedoms (1) only vis-à-vis the copyright holder who granted them and 
(2) only in the Free Software program subject to the grant (original or 
improved). First, under the grant of freedoms alone, third parties are not 
obliged to allow users to exercise their freedoms in a Free Software pro-
gram.84 So a distributor is allowed to distribute a Free Software program and 
restrict user freedoms at the same time. Second, the grant of freedoms in an 
original program does not by itself allow users to exercise any freedoms in 
improvements of the program. Certainly, users are allowed to create 
improvements on their own, but they are not allowed to exercise the free-
doms in improvements created by others. It follows that the grant of freedoms 
covers all combinations presented in Table 3.1, but only to the extent that the 
consent of the copyright holder is necessary to exercise the freedoms. Such 
consent is indeed always a necessary, but not always a sufficient condition of 
the freedoms. We already noted that in case of improvements both the copy-
right holder of the original and the copyright holder of the improvement 
have to agree to the exercise of user freedoms. In the remainder of this thesis 
we will discuss many situations when the consent of copyright holders is not 
sufficient for user freedoms. For example, if the program (original or 
improved) is obtained from a third party (a distributor), the additional con-
dition of user freedoms is that the third party does not restrict them.
We include in the model of the framework: the grant of freedoms (RU2), 
and the relation between the grant of freedoms and the default rule (RE1).
(2) The right to fork
Under the grant of freedoms licensees are in particular allowed to distribute a 
given original Free Software program. They are also allowed to develop an 
improvement of the program and distribute the improvement. Specifically, 
they are allowed to engage into such activities concurrently with other 
licensees (and even concurrently with copyright holders, the licensors). Con-
current development and distribution of the same Free Software program is 
called “forking”.85 From the point of view of user freedoms, forking is impor-
tant in two situations: (1) when a licensee distributes an original Free Soft-
83 Certainly, the license can be non-binding in a particular case, or under a particular appli-
cable law. Then, if there is no exception from the default rule provided for in the applicable 
law, the exercise of the freedoms constitutes copyright infringement (the default rule is not 
affected). Possibly, the user could use the software in a limited scope (see art. 5 and 6 of 
the Software Directive or their implementation in art. 75 of the Polish Copyright Act).
84 Notably, under the FSD a program is Free Software even if it is subject to restrictions 
imposed by third parties, such as distributors. Cf. our fi ndings in Subsection 2.1.3.
85 See, e.g., Wikipedia, Fork (software development), at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fork_
(software_development).
Towards_an_Improved_def.indd   66 23-02-2010   10:49:18
67Regulatory framework of free software
ware program but restricts86 users in the exercise of their freedoms, and (2) 
when the licensor or a licensee creates an improved Free Software program 
and does not distribute it as Free Software.87 In the first situation any user 
can serve as a substitute source of the original program without restrictions, 
while in the second situation any user can create a substitute improvement 
and distribute it as Free Software. This is possible, because every Free Soft-
ware licensee gives licensees the right to fork.88 We identify the following rule 
in the right to fork.
The right to fork : Any user of a Free Software program is allowed to distribute the original 
program or to develop an improvement of the program and distribute it (1) together with 
source codes and (2) without restricting the freedoms of other users.
The right to fork is in a relation with the grant of freedoms. Actually, it is a direct 
implication of the grant of freedoms. It is also in a relation with the default rule. 
The relation between the right to fork and the default rule is similar to the rela-
tion between the grant of freedoms and the default rule. Namely, if the copyright 
holder attempts to prevent a user from forking, the user can invoke the 
license (and the right to fork contained therein) as a legal defence.
In other words, the right to fork attempts to turn the rights granted to 
users in Free Software licenses into negative freedoms (liberties). Liberties 
are rules that prevent other parties from interfering with certain actions of a 
free individual. Under the right to fork, the licensor allows the licensees (1) to 
exercise all freedoms in the program or its improvements they created them-
selves. Licensees are also (2) allowed to distribute the program without 
restricting freedoms of other users as well as to grant freedoms to their 
improvements to other users. However, they are also (3) allowed to appropri-
ate the program or the improvements. The licensees do not have any specific 
obligation to exercise their right to fork. So, the right to fork does not oblige 
86 Many Free Software licenses contain clauses whereby the user that obtains the program 
from a licensee becomes an additional licensee vis-à-vis the original licensor. This means 
that distributors of Free Software are not expected to grant users a separate license (subli-
cense) wherein they could restrict user freedoms, but they “pass on” the initial license to 
users. Distributors are expected to grant licenses on their own only if they distribute 
improvements, of which they are copyright holders (granting of such licenses is required 
in copyleft clauses). H. Meekers calls this “direct licensing” (Heather J. Meeker, The 
Open Source Alternative Understanding Risks and Leveraging Opportunities 
(Wiley, 2008), 29-30). See also: Lucie Guibault, Ot van Daalen, Unraveling the Myth 
around Open Source Licenses. An Analysis from A Dutch and European Law Per-
spective (TMC Asser Press 2006) 77. However, apart from “passing on” the original 
license, distributors can conclude contracts with users on their own, as well as sublicense 
the software (some Free Software licenses allow sublicensing). Such contracts can be used 
to restrict user freedoms.
87 Some authors present forking as negatively affecting software development due to the 
need to duplicate efforts. See: Andrew M. St. Laurent, Understanding Open Source 
and Free Software Licensing (O’Reilly 2004) 171.
88 See, e.g., MeatBall, RightToFork, at: http://www.usemod.com/cgi-bin/mb.pl?RightToFork.
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anyone to make the programs (or their improvements) available as Free Soft-
ware. It follows that the default rule is affected if only someone decides to 
exercise the right to fork.
The rule identified in the right to fork covers all four combinations pre-
sented in Table 3.1. We remark that the coverage is not direct, since it does 
not allow users to access the specific original or improved programs that 
were not made available as Free Software. The rule merely allows users to 
become developers and distributors of substitute originals or improve-
ments.89
We include in the model of the framework: the right to fork (RU3), the 
relation between the right to fork and the default rule (RE2), and the relation 
between the right to fork and the grant of freedoms (RE3).
(3) Copyleft
Under the grant of freedoms and the right to fork copyright holders (and every-
one else, ceteris paribus) are not allowed to restrict user freedoms by invoking 
the default rule. But third parties are not required to refrain from doing so. 
They are also not obliged to ensure that users can exercise the freedoms. The 
source of such an obligation is another rule – the rule of copyleft.90 Copyleft, 
briefly speaking, is an obligation of Free Software licensees (1) to allow users 
to exercise the freedoms with regard to an original Free Software program 
and (2) to grant users the freedoms to improvements of the program. They 
are required to perform in a particular way, not just refrain from certain 
activities.
If a licensee distributes an original or an improved Free Software pro-
gram subject to copyleft, the licensee (the distributor) is obliged to make avail-
able the source codes of the program to such users to whom the program is 
distributed. Additionally, the licensee is not allowed to impose restrictions 
on the freedoms.91 The rule that we identify in copyleft is as follows.
89 One could argue that users of proprietary software have the right to fork as well. Namely, 
they can independently develop and distribute substitute programs as well (this is most-
ly due to the fact that copyright law protects only expression, but not ideas embodied in 
the expression – for a landmark case see, e.g., Lotus Development Corporation v. Borland 
International, Inc., 516 U.S. 233 (1996)). However, they cannot do so using copyrighted 
material of a proprietary program. Conversely, Free Software licenses allow users to use 
such material when creating a substitute (a fork).
90 See: Lucie Guibault, Ot van Daalen, Unraveling the Myth around Open Source 
Licenses. An Analysis from A Dutch and European Law Perspective (TMC Asser 
Press 2006) 21, 72 et seq.
91 The distributor who is the copyright holder of an improvement of a copylefted program is 
obliged to license the improvement under a Free Software license. The copyleft clause in 
the Free Software license of the original usually indicates that the same model license 
should be granted to improvements. I.e., the GPLv2 requires that the distributed improve-
ments are released under the GPLv2, the MPL requires that they are released under the 
MPL, etc. Some Free Software licenses allow to distribute improvements under different 
licenses considered “compatible”.
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Copyleft : The distributor of a Free Software program subject to a copyleft clause (original 
or improved) (1) is obliged to deliver the source codes of the program to users to whom 
the program is distributed and (2) is not allowed to restrict such users in the exercise of the 
freedoms in the program.
We remark that this rule applies only to such original or improved Free Soft-
ware programs that are distributed.92 Also, this rule does not apply to all 
imaginable distributed improvements, since it is generally based on the 
copyright holder’s right to control derivative works (modifications),93 which 
is included in the default rule.94 Additionally, this rule applies to licensees 
only – Free Software licensors are not obliged to follow copyleft.95 Namely, 
licensors are not obliged to deliver originals or improvements of their pro-
92 Distribution is the trigger of copyleft obligations under the GPL. However, e.g., the copyleft 
clause of the Affero GPL covers improvements that are both distributed and used to offer 
services (such as by running them on a server, see: http://www.fsf.org/licensing/licens-
es/agpl.html). Similar trigger is included in the Open Software License and called “Exter-
nal Deployment” (http://www.opensource.org/licenses/osl-3.0.php). What constitutes 
“distribution” is usually defi ned in the applicable national law (see, e.g., Heather J. 
Meeker, The Open Source Alternative Understanding Risks and Leveraging 
Opportunities (Wiley, 2008), 234).
93 The exact relation between derivative works and modifi cations depends on the applica-
ble law.
94 The exact scope of copyleft clauses varies depending on the license. The copyleft of GPLv2 
(and GPLv3) covers all derivative works (for a thorough discussion about the exact scope 
of copyleft see, e.g., Raymond T. Nimmer, Legal Issues in Open Source and Free Software Dis-
tribution, Open Source Software Spring 2006 Critical Issues in Today’s Corporate 
Environment, PLI Handbook no. G-861, 7; Krzysztof Siewicz, Scope of copyleft clause 
under Polish law, J. Barta (ed.), Zagadnienia Prawa Autorskiego [Copyright Law Issues], 
ZNUJ PWiOWI [Jagiellonian University Intellectual Property Journal, Vol. 93 p. 
235, (Zakamycze 2006), English version at: http://ksiewicz.net/fi les/siewicz_copyleft_
scope.pdf. We are not aware of any Free Software license that attempts to cover all imagi-
nable improvements, that is even the ones which are not derivative works (such as 
improvements that are only inspired by the original program), although the SleepyCat 
license could be considered an example of such an attempt (it covers “any accompanying 
software that uses the [licensed] software” (http://www.opensource.org/licenses/
sleepycat.php). On the “10-line exception” in the copyleft clause of the LGPL see, e.g., 
Heather J. Meeker, The Open Source Alternative Understanding Risks and Lever-
aging Opportunities (Wiley, 2008), 40. On an insightful analysis of the GPLv2 copyleft 
clause and its scope see id. 200 et. seq. See also: Andrew M. St. Laurent, Understanding 
Open Source and Free Software Licensing (O’Reilly, 2004) (discussing various Free 
Software licenses).
95 Here, we assume that every user, developer, and distributor of Free Software becomes a 
licensee, except for the copyright holder (who is the licensor). If a person distributes own 
improvements of a Free Software program, such a person most likely is both a licensee 
(towards the copyright holder of the original) and a licensor (towards the recipients of 
the improvement). Some Free Software licenses contain obligations of the licensors to 
provide source code of software, but this is not a part of the copyleft as discussed here 
(see: Andrew M. St. Laurent, Understanding Open Source and Free Software 
Licensing (O’Reilly, 2004), 25).
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grams as Free Software, unless they want to, but they cannot prevent users 
from forking.96
The relation between copyleft and the default rule is as follows. Copyleft as 
such is based on the default rule, since without it the licensor could not control 
the use, development, and distribution of a program and its improvements. 
The default rule provides for a firm legal basis for imposing obligations on 
licensees whenever they undertake activities covered by exclusive copy-
rights. Copyleft attempts to turn the rights granted to users in Free Software 
licenses into positive freedoms. Positive freedoms are rules that oblige cer-
tain parties to allow free individuals to exercise these freedoms. Namely, 
copyleft is an obligation of the licensees to allow users to exercise their free-
doms in the program or its improvements distributed by the licensees. Copyl-
eft attempts to provide an enforceable claim against a person that would like 
to make a Free Software program or its improvement proprietary. Thus, 
copyleft attempts to allow to enforce the obligation of the licensees.
The relation between copyleft and the grant of freedoms is similar to the 
relation between the right to fork and the grant of freedoms. However, while the 
right to fork is a direct implication of the grant of freedoms, copyleft is a rule 
independent of the grant of freedoms. It can be included in a Free Software 
license together with the grant of freedoms, but there are Free Software licenses 
without copyleft (so called “academic” or “permissive” licenses, such as the 
BSD license). In such licenses, the grant of freedoms and the resulting right to 
fork are the only protection of the freedoms.
The relation between copyleft and the right to fork is as follows. In such 
cases on which copyleft does not extend, users have to rely on the right to fork 
only. The right to fork applies to every licensee of Free Software. Copyleft obli-
gation applies only to licensees of such Free Software programs that are 
released under a Free Software license that contains a copyleft clause.
The rule identified in copyleft covers only three combinations in Table 3.1. 
The combination in the top-left cell is not covered. Namely, the copyright 
holder of the original who grants a Free Software license containing a copyleft 
clause does not assume an additional obligation not to restrict user freedoms, 
apart from the obligation already included in the grant of freedoms. The identi-
fied coverage by copyleft of both combinations relating to improvements (the 
bottom row) is partial, since it does not cover all imaginable improvements 
in all imaginable circumstances. Namely, the exact scope of copyleft depends 
on license wording and the applicable law.
96 Precisely speaking, copyright holders are not allowed to prevent users from forking (i.e., 
from exercising the freedoms in the original Free Software) because they continue to be 
bound by the Free Software licenses they granted themselves (the grant of freedoms). What 
they could do, however, is stop making the program (and its source codes) available at 
all. Additionally, if copyright holders distribute improvements of which they do not hold 
copyrights, and which are subject to copyleft clause imposed by their copyright holders, 
they themselves become the licensees bound by copyleft.
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We include in the model of the framework: copyleft (RU4), the relation 
between copyleft and the default rule (RE4), the relation between copyleft and 
the grant of freedoms (RE5), and the relation between copyleft and the right to 
fork (RE6).
(4) The hacker immunity
All programs (including proprietary software) usually have bugs, do not 
have all necessary features, and are not able to interoperate properly with 
other programs. Ceteris paribus, this means that there is a high probability 
that any program will be defective in the light of law (non-merchantable or 
not fit for a particular user’s purpose). This also means that the use of the 
program could result in damages. Additionally, given the increasing ubiqui-
ty of exclusive rights in intangibles (so-called “intellectual property rights”), 
the use, development, or distribution of a program can constitute an infringe-
ment of third party rights.
In all these cases the law protects the injured party and there is generally 
no immunity for persons to whom the liability for the injury is attributable, 
unless some special exceptions apply. According to the law, software transac-
tions are usually subject to warranty of merchantability, warranty of fitness 
for particular purpose, and warranty of title by default.97 Depending on cir-
cumstances, warranty obligations can attach to a developer or a distributor of 
a Free Software program.98 Liability for infringement of third party rights, 
depending on the nature of the infringement could be borne by developers, 
distributors, and also by users. If a user is held liable,99 the user could have a 
recourse against the person who delivered the infringing software or other-
wise contributed to the infringement. So, generally developers and distribu-
tors of Free Software could be liable for the software unless there is a rule to 
the contrary. The liability can also be attributed to users themselves vis-à-vis 
third parties, with a possible recourse against distributors or developers.
However, there is a common rule throughout the whole software indus-
try that attempts to remove the liability from developers and distributors, 
and grant them with an immunity. As a result the risk is pushed onto the 
users, without leaving them with a recourse. Such an immunity has been 
embodied in various warranty disclaimers and liability limitation clauses. 
These clauses have been also widely accepted because many believe that it is 
technically impossible to write flawless software (both technically and legal-
ly), so actors have to “immunize” themselves from liability. The rule that 
follows from the warranty disclaimers and liability limitation clauses reads 
97 For a general overview under the U.S. law see: Andrew M. St. Laurent, Understan-
ding Open Source and Free Software Licensing (O’Reilly, 2004), 11.
98 Free Software can be developed and distributed both by its copyright holders as well as 
by third parties.
99 For example, not just the development and distribution, but a mere use of a patented 
invention without a valid patent license usually constitutes patent infringement. See: Aro 
Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co. 377 U.S. 476, 84 S.Ct. 1526 (U.S.Mass. 1964).
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that users cannot claim damages. The Free Software approach has eagerly 
borrowed this rule from the general regulatory framework of software.100 
Thus, the broad grant of rights in Free Software licenses is usually followed 
by an “as is” or other type of warranty disclaimer and liability limitation 
clause. This means that according to Free Software licenses there is a rule, 
which we refer to as “the hacker immunity”.
The hacker immunity: Users are not allowed to claim liability related to Free Software.
We call this rule “the hacker immunity” because it removes a strong demotiva-
tor (liability) away from many volunteer hackers who are developers of Free 
Software programs. However, precisely speaking it removes liability from 
all Free Software licensors. Depending on a particular case the licensor can 
be a hacker, a firm, or any other entity that is the copyright holder of a given 
Free Software program (original or improved) and offers it under a Free Soft-
ware license.
Two clarifications are necessary:
(1) The hacker immunity  as contained in Free Software licenses does not 
per se remove liability from a person that is not the licensor. This 
means that such developers and distributors who are not licensors 
bear liability for the program by default. Usually, however, third 
party distributors accompany the distributed program with a sepa-
rate warranty disclaimer and liability limitation clause and thus 
they extend the hacker immunity on themselves.101
(2) All Free Software licenses known to us contain the hacker immunity 
that covers technical defects (i.e., they exclude warranty of fi tness for 
purpose, warranty of merchantability). Many of the licenses extend 
the immunity on legal defects as well (i.e., they waive liability for in-
fringement of third party rights, the so-called “warranty of title”).102
100 Some argue that, on the contrary, “the lack of warranty protection for licensees is a defi n-
ing characteristic of [the Free Software] licensing model” and that proprietary licensors 
offer warranties and indemnifi cations (Raymond T. Nimmer, Legal Issues in Open Source 
and Free Software Distribution, Open Source Software Spring 2006 Critical Issues in 
Today’s Corporate Environment, PLI Handbook no. G-861, 7, 85). However, most so-
called end-user licenses of proprietary software contain as broad warranty disclaimers 
and liability limitations as are usually found in Free Software licenses, but without giving 
end-users access to source codes or any signifi cant rights to software.
101 Notably, licenses such as the GPLv2 require that distributors of the program accompany 
it with the liability limitation clause in a prescribed form. The distributor, however, can 
choose to offer additional warranty or services. If such a warranty or services are offered, 
the hacker immunity continues to apply between users and the licensor, but users can ben-
efi t from warranty services of the distributor.
102 For an example of a license that does not release the licensor from all liability for legal 
defects see, e.g., Eclipse Public License that contains representation that the contributor has 
suffi cient copyrights to grant license ( http://www.eclipse.org/org/documents/epl-v10.
php). See also clauses 3.4.a and 3.4.c of the MPL.
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There is no direct relation between the hacker immunity and other rules in the 
framework identified so far. Rather, the hacker immunity, by removing the 
demotivating liability out of the way of actors in the Free Software scene 
serves as a basic incentive mechanism that stimulates many actors not to 
abandon Free Software development or distribution. In particular, it stimu-
lates them not to invoke the default rule against users but to grant them their 
freedoms. So, there is an indirect relation between the hacker immunity and 
the default rule.
The hacker immunity  covers all four combinations presented in Table 3.1. 
Namely, it attempts to remove liability regardless of who distributes Free 
Software and what kind of Free Software is distributed. The coverage, how-
ever, is partial, since only some Free Software licenses waive all imaginable 
liability (including the title warranty).
We include in the model of the framework: the hacker immunity (RU5) 
and the indirect relation between this rule and the default rule (RE7).
3.1.2 Other rules for software
The default rule makes the consent of copyright holders a prerequisite of the 
freedoms. Copyright holders who follow the Free Software approach use 
Free Software licenses to grant users the freedoms (the grant of the freedoms).103 
The licenses also contain rules that attempt to protect the freedoms of users, 
i.e., the right to fork and copyleft. Additionally, the hacker immunity attempts to 
release actors in the Free Software scene from liability. But the model of the 
framework including all these rules and relations between them (as identi-
fied in the previous subsection) is not complete. The grant of freedoms in Free 
Software licenses, and the protection of the freedoms by the right to fork and 
copyleft, as well as by the hacker immunity depend on whether these rules are 
enforceable and remain effective despite other rules that exist in the frame-
work. Some of the other rules may dilute but some of them may reinforce 
these rules. Either way, the other rules can affect the freedoms in some or all 
103 Some users exercise their freedoms in a software community, while other users exercise 
these freedoms in private or otherwise outside of the communities. Some of the Free Soft-
ware users are governments or users of eGovernment services. Here, we may already 
assume that the communities are in a relation to user freedoms. We may also assume that 
eGovernments are also in a relation to user freedoms. However, we do not include these 
relations in the model of the current framework. Otherwise, we would not be able to ans-
wer RQ1 and RQ2, which are: “In what way do software communities affect the current 
regulatory framework concerning the protection of user freedoms, as articulated by Stall-
man?” and “In what way do eGovernments affect the current regulatory framework con-
cerning the protection of user freedoms, as articulated by Stallman?” We shall include in 
the model of the framework only the rules (and relations between them) that regulate the 
freedoms independently of them being exercised in the context of communities or 
eGovernments. Then, (in Chapters 4 and 5, respectively) we will analyse how such a 
model of the framework is affected by software communities and eGovernments.
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combinations presented in Table 3.1. We need to include these other rules in 
the model of the framework.
Below, we identify the remaining rules for software and their relations 
with the rules identified in Free Software licenses. In order to identify these 
rules we focus on the following issues: (1) license proliferation and incom-
patibilities, (2) license revocability, (3) inter partes nature of licenses, (4) soft-
ware-related patents, (5) contracts with distributors, (6) liability rules, and 
(7) non-legal regulators of software. At the end of each point we state what 
rules and relations we include in the framework.
(1) License proliferation and incompatibilities
Since mid 1980s, few dozen of FSD-compliant model licenses have been pre-
pared.104 By far the most popular of them is the GNU General Public License 
version 2 (“GPLv2” or “GPL”), which applies to approximately 70% of Free 
Software.105 The GPLv2 and the second most popular model license (GNU 
Lesser General Public License, “LGPL”) have been prepared by the FSF. The 
FSF has recently (2007) finalized a public debate on the “upgrade” of the 
GPLv2 and LGPL. As a result, the new version 3.0 of the GPL (“GPLv3”) and 
the new version 3.0 of the LGPL (“LGPLv3”) have been adopted. Not all 
licensors that have been using GPLv2 have switched to GPLv3, although a 
growing number has switched already.106 Other popular model licenses 
include, for example, Berkeley Software Distribution License (the “BSD 
license”), and Mozilla Public License (the “MPL”). We illustrate the prolifer-
ation in Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2: Proliferation of licenses
104 Free Software Foundation, Various Licenses and Comments About Them, at: http://www.
gnu.org/philosophy/license-list.html; Open Source Initiative, The Approved Licenses, at: 
http://opensource.org/licenses/.
105 Free Software Foundation, GNU General Public License, at: http://www.gnu.org/licens-
es/gpl.html, the popularity of the GPL is based on data available from SourceForge 
repository (http://sourceforge.net).
106 Many programs are released under “GPLv2 or any later version”, which seems to allow 
users to choose that GPLv3 applies to them. The effectiveness of such licensing depends 
on the applicable law.
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In Figure 3.2 we present a result of using two different model licenses. Some 
licensors (black dots demarcated in one circle) use one model Free Software 
license, while other licensors (the other black dots demarcated in the other 
circle) use another model Free Software license. Each user (grey dots) obtains 
one program under the first license and one program under the second 
license. As a result, the rights and obligations of each user towards each 
licensor are subject to a different license (this is represented by different lines 
between users and licensors). It follows that if a user obtains more than one 
Free Software program (original or improved) and the obtained programs 
are subject to different Free Software licenses, the freedoms of that user 
should be scrutinized with regard to each program separately. This is often 
the case in practice, since even simple IT systems consist of numerous pro-
grams. Thus, we should expand the four combinations presented in Table 3.1 
by adding one additional table of four combinations for each program sub-
ject to a different Free Software license that a licensee uses. We illustrate this 
in Figure 3.3.
Figure 3.3: Using programs under different Free Software licenses
It would be impractical to reconstruct a model of the framework with a 
degree of detail that is necessary to account for all different Free Software 
licenses. In such a case, we would have to reconstruct a separate framework 
for each license and then a combined framework for combinations of pro-
grams under different licenses. It follows that in order to make our task prac-
ticable, we have to downsize the model to be able to deal with the issue of 
proliferation on a more general level. We do the downsizing below, by iden-
tifying rules that are materially affected by the proliferation. Then, we 
include in the model these rules as adjusted to account for the proliferation 
to the extent it materially affects them.
As far as the grant of freedoms is concerned, since the FSD requires to allow 
users to exercise all six activities enumerated thereto, all FSD-compliant 
licenses allow licensees to exercise these activities. Also, a given Free Soft-
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ware program generally remains subject to one Free Software license, not to 
many different licenses at the same time. This means that the grant of freedoms 
is not affected materially, as long as users obtain single original Free Soft-
ware programs (regardless of whom).107 However, in practice distributors 
usually combine multiple Free Software programs together and offer them 
to users as complex software products.108 The combination can be limited to 
simple collection of programs in a single distribution, but usually it involves 
at least some pre-configuration of them to work together properly. It is often 
the case that programs are combined using various software engineering 
techniques, which goes beyond mere aggregation of them. Certainly, a dis-
tributor of any combination has to comply with all licenses of the combined 
programs at the same time. This is possible if only all these licenses are com-
patible.
Licenses are  compatible with each other as long as they permit to com-
bine programs released under their terms and to distribute the combina-
tion.109 Distribution of combination is possible if only all licenses of the com-
bined programs are complied with. If one license obliges the licensee to 
perform in a particular way, while another license forbids the licensee to per-
form in such a way, then the licensee cannot comply with both of them at the 
same time. For example, if two licenses contain copyleft clauses that require 
improvements to be distributed under different Free Software licenses, such 
two licenses are incompatible. Licenses are incompatible also if only one of 
them contains a copyleft clause, while the other imposes on the user other 
obligations, which cannot be performed together with distributing improve-
ments under the Free Software license required by the former.
But incompatibilities occur not only between some Free Software licens-
es. Naturally, the Free Software licenses are to a significant extent incompat-
ible with the proprietary software  approach. Developers and distributors of 
proprietary software usually cannot use Free Software in their programs and 
107 Certainly, users have to scrutinize each license separately, in order to determine the exact 
scope of the rights and obligations. Although we can assume that all FSD-compliant 
licenses grant users all their freedoms, some of them are written better than others, and 
the differences may lead to their different interpretations. See e.g., Brendan Scott, BSD – 
The Dark Horse of Open Source, at: http://opensourcelaw.biz/publications/papers/
BScott_BSD_The_Dark_Horse_of_Open_Source_070112lowres.pdf (arguing that the BSD 
license requires BSD code and modifi cations to BSD code to be licensed under the terms 
of the BSD license, while the BSD license is commonly believed not to include a copyleft 
clause). We will return to the issue of different interpretations in Chapter 4.
108 For example, modern GNU/Linux distributions include hundreds of Free Software pro-
grams. A user could attempt to obtain all these programs directly from their copyright 
holders, but this is rarely the case given the time and effort necessary to fi nd and confi -
gure all of them to work together.
109 According to the FSF, compatibility with the GPL means that “you can combine code released 
under the other license with code released under the GNU GPL in one larger program.” (See: 
http://www.fsf.org/licensing/licenses/gpl-faq.html#WhatDoesCompatMean). On 
license incompatibilities generally see: Andrew M. St. Laurent, Understanding Open 
Source and Free Software Licensing (O’Reilly 2004) 159 et. seq.
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maintain exclusive control over them at the same time. Precisely speaking, 
non-copyleft (“academic” or “permissive”) licenses are rarely a burden for 
proprietary actors, and many programs subject to such licenses have been 
included in proprietary software. Conversely, copyleft licenses do not allow 
appropriation of Free Software, unless the proprietary actor finds a way to 
avoid copyleft obligations. Certainly, this may lead to less Free Software being 
included in proprietary software, but it also means that it is harder to restrict 
user freedoms (which is the exact purpose of the copyleft). In other words, we 
do not consider that inability to appropriate some Free Software (e.g., to 
include it as a part of a proprietary offering) is a limitation of user freedoms. 
Actually, we consider any such successful appropriation as a restriction of 
user freedoms, which should be prevented in order for the freedoms to be 
sufficiently protected.110
However, from the point of view of user freedoms such an inability to 
appropriate a Free Software program may constitute a problem in the fol-
lowing situation. Imagine that it is desired to use such a program in a certain 
conjunction with a proprietary program. This might be a case when the user 
is locked-in to a closed standard used in the proprietary program.111 It may 
be possible to provide for interoperability by combining the Free Software 
program with certain proprietary extension, but the particular license of the 
Free Software program does not allow such a combination to be legally 
developed or distributed. Actually, many developers and distributors 
attempt to work around this issue using different means. The means usually 
involve restricting the freedoms of users or requiring them to trade the free-
doms in exchange for the additional functionality.112 But from the point of 
view of user freedoms, a proper resolution of the incompatibility with the 
proprietary licensing would be to provide users with a substitute of the pro-
prietary software to which users are locked in, which would be completely 
free of restrictions. This can be done, however, only if the closed standard 
can be translated to an open standard, or if users are stimulated to switch to 
open standards otherwise. This is not an easy task, as we show later in this 
chapter.
Here, for the sake of simplicity, when discussing license incompatibili-
ties we focus on incompatibilities between Free Software licenses only. We 
leave incompatibilities with the proprietary approach aside. We illustrate the 
incompatibilities between Free Software licenses in Figure 3.4.
110 See below on contracts with distributors and non-legal regulators (in particular passages 
about making Free Software part of a service or a device).
111 For the discussion about closed standards and lock-ins see Subsection 3.2.1.
112 The means include dual licensing, maintaining separate repositories with proprietary 
extensions, avoiding using software subject to copyleft licenses, or trying to circumvent 
copyleft clauses, etc.
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Figure 3.4: Incompatibility of licenses
Assume there are two Free Software programs, each licensed by a different 
licensor. For example, they may be two libraries113 each able to expand a 
third program with new functionalities. On the left of Figure 3.4, we see that 
the licensors (black dots) use two compatible licenses for their programs 
(libraries). They grant the licenses to a user (grey dot). The user can exercise 
the freedoms in each of these programs separately. Additionally, the user is 
legally allowed to combine the programs together, and to distribute the com-
bination. In such a way, the user creates a complete Free Software product 
and offers it to yet another user (white dot). It is possible since both licenses 
for the “input” programs are compatible and allow to redistribute them as 
combined in a finished product under one license. Conversely, on the right 
of Figure 3.4, we see that the licensors use two incompatible licenses for their 
programs. If both licenses are Free Software licenses, the user may exercise 
the freedoms in the two programs. In particular, the user is allowed to 
improve the programs separately and separately distribute the improve-
ments. However, the user cannot satisfy obligations in both licenses and dis-
tribute the programs combined into one product.114
Combination may constitute a collection of multiple original Free Soft-
ware programs but it may also be an example of an improvement of these 
programs.115 Depending on the exact wording of a particular license, results 
113 For an explanation of “library” see: Wikipedia, Program library, http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Program_library.
114 An interesting example is the the SleepyCat license (http://www.opensource.org/licens-
es/sleepycat.php, pointed out by Heather Meeker (Heather J. Meeker, The Open 
Source Alternative Understanding Risks and Leveraging Opportunities (Wiley, 
2008), 43.), which allows to distribute improvements under another Free Software license 
(the relevant part reads: “The source code must either be included in the distribution or 
be available for no more than the cost of distribution plus a nominal fee, and must be 
freely redistributable under reasonable conditions”).
115 Here, we use the word “combination” to cover various copyright institutes, such as 
“modifi cation”, “collection”, “derivative work”, “collective work”. Each of these institu-
tes has different legal consequences. When creating a particular contribution a user has to 
determine which of these institutes applies exactly and what are the consequences under 
the applicable law.
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of incompatibilities between licenses can vary from a restriction on distribut-
ing any imaginable combination to a restriction on distributing specific com-
binations.116 In practice, the proliferation and incompatibilities have been 
found to affect specific combinations only. Also, at least three types of ten-
dencies can be observed that attempt to overcome the proliferation and 
incompatibilities. First, there is already a clearly visible trend in the Free 
Software licensing. Namely, more popular model licenses are chosen more 
often than the less popular, and rarely licenses are drafted anew.117 Second, 
many licensors use dual licensing schemes, which can eliminate most if not 
all issues related to the proliferation and incompatibilities.118 Third, the 
drafters of some most popular model licenses have already started releasing 
new versions of these licenses which contain clauses that address many 
incompatibilities.119
It follows that proliferation, and the resulting incompatibilities between 
Free Software licenses, will continue to affect the grant of freedoms in all com-
binations presented in Table 3.1 materially, unless something prevents the 
above tendencies to succeed. Currently (2009) we are still in a transitional 
phase, and it cannot be taken for granted that the proliferation and incom-
patibilities will be successfully eliminated owing to these tendencies alone. 
So, for the time being we consider that the grant of freedoms is affected, 
although only to the extent that (a) the combination includes Free Software 
programs released under incompatible licenses, and only to the extent that 
116 For example, copyleft obligations under GPLv2 do not apply in case a “mere aggregation” 
of programs is distributed. So, combinations of programs under GPLv2 can be distribu-
ted with programs released under licenses incompatible with the GPLv2 as long as the 
combination is a “mere aggregation” only. What constitutes a “mere aggregation” is 
unclear from the legal point of view. However, the overall Free Software community has 
developed some customs and trade practices that provide some guidance. See, e.g., Soft-
ware Freedom Law Center, Maintaining Permissive-Licensed Files in a GPL-Licensed Project: 
Guidelines for Developers, at: http://softwarefreedom.org/resources/2007/gpl-non-gpl-
collaboration.html.
117 Recently, the OSI has been rather reluctant to approve any new licenses as “Open Source”, 
even if they would meet the OSD criteria. But there have been some new model licenses 
(MSPL, EUPL) approved by the OSI despite this reluctance.
118 Dual licensing means that a program is released under a number of model FSD-compli-
ant licenses. Users (in particular users that combine the program with other programs) 
can choose which license they will be bound to. If such a choice is made possible by the 
licensor, it can be possible to choose a license compatible with the licenses of other com-
bined programs. Arguably, after the choice there is no possibility to change it again when 
a subsequent combination is made. See: Lucie Guibault, Ot van Daalen, Unraveling 
the Myth around Open Source Licenses. An Analysis from A Dutch and European 
Law Perspective (TMC Asser Press 2006) 129.
119 See, for example, GPLv3, EUPL. See also: CeCILL v2 (containing an express GPL compa-
tibility clause).
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(b) such a combination is distributed.120 Otherwise, the grant of freedoms is not 
materially affected. Strictly speaking, the grant of freedoms is limited by the 
following rule that we call “license proliferation and incompatibilities”.
License proliferation and incompatibilities: Users are allowed to distribute combinations 
of Free Software programs as long as licenses of all combined programs are complied 
with.
License proliferation and incompatibilities affect also the rules that we iden-
tified in the right to fork and copyleft. Namely, they limit the exercise of the 
right to fork with regard to combinations of programs. They also limit the 
exercise of copyleft. Here, one clarification is necessary. The incompatibilities 
do not release the distributors from their copyleft obligation not to restrict 
user freedoms. Rather, they make it legally impossible to observe such an 
obligation if the distributor attempted to distribute the combination of two 
or more programs that are subject to incompatible licenses. In such a case, 
the distributor has to refrain from distribution and can only use the combi-
nation in private. Certainly, other users are free to make and use the combi-
nation by themselves privately as well.121
All Free Software licenses known to us contain broad liability limitation 
clauses. When discussing the hacker immunity we noted that the clauses are 
sometimes different to the extent some of them extend to legal defects (title 
warranty), while others do not. This means that the actual liability may vary 
depending on the wording of the license in question. We do not consider this 
as a material difference, since the main purpose of the hacker immunity is to 
waive liability for technical defects (warranty of merchantability). Certainly, 
some Free Software licenses may boast of well-written waivers, while others 
can be found lacking some important wording. We do not find that this is the 
case with the most popular Free Software licenses per se; it depends more on 
the differences between national laws, under which such clauses would be 
scrutinized. So, we assume at this point that the proliferation does not affect 
materially the hacker immunity.
We include in the model of the framework:
(1) license proliferation and incompatibilities (RU6);
(2) the relation between license proliferation and incompatibilities, and 
the grant of freedoms (RE8);
120 Users are still allowed to combine most Free Software and use the combinations in pri-
vate without distributing them, even if the combined programs are released under 
incompatible licenses. This is because incompatibilities usually occur between copyleft 
clauses (or copyleft clauses and other clauses imposing distribution-related obligations), 
which are usually triggered upon distribution only.
121 In the Free Software scene there exist many repositories of software that cannot be dis-
tributed together with another software, but can be legally used by end-users. See, e.g., 
http://livna.org.
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(3) the relation between license proliferation and incompatibilities, and 
the right to fork (RE9); and
(4) the relation between license proliferation and incompatibilities, and 
copy left (RE10).
(2) License revocability
In Subsection 2.1.2 we found that the FSD requires irrevocability of the 
license as a condition of compliance. We can assume that a license that 
expressly provides for a right of the licensor to terminate it unilaterally 
(without a valid reason) would not be accepted as FSD-compliant by the FSF. 
So far, the FSD allows to terminate licenses only if the licensee “does some-
thing wrong”. We are not aware of any Free Software licenses that are revo-
cable as far as the license wording is concerned (i.e., they contain no termina-
tion clauses except in case of a breach). However, it may be the case that the 
applicable law provides for a non-waivable right of the licensor to terminate 
a license, or it requires a special wording, or form, in order to make a license 
irrevocable by the licensor.122 In such a case the copyright holder could 
revoke the license or otherwise terminate it unilaterally, despite the license 
wording. After the license has been terminated, the copyright holder could 
invoke the default rule against users and as a result prevent them from exer-
cising the freedoms. Consequently, the grant of freedoms would be annulled, 
since it requires a binding Free Software license to exist.
A main question that arises reads: is such a license termination possible 
in practice? The answer is positive if the licensees are not numerous and if 
the licensor can easily identify all of them. In such a case, all licensees can be 
delivered with termination notices in a form as required by the applicable 
law. However, users usually obtain Free Software without identifying them-
selves, and attempts to identify them would require additional efforts that 
may prove impracticable. Even if it were possible to identify all users who 
obtained the program directly from the licensor, a significant part of Free 
Software distribution is performed by third parties. Free Software licenses 
122 Under Polish law (Copyright Act) a license concluded for an unspecifi ed period of time 
can be terminated by either party. It is questionable whether the licensor could waive the 
right to terminate. Conversely, a license granted for a specifi ed period of time cannot be 
easily terminated unless parties agree otherwise. However, a license granted for a speci-
fi c period longer than 5 years, after that period automatically transforms into a license 
granted for unspecifi ed period of time, as a matter of law. For an American law analysis 
see: Raymond T. Nimmer, Legal Issues in Open Source and Free Software Distribution, Open 
Source Software Spring 2006 Critical Issues in Today’s Corporate Environment, 
PLI Handbook no. G-861, 7, 41 (arguing that irrevocability can be obtained only if a Free 
Software license is concluded as a contract). See also: Heather J. Meeker, The Open 
Source Alternative Understanding Risks and Leveraging Opportunities (Wiley, 
2008), 228 (doubting whether Free Software licenses are “bare licenses” that can be revo-
ked under the U.S. law). For a European law perspective see: Lucie Guibault, Ot van 
Daalen, Unraveling the Myth around Open Source Licenses. An Analysis from A 
Dutch and European Law Perspective (TMC Asser Press 2006) 51, 86 et seq.
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do not require such third parties to report to whom they distribute. Also, 
termination of licenses of identified distributors does not necessarily termi-
nate the licenses of downstream recipients.123 It follows that in case of a sig-
nificant user base or at least of a developed downstream distribution per-
sonal delivery of termination notices does not seem to be practicable. So, it 
has to be determined whether the licensor is legally allowed to terminate the 
license in another way, for example by declaring publicly that the license is 
revoked (terminated). This depends on the applicable law, and we believe it 
to be unlikely that every law would allow to terminate the license of all users 
in such a way. Nevertheless, the licensor could still manage to identify major 
users of the program (e.g., its most prominent developers and distributors) 
and be able to serve them with termination notices. From the practical point 
of view, termination with regard to such major users might be sufficient to 
prevent most other users from exercising the freedoms. Thus, restriction of 
user freedoms using license revocability is possible in practice, even if it 
would not affect all users.124
We are not aware of a license to any major Free Software program hav-
ing been revoked since the beginning of the history of Free Software licens-
ing, which dates back to the 1980s. Actually, many licensors have even made 
public pledges to maintain their programs as Free Software.125 But should 
the licensors suddenly change their mind, the revocation of their licenses 
would affect all four combinations presented in Table 3.1, since a valid Free 
Software license is necessary to exercise the freedoms in each of these combi-
nations. So, we account for such a negative scenario of the revocability in the 
model of the framework by adding the following meta-rule. We call it 
“license revocability”.
License revocability: The grant of freedoms remains in force as long as the licensor does not 
effectively revoke the license.
Revocation enables the copyright holder to invoke the default rule against users without 
leaving users with a legal defense.
123 Generally, a downstream user obtains automatically the license from the original licensor 
whenever the program is redistributed (see FN 86). Thus, assuming such mechanism is 
effective the revocation is possible if only all licensees may be quickly identifi ed and 
delivered with termination notices, before the program is passed downstream.
124 Under particular applicable laws it may be possible to invoke additional legal arguments 
against termination. See, e.g., Janusz Barta, Ryszard Markiewicz, Oprogramowanie 
Open Source w świetle prawa. Między własnością a wolnością [Open source soft-
ware in the light of law. Between property and freedom] (Zakamycze 2005), 113 
(arguing that under Polish law a revocation of a Free Software license is a misuse of rights 
(“nadużycie prawa”) or is contrary to good morals (“zasady współżycia społecznego”)).
125 See e.g., Brian Prince, Sun Asserts MySQL Will Remain Open Source, at: http://www.
eweek.com/c/a/Database/Sun-Asserts-MySQL-to-Remain-Open-Source/. Some pled-
ges refer just to the price of software. See e.g., Ubuntu, at: http://www.ubuntu.com/
products/whatisubuntu (“Ubuntu is and always will be free of charge”).
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This rule has direct relations with the grant of freedoms and the default rule. A 
revoked Free Software license renders the grant of freedoms ineffective and it 
allows licensors to invoke the default rule against users.
We include in the model of the framework:
(1) license revocability (RU7),
(2) the relation between license revocability and the grant of freedoms 
(RE11), and
(3) the relation between license revocability and the default rule (RE12).
(3) Inter partes nature of licenses
Free Software licenses create inter partes rights and obligations between licen-
sors and licensees. More precisely, this means that each license binds only the 
particular licensor vis-à-vis the licensee to whom the license was granted. It 
follows that the possibility to apply any rights and obligations from a Free 
Software license to persons other than its parties is significantly limited. The 
inter partes nature of licenses affects copyleft. Other rules in the framework are 
not materially affected. Essentially, copyleft obliges licensees to allow users to 
exercise their freedoms in Free Software programs (or their improvements) 
distributed by the licensees. However, as an inter partes obligation, it obliges 
the licensee only towards the licensor, not towards users (even if the obliga-
tion is to perform to the benefit of users). Generally, only a person to whom 
another person is obliged (here: the licensor) can legally enforce the obliga-
tion. Consequently, users (despite being the intended beneficiaries of copyleft) 
cannot enforce copyleft against licensees, unless there is a rule to the contrary.
Whether there is a rule that allows a user to enforce copyleft depends on 
the applicable law. There are laws that allow third parties to enforce certain 
inter partes obligations. For example, under Polish law it may be possible to 
construct copyleft clauses as “contracts to the benefit of a third party.” If so, 
then a third party could have the standing necessary to enforce copyleft claus-
es without the help of the licensor.126 Yet, there is a debate whether Free Soft-
126 According to art. 393.1 of the Polish Civil Code, if the contract obliges a party to perform 
to the benefi t of a third party, such a third party may request performance directly from 
that party (unless this is excluded in the contract). The Polish Supreme Court held on 28 
November 2003 r. (IV CK 206/2002) that the third party benefi ciary should be identifi ed 
in such a contract, or the contract should at least contain clauses that allow to identify the 
third party. Free Software licenses are model licenses that do not identify any particular 
third party as a benefi ciary. However, licenses such as the GPLv2 are quite explicit that 
their copyleft clauses should benefi t every user that receives the software from a licensee. 
Nevertheless, the GPLv2 at the same time provides that in case of a breach it is automati-
cally terminated (Sec. 4). A terminated license does not bind parties any longer. This 
means that the licensee is no longer obliged to perform to the benefi t of a third party. 
Also, art. 393.1 applies to contracts only, not to unilateral acts. It means that its applicabi-
lity depends on the construction of Free Software licenses as contracts. For a similar ana-
lysis under U.S. law see: Andrew M. St. Laurent, Understanding Open Source and 
Free Software Licensing (O’Reilly 2004) 154 et. seq.
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ware licenses are contracts or rather unilateral acts.127 For example, Ray-
mond T. Nimmer argues that if copyleft is non-contractual in nature, a breach 
of copyleft could not be remedied by specific performance, although it could 
provide a basis for a copyright infringement suit.128 If there are indeed legal 
limitations in demanding performance of copyleft obligations (be it by the 
licensor or a third party), then users can rely on the right to fork only.129
Here, we assume that copyleft obligations can be enforced, so we retain 
the copyleft rule in the framework. However, given the inter partes nature of 
the license relation we have to include an additional rule in the framework 
that constitutes a limitation of the copyleft rule. We call this rule “inter partes 
nature of licenses”.
127 Licenses are based on copyright, and they additionally can be based on contract law. In 
common law jurisdictions, a license in this context is usually defi ned as a private unilate-
ral grant of rights. Such a unilateral act is distinguishable from a contract, which is thereto 
defi ned as an agreement whereby one person promises something for an exchange of a 
consideration. In the U.S. such licenses that are unilateral acts are based on the federal 
copyright law only, while contracts are additionally regulated by the states. Many of the 
most prominent Free Software advocates, including Eben Moglen (with regard to the 
GPL), have often argued that Free Software licenses are unilateral acts (Eben Moglen, The 
GPL Is a License, not a Contract, at:  http://lwn.net/Articles/61292/). But see: Raymond T. 
Nimmer, Legal Issues in Open Source and Free Software Distribution, Open Source Soft-
ware Spring 2006 Critical Issues in Today’s Corporate Environment, PLI Handbook 
no. G-861, 7, (arguing inter alia, that asking whether the GPL is a contract is nonsensical 
without a specifi c context in which a particular license incorporating the GPL’s terms was 
concluded (at 25)). For the analysis of the GPLv2 in abstracto see Heather J. Meeker, The 
Open Source Alternative Understanding Risks and Leveraging Opportunities 
(Wiley, 2008), 225 et. seq. See also: Andrew M. St. Laurent, Understanding Open Sour-
ce and Free Software Licensing (O’Reilly 2004) 148 (discussing how even the language 
of most permissive Free Software licenses allows to fi nd consideration necessary to esta-
blish a contractual relation in common law jurisdictions). Even the FSF does not exclude 
the possibility that software may be subject to contract law (see FSD). In civil law jurisdic-
tions it is also possible to conclude that the use of programs may be regulated unilaterally 
by the copyright holder, although certain jurisdiction-specifi c reservations may apply. 
For example, under Polish law a license is generally a contract (although a specifi c one, 
subject to copyright law) and it is not clear whether a license could be granted unilate-
rally. See also: Lucie Guibault, Ot van Daalen, Unraveling the Myth around Open 
Source Licenses. An Analysis from A Dutch and European Law Perspective (TMC 
Asser Press 2006) 46, 55 et seq., 150 et seq.
128 Raymond T. Nimmer, Legal Issues in Open Source and Free Software Distribution, Open 
Source Software Spring 2006 Critical Issues in Today’s Corporate Environment, 
PLI Handbook no. G-861, 7, 26. The author, however, provides an extensive argumenta-
tion for the contractual nature of Free Software licenses. See also Heather J. Meeker, The 
Open Source Alternative Understanding Risks and Leveraging Opportunities 
(Wiley, 2008), 226-227.
129 Heather Meeker points out that if a program constitutes a joint work, all authors might be 
required to stand in a case. This might effectively prevent enforcement of copyleft, espe-
cially in projects, the rights of which are shared among multiple contributors. See: 
Heather J. Meeker, The Open Source Alternative Understanding Risks and 
Leveraging Opportunities (Wiley, 2008), 179. See also: Lucie Guibault, Ot van 
Daalen, Unraveling the Myth around Open Source Licenses. An Analysis from A 
Dutch and European Law Perspective (TMC Asser Press 2006) 51, 72 et seq.
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Inter partes nature of licenses: Unless the applicable law provides to the contrary, only 
the Free Software licensors are allowed to enforce obligations of the licensees under copy-
left.
Naturally, the above rule covers only those combinations in Table 3.1, which 
are covered by copyleft itself. Also, this rule is in a relationship with copyleft 
only. The relationship is that the obligations under copyleft are limited inter 
partes, unless there is a legal rule to the contrary in the applicable national law.
We include in the model of the framework the inter partes nature of 
licenses (RU8) and the relation between this rule and copyleft (RE13).
(4) Software-related patents
Under the default rule copyright holders are the ones who can restrict all six 
activities covered in the FSD. Other rules identified so far regulate the way 
in which copyright holders allow users to undertake these activities. How-
ever, copyright holders are not the only ones who can restrict users in the 
exercise of their freedoms. In other words, consent of copyright holders is 
always necessary, but not always sufficient for user freedoms. Notwithstand-
ing copyrights, there are other exclusive rights that a third party might hold 
in relation to a Free Software program. The most important ones of such 
exclusive rights are patents.130 Patent rights belong exclusively to their hold-
er and they are effective erga omnes, including against the parties to a Free 
Software license.131 With these rights, the patent holder can prevent others 
130 Software may benefi t from patent protection if it forms a part of a product or process 
constituting an invention, and such a software-related invention is not excluded from 
patentability under applicable law (see generally: Kenneth Nichols, Inventing soft-
ware: the rise of “computer-related” patents (Quorum Books, Westport, 1998). More 
precisely, software often constitutes an element of an invention consisting of some “func-
tional interrelation between technical components of a system, e.g., the architecture of a 
processor and the particular way of processing data in such a processor.” (Yannis Sku-
likaris, Software-Related Inventions and Business-Related Inventions; A review of practice and 
case law in U.S. and Europe, Patent World, February 2001, 26.) Notably, copyright pro-
tects expression (form of the work), whereas patent may be granted for the practical 
application of innovative ideas effecting in a product or process (Ian J. Lloyd, Informa-
tion Technology Law, 308 (Butterworths, London, Edinburgh, Dublin, 2000, 3rd ed.)). 
See also: Lucie Guibault, Ot van Daalen, Unraveling the Myth around Open Sour-
ce Licenses. An Analysis from A Dutch and European Law Perspective (TMC Asser 
Press 2006) 131.
131 Certainly, if a patent holder is at the same time a party to a Free Software license it is pos-
sible to argue that the patent holder has granted an implied or explicit patent license. We 
should note that only some of Free Software licenses explicitly cover other exclusive rights 
of the licensor than copyright, that may attach to a computer program (examples include 
the MPL, GPL, and Eclipse Public License), while others may contain only implicit patent 
licenses (see: Andrew M. St. Laurent, Understanding Open Source and Free Soft-
ware Licensing (O’Reilly, 2004)). Still, many Free Software licenses are limited to copy-
rights only. Thus, even the licensor could attempt to enforce the exclusive rights that were 
not covered in the license to prevent licensees from exercising their freedoms (although 
this might constitute an abuse of rights, or be otherwise barred by the applicable law).
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from using, developing, or distributing programs that are related to the pat-
ented product or process in a way covered by patent claims.
Obtaining patent protection requires application and registration at pat-
ent offices. The application, registration, and patent attorney fees may con-
stitute an obstacle in applying for patent protection for some applicants. 
Additionally, patents are granted usually only if the reviewer of the applica-
tion finds patentable subject-matter in it.132 Patentability of software-related 
inventions depends on the applicable national law, and patents are granted 
for a specific jurisdiction.133 This means that patents allow their holders to 
restrict user freedoms in some jurisdictions only.134 It also means that patent 
holders may have difficulties in enforcing their patents against Free Software 
users scattered accross many jurisdictions. However, we are not aware of 
any major jurisdiction that would completely forbid granting of software-
related patents in one way or another. Such patents have been widely recog-
nised in the U.S.135 In Europe, software-related patents have been granted 
132 Some patent offi ces perform only a partial check, while some of them do not perform any 
examination at all, which means that the validity of the patents is checked only in case 
the patent is enforced and the alleged infringer defends in a court. See: WIPO (Standing 
Committee on the Law of Patents), Report on the International Patent System, (3 February 
2009, SCP/12/3 Rev. 2), p. 53.
133 Some vague legal guidelines for software patentability may already be found on an inter-
national level, within the framework of WTO in TRIPS Art. 27 providing for a patentabil-
ity of inventions in all fi elds of technology. Partially in the light of TRIPS Arts. 27(2) and 
27(3) which do not mention software as capable of being excluded from patentability 
(Daniele Schiuma, TRIPS and Exclusion of Software “as Such” from Patentability, Vol. 31, 
No.1, IIC International Review of Industrial Property and Copyright Law 36, 40 
(2000)). On the other hand; as Tripathi and others rightly point out, patenting things that 
do not meet general patentability requirements and are not inventions is not the objective 
of TRIPS, although Art. 1 allows to establish a more extensive protection than the one 
provided for by the agreement (R C Tripathi et al., Patenting of Computer Software: Status 
and Approach, Vol. 7 Journal of Intellectual Property Rights 128, 129 (2002), adding 
that in the early 90s, when TRIPS was drafted and discussed software was mostly consid-
ered not to constitute inventions but algorithms, at best just discovered (Id. at 130)).
134 Generally in order to obtain a patent effective worldwide, the inventor would have to 
apply in each national jurisdiction separately. However, there are means to obtain patent 
for multiple jurisdictions as a result of single or simplifi ed application (which are a result 
of international treaties such as the PCT or EPC).
135 In the U.S. for a long time, the ruling decision in the American debate on software patent-
ability has been State Street Bank & Trust v. Signature Financial Services, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 851 (U.S. Jan 11, 1999). Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit was presented with a computerized algorithm for managing an investment fund 
structure and held that it constitutes a patentable subject matter, which should be evalu-
ated under the usual test of usefulness, novelty and non-obviousness (Peter Toren, Soft-
ware and Business Methods are Patentable in the U.S. (Get over it), Patent World, September 
2000, 8). See also: Christopher L. Ogden, Patentability of Algorithms After State Street Bank: 
The Death of the Physicality Requirement, No. 10 Vol. 82 Journal of Patent and Trade-
mark Office Society 721, 724 et seq (2000). In a recent case, however, In re Bilski, the Fed-
eral Circuit might have started a more rigid approach towards software patentability (545 
F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc)). See, e.g., Patently O, http://www.patentlyo.com/
patent/ 2008/10/in-re-bilski.html).
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under the EPC.136 Although the so-called Software Patents Directive propos-
al was rejected, some national patent laws in Europe have been applied in a 
way to allow patentability of software-related inventions.137 Additionally, no 
restrictions on patents provided in patent laws known to us could allow Free 
Software users to disregard the threat of patents.138
It follows that we have to include an additional rule in the framework, 
the “software-related patents” rule.
Software-related patents: Users are not allowed to exercise some or all of the six activities 
covered in the FSD to the extent that and in a jurisdiction where such activities constitute 
an infringement of a patent, unless they obtain consent of a patent holder.
In particular, it is not allowed to use, develop, or distribute Free Software in jurisdictions 
where the use, development, or distribution (respectively) of that Free Software consti-
tutes a patent infringement.
Software patents cover all four combinations presented in Table 3.1. They 
allow patent holders to restrict user freedoms regardless of whom a user 
obtained Free Software, and regardless of what kind of Free Software was 
obtained (original or improved). Certainly, software-related patents cover 
these combinations only to the extent they apply to Free Software.139 So, each 
136 The European Patent Convention of 1973 (EPC) excludes computer programs from the 
understanding of inventions in Art. 52(2)(c). However, pursuant to Art. 52(3), patentability 
is excluded only to the extent to which an application relates to computer program “as 
such”. However, relying on the case law of Appellate Body, EPO has for a long time not 
rejected software-related applications straight away. The exception of EPC Art. 52(3) has 
been generally understood by EPO as excluding non-technical software-related inventions 
from the understanding of “invention”. To pass the test for patentability, “technical effect” 
has to go beyond mere interaction between hardware and software (Skulikaris, FN 130 at 
28). In the late 90s this term was broadened in the Appellate Body decision T 1173/97 to 
include “a computer program claimed by itself” if only the technical effect was present 
(International Business Machines, Corp./Computer program product, Decision of Technical 
Board of Appeal 3.5.1 dated 1 July 1998, T 1173/97 (OJ 10/1999, 609)). See: EPO, Guidelines 
for Examination in the European Patent Offi ce (2009), at:  http://www.epo.org/patents/law/
legal-texts/guidelines.html. See also: Daniel J. M. Attridge, Challenging Claims! Patenting 
Computer Programs in Europe and the USA, 1 Intellectual Property Quarterly 22, 44 
(2001). But see: EPO, Pending referral to the Enlarged Board of Appeal (G 3/08), at:  http://
www.epo.org/topics/issues/computer-implemented-inventions/referral.html.
137 Although Polish Industrial Property Law does not allow to grant patents for computer 
programs there have been many patents granted in one way or another related to prod-
ucts or processes that use computer programs (see, e.g. PL 123 820, published on 25 Sep-
tember 1984, PL 116 724, published on 31 March 1983).
138 Some Free Software licenses contain wording aimed at minimizing the threat of patents. 
Their intended effect is to discourage patent litigation (See: Heather J. Meeker, The 
Open Source Alternative Understanding Risks and Leveraging Opportunities 
(Wiley, 2008), 42. For other types of defences against patents on the Free Software scene 
see id. 89, 95-96).
139 According to some studies, the Linux kernel infringes a few dozen of patents. See, e.g., 
eWEEK, Open-Source Insurance Provider Finds Patent Risks in Linux, http://www.eweek.
com/c/a/Linux-and-Open-Source/OpenSource-Insurance-Provider-Finds-Patent-
Risks-in-Linux/.
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Free Software program has to be scrutinized separately under each applicable 
law and patents granted in the jurisdiction in question. With these reserva-
tions, software-related patents restrict the freedoms that result out of the grant 
of freedoms by making it insufficient for a user to obtain a consent (license) of 
the copyright holder for the exercise of the freedoms. The consent of the pat-
ent holder is made an additional necessary condition. It means that the rule 
of software-related patents is in a direct relation with the grant of freedoms.
We include in the model of the framework software-related patents 
(RU9) and the relation between this rule and the grant of freedoms (RE14).
(5) Contracts with distributors
In Subsection 2.1.2 we indicated that some distributors of Free Software use 
restrictive distribution and service contracts. We should remind that, for 
example, users of some commercial GNU/Linux distributions are required to 
undertake contractually towards distributors (1) not to use certain software 
or (2) to use the software only in a particular way. Some users also undertake 
to refrain from modification or distribution of Free Software. Many of such 
obligations are not subject to any extreme sanctions. Usually, a user risks only 
losing warranty or services related to the software. However, this can be suf-
ficient to prevent many users from exercising their freedoms. Certainly, not 
all distributors affect users only negatively. Some of them, in exchange for 
user freedoms, provide additional warranty for software, thus minimizing 
the risk resulting for users from the hacker immunity. We notice that such con-
tracts do not affect the status of Free Software from the point of view of the 
FSD; Free Software programs subject to such contracts remain Free Software. 
However, by entering into such contracts, users invite new rules in the frame-
work that affect their freedoms regulated by the rules identified so far.
Given the autonomy of parties to a contract that follows from contract 
law, there are practically no limits as to what the new rules could be. Here, 
we provide just four examples. First, users may contractually undertake not 
to exercise some or all of the six activities that constitute their freedoms. Sec-
ond, they may in particular undertake not to fork the program. Third, it is 
possible to limit contractually the rules of copyleft. Namely, the distributor 
delivers improvements under a Free Software license to a user (thus per-
forming copyleft obligations), but the user contractually undertakes not to 
distribute them, or not to use them in some other way.140 Fourth, distributors 
could either provide additional warranty, or explicitly extend the hacker 
immunity that follows from the license of the distributed program on them-
selves (in such cases user freedoms are not restricted, ceteris paribus). Nota-
bly, any such new contract rule affects only users that enter into the contract. 
140 According to the FSF, if the program is under the GPL, “[the licensee is] not allowed to 
distribute the work on any more restrictive basis” (Free Software Foundation, GNU Gen-
eral Public License Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-faq.
html#DoesTheGPLAllowNDA). Such a contract would be thus a breach of the GPL. 
However, it would still bind the user vis-à-vis the licensee (the distributor).
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Other users are not affected by the contract, and they may continue to exer-
cise their freedoms (ceteris paribus).
Certainly, even though the autonomy of the parties is the basic principle 
of the contract law, there are many laws that allow to interfere with a con-
cluded contract. Consumer protection and competition laws are the most 
prominent examples. Users are definitely able to invoke such laws against 
distributors who attempt to impose restrictive contracts on them. But we 
find it unlikely that they would allow to impose on distributors an obliga-
tion to enable users to exercise their freedoms as a remedy. So, we have to 
conclude that the freedoms can be restricted contractually despite such laws 
and in the model of the framework we include a general rule that follows 
from contracts with distributors.
Contracts with distributors: A user is allowed to exercise all six activities covered by the 
FSD as long as the user does not contractually undertake not to exercise some or all of 
them.
In particular, a user can undertake to use the software in a specifi c way only, or not to 
become a developer or a distributor of a Free Software program.
The above rule affects only these two combinations in Table 3.1 that regulate 
Free Software (original or improved) obtained from third parties – the dis-
tributors (the right column). Depending on the clauses of a particular con-
tract with a distributor, this rule affects separately the grant of freedoms, the 
right to fork, copyleft, the hacker immunity, or all these rules at the same time. 
The extent that these rules are affected also depends on clauses of a particu-
lar contract.
We include in the model of the framework:
(1) contracts with distributors (RU10),
(2) the potential relation between contracts with distributors and the 
grant of freedoms (RE15),
(3) the potential relation between contracts with distributors and the 
right to fork (RE16),
(4) the potential relation between contracts with distributors and copy-
left (RE17), and
(5) the potential relation between contracts with distributors and the 
hacker immunity (RE18).
(6) Liability rules
Liability rules provide for remedies in case of non-merchantability or unfit-
ness of products for agreed or communicated purposes, other breaches of 
contract, torts, or infringement of third party rights. They also regulate 
whether and to what extent a person who otherwise would be liable is 
allowed to waive or escape such liability. We notice that the liability rules 
materially affect the hacker immunity (and it is the only rule in the framework 
affected by liability rules). Namely, liability rules may limit the scope of the 
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hacker immunity and bring back an important demotivator, the liability, into 
the path of Free Software actors such as developers and distributors. In par-
ticular, liability rules affect the readiness of developers to contribute new 
pieces of Free Software and the readiness of distributors to offer Free Soft-
ware to users.
Liability rules are provided for by the applicable national law. Each 
national law strikes a balance between interests of all actors at a different 
point. However, we do not expect that any national law could completely 
prohibit warranty disclaimers or liability limitations.141 Usually, liability 
rules do not allow to waive liability in some circumstances only, such as if 
the damages were caused due to gross negligence or wilful behaviour, as 
well as in relations with consumers. At the same time liability rules contain 
many exceptions that can be used to avoid liability or transfer it to another 
entity. For example, developers could hide behind the “corporate veil” of a 
legal person, such as a company.142 Then, if the company distributed soft-
ware that caused a damage not covered by the hacker immunity, the company 
would be liable for the damage vis-à-vis the users.
Much of the above dilemma is resolved in the Free Software scene using 
contracts. Many distributors offer additional contractual warranties or ser-
vices related to Free Software in exchange for remuneration. By exercising 
such warranties or purchasing such services, users are able to have many 
defects in Free Software promptly removed. A prompt removal of defects 
means that the users are less likely to seek damages against the actors in the 
Free Software scene or to seek other legal recourse. The fact that under the 
grant of freedoms everyone is allowed to offer a warranty or a service in rela-
tion to a Free Software program stimulates the operation of the market of 
these warranties and services. However, if this market was prevented from 
operation, users would be more likely to litigate against the actors. Liability 
would become a real threat, which would demotivate the actors from devel-
oping and distributing Free Software despite the hacker immunity.
Nevertheless, liability is always a potential threat, irrespective of the 
operation of the market described above. The mere fact that a third party (a 
distributor) grants a warranty or stipulates to provide services related to 
Free Software does not affect general liability rules between users and those 
who actually cause damages. Generally, such warranties or services provide 
141 See, e.g., Raymond T. Nimmer, Legal Issues in Open Source and Free Software Distribution, 
Open Source Software Spring 2006 Critical Issues in Today’s Corporate Environ-
ment, PLI Handbook no. G-861, 7 (arguing that the effectiveness of warranty disclaimers 
and liability limitations in Free Software licenses depends on whether they create a con-
tractual relationship, not a condition on the use of software (at 30, 33); citing UCC and 
UCITA requirements for effectively waiving express and implied warranties). See also: 
Lucie Guibault, Ot van Daalen, Unraveling the Myth around Open Source Licen-
ses. An Analysis from A Dutch and European Law Perspective (TMC Asser Press 
2006) 78 et seq.
142 See: Wikipedia, Corporate veil, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corporate_veil.
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only for an additional party a user could turn to in case of defects. The gen-
eral liability rules that allow to turn to the person who actually caused the 
damage remain largely unaffected. This means that the hacker immunity is 
subject to liability rules, that is by all rules that regulate liability in the appli-
cable law. So, we include in the framework liability rules that limit the hacker 
immunity.
Liability rules: Users are not allowed to claim liability related to Free Software as long as 
the applicable law does not provide to the contrary, or it provides for exceptions that 
allow to avoid liability.
Precisely speaking, there are usually many rules that regulate liability. For 
example, these are: rules of statutory warranties, contractual liability rules, 
rules of torts, etc. In this thesis we group all of them in one class called “lia-
bility rules” and we include this class in the framework, as if it was a single 
rule. This is possible, because every liability rule is generally in the same 
relation with the hacker immunity. Namely, such a rule regulates (and most 
possibly restricts) the hacker immunity in all four combinations presented in 
Table 3.1.
We include in the model of the framework liability rules (RU11) and the 
relation between this class of rules and the hacker immunity (RE19).
(7) Non-legal regulators of software
So far we focussed on the identification of legal rules. However, the free-
doms could also be subject to limitations or restrictions that follow from non-
legal regulators, i.e., (1) the architecture, (2) the norms, and (3) the market. 
Usually, it is not easy to indicate one of these regulators as an isolated source 
of a particular restriction or limitation. It should be definitely expected that 
many restrictions and limitations are a result of various regulators acting 
together. Here, it is important to account for the resulting non-legal restric-
tions and limitations in the form of rules that are included in the model of 
the framework. Below, we provide four examples of such restrictions and 
limitations. Then, we identify rules that follow from them.
First, some vendors make Free Software programs available as a part of 
a service143 or of an embedded device.144 In such a case, it is possible for 
them to control the exercise of the freedoms using the architecture of the ser-
vice or of the device. Namely, they can employ technical means that make it 
143 There is a growing trend of delivering software not as a product, but as a service. See: 
Wikipedia, Cloud computing, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cloud_computing. See also: 
autonomo.us, Franklin Street Statement on Freedom and Network Services, http://autonomo.
us/2008/07/franklin-street-statement/.
144 There is a growing trend of embodying Free Software in various devices. See, e.g., Wiki-
pedia, Tivoization, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tivoization, see also: Wikipedia, 
Android (mobile device platform), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_(mobile_device_
platform).
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impossible or impracticable for users to use modified or third-party Free 
Software programs together with the respective service or device. As a result, 
users remain legally allowed to exercise the freedoms, but they have difficul-
ties in using the software for purposes other than contemplated by the dis-
tributor. More importantly they are not able to study, to adapt, and to 
improve the software effectively. Obviously, they are unable to redistribute, 
and release the software as well (since it makes not much practical sense). 
Certainly, users could exercise their freedoms in an unencumbered way only 
if they were able to reconstruct the whole infrastructure used to provide the 
service, or if they were able to manufacture a substitute embedded device. 
This makes the exercise of the freedoms unlikely.
Second,  the practice shows that average users do not exercise the free-
doms, at least not to the full possible extent. Instead of, e.g., improving pro-
grams on their own, many users rely on certain developers and distributors 
of Free Software (such as renowned firms or communities that develop and 
distribute GNU/Linux distributions). Such users do not modify the software 
if they identify bugs, require some lacking functionalities, or require a higher 
degree of interoperability. Rather, they send bug reports or feature requests to 
these developers and distributors. These users do not develop the program 
on their own if they see that the development is not organized according to 
their will. This means that many users turn into passive audience, such as the 
users of proprietary software, despite they are legally allowed to be active 
actors. Obviously, the fact that the users have the freedoms from the legal 
point of view, does not mean that they will exercise the freedoms at all times.
Third, it has been observed in practice that copyleft does not necessarily 
enable users to exercise their freedoms in the improvements of Free Software 
made available as a result of this rule. Harald Welte claims that he managed 
to enforce copyleft in over 100 cases.145 However, he noted that software that 
was made available as a result of this enforcement was mostly useless. Welte 
indicates the following reasons: (1) low quality of the source code (poor cod-
ing style, API problems, lack of portability); (2) outdated source code (writ-
ten against old versions of the original program); (3) copyleft-avoidance prac-
tices such as “binary kernel modules”. This shows that the law alone (as 
expressed in a copyleft clause) is not a sufficient regulator that could direct 
anyone to develop good-quality code, to write it against recent versions of 
programs, or not to attempt to game the boundaries of the scope of copyleft. 
We anticipate that such a regulation could be a result of norms or of the mar-
ket. However, Welte’s observations already allow us to conclude that there 
are no such rules that regulate copyleft infringers effectively.
Fourth, assume a person makes an improvement, such as a patch or a 
feature upgrade, to a Free Software program. Assume also that the improve-
ment is of good quality, works with the current version of the program, and 
145 Harald Welte, Some more thoughts on the results of GPL enforcement, at: http://gnumonks.
org/~laforge/weblog/2006/10/30/#20061030-gpl-devices.
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that it is provided with the whole source code. Then, the improvement has to 
be properly integrated in the whole program. Only if it is properly integrat-
ed, a working new version of the program is created, and the freedoms to the 
new version may be exercised by users in practice. Otherwise, the program 
would not work at all, or it would work after each user invested a consider-
able technical effort. The integration is possible if only the development of 
software is organized properly. The organization is necessary because the 
integration requires proper skills of developers and cooperation between 
them. It means that there are transaction costs involved in the integration.146 
These transaction costs might prevent individual users from integrating the 
code on their own.
Here, we may conclude that non-legal regulators limit or may be used to 
restrict user freedoms. In the first example given above, the restriction is a 
result of the architecture as constructed by vendors of services or devices 
offered together with Free Software. The architecture has an impact similar 
to contracts with distributors, already described in one of the above para-
graphs. So, we include in the framework, called “architectural restrictions”.
Architectural restrictions: A user can exercise all six activities covered by the FSD as long 
as the user is not prevented from it by technical means.
In particular, technical means could prevent users from using, developing, or distribut-
ing a Free Software program.
Architectural restrictions cover all combinations presented in Table 3.1, since 
they can be applied regardless of whom distributes Free Software and what 
kind of Free Software is distributed. The restrictions are in a direct relation 
with the grant of freedoms. Namely, they are used to restrict the exercise of the 
freedoms granted by copyright holders to Free Software. We include in the 
model of the framework the architectural restrictions (RU12) and the relation 
between this rule and the grant of freedoms (RE20).
In the second example, we observe a limitation. Users exercise the free-
doms in some situations only. We assume that the exercise of the freedoms 
comes at a price; it causes transaction costs. Namely, it requires technical 
knowledge necessary to create a working computer program out of an origi-
nal Free Software program and improvements of the program. Also, the 
resulting software requires support and maintenance services. In such a case, 
users who exercised freedoms in the program on their own, would have to 
support and maintain it by themselves as well. Thus, in the second example 
146 Cf. Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, Economica, vol. 4, no. 16, November 1937 at 
386. Transaction costs, generally, are costs that individuals bear while acting on a free 
market. According to Yochai Benlker a particular type of transaction costs present in the 
development of Free Software are “integration costs”, i.e., costs of controlling quality of 
contributions and integrating them in the whole product (Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, 
or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 Yale Law Journal 369 (2002)). See also: Wikipe-
dia, Transaction costs, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transaction_costs.
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the limitation on the protection of user freedoms is a result of the market, 
which prevents rational users (homo economicus) form undertaking activities, 
of which costs outgrow benefits. This limitation affects the grant of freedoms 
and can be expressed in the following way.
Limitation of the grant of freedoms by the market: A rational user will exercise the free-
doms provided that the benefi ts for the user are higher than costs.
The limitation covers all combinations presented in Table 3.1 that are at the 
same time covered by the grant of freedoms. We note that this limitation does 
not always affect users who do not have to follow the cost/benefit calculus, 
such as the government or non-profit organizations. The limitation is in a 
direct relation with the grant of freedoms. We include in the model of the 
framework the limitation of the grant of freedoms by the market (RU13) and 
the relation between this rule and the grant of freedoms (RE21).
In the third example we also observe a limitation. It is due to insufficient 
market regulation or insufficient norms that could stimulate all users not to 
infringe copyleft. This leads to a situation wherein copyleft has to be enforced 
using the law. However, the law alone cannot direct copyleft infringers to 
write good quality source code and provide it in a way that allows to use the 
code by other users. This limitation directly affects copyleft.
Limitation of copyleft by the market and norms: A licensee will perform the copyleft 
obligations provided that (1) the benefi ts for the licensee are higher than costs and (2) the 
non-performance of the obligations is contrary to norms that bind the licensee.
The limitation covers all combinations presented in Table 3.1 that are at the 
same time covered by copyleft. Consequently, the limitation is in a relation 
with copyleft only. It consists of two regulators: (1) the market, and (2) the 
norms. We note that the market limitation applies only to users who have to 
follow the cost/benefit calculus, while the remaining users are only subject 
to the norm that stigmatises copyleft infringement. We include in the model 
of the framework the limitation of copyleft by the market and norms (RU14) 
and the indirect relation between this rule and copyleft (RE22).
In the fourth example, there is another limitation. It is a result of transac-
tion costs related to the integration of source code that comes from various 
sources into a finished working software product. If a user cannot bear these 
transaction costs, the user has to forgo the exercise of the freedoms in a par-
ticular improvement of Free Software. There is a general rule that follows 
from this example. It regulates all six activities covered by the FSD, not only 
improving Free Software. We call this rule “market limitation of freedoms”.
Market limitation of freedoms: A user will exercise the six activities covered by the FSD 
provided that the benefi ts for the user are higher than costs.
In particular, a user will not become a developer or a distributor of Free Software if the 
development or distribution (respectively) is not viable economically.
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Market limitation covers all combinations presented in Table 3.1, since it can 
be applied regardless of whom distributes Free Software and what kind of 
Free Software is distributed. The limitation is in a direct relation with the 
grant of freedoms. Namely, it limits the exercise of the freedoms granted by 
copyright holders to Free Software. Again, we note that the limitation applies 
only to users who have to follow the cost/benefit calculus. So, if a given user 
is able to undertake activities, of which costs outgrow their monetary bene-
fits, and the exercise of a particular freedom leads to such an effect in the 
given circumstances, then the user will not be prevented from the exercise of 
the freedom by this limitation. We include in the model of the framework the 
market limitation (RU15) and the relation between this rule and the grant of 
freedoms (RE23).
In summary, as a result of the analysis of non-legal regulators, we include 
in the framework four rules and four relations. For the sake of clarity, we 
group all this rules in one class, to which we will refer to as “non-legal regu-
lators” (RU12-15). This class of rules is in relation with the grant of freedoms 
(RE20, RE21, and RE23) and it is in relation with copyleft (RE22).
3.1.3 Conclusion on rules for software and relations between them
In Subsections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 we identified 15 rules that regulate access to 
software. We also identified 23 relations between these rules. We provide a 
simplified graphical representation of the rules identified so far and rela-
tions between them in the Figure 3.5.
Figure 3.5: Rules for software and relations between them
For the sake of clarity, we performed the following simplifications in Figure 
3.5. First, we group together all non-legal regulators in one item (as explained 
above). Second, we do not present all 23 relations, but only the relations we 
find most important for the purpose of our study. Namely, we omit relations 
between the grant of freedoms, the right to fork, and copyleft, as these relations 
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do not limit or restrict user freedoms. For all other identified relations, the 
reader should revert to the respective paragraphs above. The presented rela-
tions between rules are indicated using lines. Solid lines represent legal rela-
tions. Dashed lines represent relations between legal rules and the rules that 
follow from non-legal regulators.
In Figure 3.5 we present the rules grouped in three levels. On the first level 
there is the default rule. This is the rule which empowers copyright holders to 
grant or refuse user freedoms. On the second level there are 4 rules that grant 
or protect user freedoms (the grant of freedoms, the right to fork, copyleft, and the 
hacker immunity). On the third level there are 10 rules that constitute limita-
tions or restrictions of user freedoms (since 4 non-legal regulators are grouped 
in one class, there are only 7 boxes presented on the third level). In this thesis 
we will focus on the third level, that is on the limitations and restrictions of the 
freedoms. For example, we will analyse how these limitations and restrictions 
are affected by software communities (in Chapter 4) and eGovernments (in 
Chapter 5). Also, we will propose improvements of the framework designed 
to address the limitations and restrictions (in Chapter 6).
Here, we may conclude that we identified rules that are related to the 
software scene and relations between them. We may also conclude that we 
include in the framework all the identified software rules and relations.
3.2 Identification of rules for standards and relations between them
It follows from our findings in Chapter 1 that there are two necessary condi-
tions of user freedoms: (1) access to software, and (2) access to standards. All 
rules identified so far regulate access to software. So, we still have to identify 
additional rules that regulate access to standards. Then, we have to identify 
relations between them. Afterwards, we have to include these rules and rela-
tions in the model of the framework. We do all this in this section. First, we 
identify rules and relations that limit or restrict access to standards and lead 
to closed standards (3.2.1). Then, we identify rules and relations that regu-
late activities directed at removing the restrictions on standards and at mak-
ing open standards (3.2.2). Finally, we present conclusions on the rules for 
standards and on the relations between them (3.2.3).
3.2.1 Rules that lead to closed standards
To put it in a nutshell, closed standards are protocols, interfaces, and data 
formats, of which the specifications are not generally available and that are 
subject to exclusive control.147 Access to, and the use of, interoperability 
147 In this thesis we treat any standard that does not meet the defi nition of an open standard, as 
a closed standard. The defi nition of an open standard was presented in Chapter 2, Section 
2.3. This defi nition was taken from the EIF v. 1.0. Here, “available” means not only “acces-
sible without limitations”, but also “capable of being legally used without restrictions”.
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information of such standards is restricted. Restrictions that lead to closed 
standards are the result of three regulators: (1) the law, (2) the architecture, 
and (3) the market.148 First, the law protects, in particular, trade secrets and 
patents. If interoperability information satisfies certain criteria, it becomes a 
trade secret. Alternatively, the use of the information may be protected by a 
patent material to the standard. So, the law can be used to restrict access to 
standards indirectly, by invoking trade secret or patent protection. Second, it 
is possible to design a program that uses a standard in a way to restrict access 
to the interoperability information. We refer to this as the scrambling of 
interoperability information. Scrambling makes it technically impossible or 
impractical to access the necessary information. Third, it is possible to make 
use of switching costs in order to lock users in to a particular closed standard. 
In such a way, standards are restricted as a result of the market regulation.
Generally, closed standards and Free Software exclude each other. Cer-
tainly, developers of Free Software programs sometimes attempt to design 
their programs to use closed standards. However, as a rule, the development, 
distribution, or use of Free Software that uses closed standards is either legal-
ly prohibited, technically impractical, or economically infeasible. This leads 
to two possibilities: (1) copyright holders of would-be Free Software pro-
grams that use closed standards are stimulated not to grant users their free-
doms in such software, or (2) users are stimulated not to exercise the free-
doms. Sometimes, the stimulation results in a situation that such software is 
not developed at all. Alternatively, it could be possible to grant users free-
doms to a program that uses a closed standard despite the stimulation, but 
the regulators mentioned above would still prevent users from exercising 
their freedoms in whole or in part. In particular, would-be developers of such 
programs could not engage in the development of the programs, or would-be 
distributors could not distribute them. More precisely, the designer of the 
standard can either prevent them from doing so completely, or impose condi-
tions incompatible with the freedoms. So, the general rule for closed stan-
dards that we include in the framework is “closed standards” (RU16).
Closed standards: users of a program are not allowed to exercise (or cannot exercise) some 
or all of the six activities covered by the FSD, as long as the program uses a closed stan-
dard.
In particular, developers are not allowed to (or cannot) freely develop Free Software that 
uses such a standard, and distributors are not allowed to (or cannot) freely distribute this 
software.
This general rule is in direct relation with the grant of freedoms (RE24). It is a 
complex relation that can be explained in the following way. Even though 
148 As far as the fourth regulator, the norms, is concerned, we proceed under an assumption 
that it does not have a material impact on the regulation of standards. However, there are 
certainly some norms that regulate standards, in particular the norms followed by parti-
cipants of standard setting organizations.
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users can invoke a Free Software license against the licensors who attempt to 
restrict user freedoms, the users are still restricted in the exercise of the free-
doms as long as the program in question uses a closed standard. Alterna-
tively, because the standard is closed, no Free Software is able to use this 
standard without restrictions. So, closed standards either restrict the grant of 
freedoms or stimulate copyright holders not to grant the freedoms at all.
The rule of closed standards affects all four combinations presented in 
Table 3.1. Namely, it allows to restrict the exercise of the freedoms regardless 
of the fact from whom the program is obtained and regardless of whether 
the program is original or improved Free Software. However, this is the case 
only to the extent that the program uses (or rather attempts to use) closed 
standards. More precisely, this is the case when users attempt to both (1) 
exercise the freedoms, and (2) provide for interoperability using closed stan-
dards. In other cases, the rule does not apply.
We include in the model of the framework the closed standards (RU16) 
and the relation between this rule and the grant of freedoms (RE24). Below, 
we refine the rule of closed standards by elaborating on four issues that are 
the result of the three regulators described above. There are two issues relat-
ed to the law: (1) trade secrets, and (2) patents material to standards. There is 
one issue that is related to the architecture: (3) scrambling of interoperability 
information, and there is one issue that is related to the market: (4) locking 
in.
(1) Trade secrets
Interoperability information related to a closed standard can constitute a 
legally protected trade secret of the designer of the standard.149 Generally, 
the legal protection of the information as a trade secret is conditioned upon 
making it secret and on undertaking efforts to protect the secret.150 Certainly, 
in order to restrict access to a standard with the use of trade secrets, the 
designer of the standard has to keep its specification private. However, the 
designer can make the specification available to others without renouncing 
trade secret protection; this is done using non-disclosure agreements 
(“NDAs”). An NDA obliges the recipient to keep the information confiden-
tial. Notwithstanding the making available under an NDA, the standard 
149 “Trade secrets” is an American legal term, but it has been recognized throughout the 
world. In various continental systems the terms “confi dential information” or “know-
how” are also used. TRIPS regulates this matter in Sec. 7, Art. 39 titled “Protection of 
Undisclosed Information”. In national laws that follow the civil law tradition, trade 
secrets are usually protected under general provisions of civil codes, or under the laws on 
unfair competition.
150 Carey R. Ramos, David S. Berlin, Three Ways to Protect Computer Software, 16 No. 1 Com-
puter Lawyer 16 (1999); Victoria A. Cundiff, Protecting Computer Software as a Trade Secret, 
in: 507 Practising Law Institute, 18th Annual Institute on Computer Law 761 
(1998); Alois Valerian Gross, What is Computer “Trade Secret” under State Law, 53 Ameri-
can Law Reports 4th 1046. See also: Van Lindberg, Intellectual Property and Open 
Source, O’Reilly 2008, 103 et. seq.
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remains a closed standard, because NDAs oblige parties to protect the infor-
mation from becoming generally available and used. They may also impose 
other restrictions on the use of the information by the recipient.
Trade secret protection terminates (1) if the designer fails to protect it 
adequately or reveals the protected information, (2) if the information 
becomes generally available without a breach of an NDA, or (3) if it becomes 
available in another lawful way.151 Afterwards, the information can be legal-
ly used to provide for interoperability, specifically for interoperability of a 
Free Software program with other programs that use the given standard. 
Conversely, as long as a standard is protected by trade secrets, it is not pos-
sible to implement the standard in a Free Software program. Obviously, the 
designer of the standard could allow certain persons to exercise some degree 
of freedom, but practically there is no possibility to allow a person to exer-
cise all four freedoms as defined by Stallman while maintaining trade secret 
protection for a standard used in a Free Software program at the same 
time.152 In particular, development or distribution of a Free Software pro-
gram that uses a standard protected as a trade secret without a breach of 
trade secrets law is generally illegal, or at least impracticable. So, the general 
rule of closed standards may be refined in the following way.
Trade secrets: As long as compliance with a standard requires the use of information that 
constitutes a trade secret, users of programs that use the standard are not allowed to exer-
cise such activities covered by the FSD that constitute a breach of the trade secret.
In particular, developers are not allowed to develop Free Software that uses such a stan-
dard, and distributors are not allowed to distribute this software.
This rule (RU16a), as a refinement of the general rule of closed standards, is 
in relation with the grant of freedoms (RE24) in the way already described 
above. The coverage of this rule of the combinations presented in Table 3.1 as 
compared to the general rule of closed standards is further limited to cases 
when the standard is protected by trade secrets. If the trade secret protection 
does not apply, user freedoms are not affected by this rule.
(2) Patents material to standards
Patents can be used to restrict access to standards much more effectively 
than trade secrets. We already outlined the basic rules of patent protection 
when discussing the rules for software. There, we focussed on software-
151 Applicable laws can differently regulate this issue. We may assume that in most major 
jurisdictions the use of a trade secret obtained in an unfair way (e.g., “industrial espio-
nage”) would rather not be legal, while the reconstruction of the information using fair 
means (e.g., reverse engineering) would not be prohibited generally.
152 David Bender, Trade Secret Implications of Open Source Licenses, Open Source Software 
Spring 2006 Critical Issues in Today’s Corporate Environment, PLI Handbook no. 
G-861, 129; Stephen J. Davidson, Gabriel Holloway, Protecting Trade Secrets in an Open 
Source Environment, Open Source Software Spring 2006 Critical Issues in Today’s 
Corporate Environment, PLI Handbook no. G-861, 143.
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related patents, of which the claims allow to restrict user freedoms because 
they extend to (a) products including a Free Software program or (b) pro-
cesses performed by such a program. Here, we focus on patents material to 
standards, which allow to restrict the freedoms because their claims extent 
to products or processes designed in compliance with a standard. If a Free 
Software program is included in such a product or performs such a process, 
its development, distribution, or use can constitute patent infringement 
(depending on the patent in question and the applicable law).
From this point of view it is necessary to add that patents grant the hold-
er the monopoly to use the patented invention (product or process), as well 
as many substitute products or processes.153 In case the subject-matter of a 
patent is an interface, protocol, or a data format, then (depending on the 
exact scope of patent claims) the patent holder may restrict the use of Free 
Software programs that interoperate using such a patented subject-matter, 
even if the programs have been independently created. Obviously, the pat-
ent holder can also restrict the development and distribution of such pro-
grams.154 The fact that patents material to standards can be obtained creates 
an incentive for existing or prospective patent holders to direct standardiza-
tion towards adopting closed standards covered with their patents. As a 
result many parties could not avoid using the standard, while at the same 
time they would have to obtain the patent holder’s authorization to do so.155 
From the point of view of user freedoms this means that the exercise of the 
freedoms would be subject to such an authorization, as long as the exercise 
involved the use of the closed standard covered by a patent. So, the general 
rule of closed standards may be refined in the following way.
Patents material to standards: As long as compliance with a standard requires the use 
of a subject-matter covered by a patent, users of programs that use the standard are 
not allowed to exercise such activities covered by the FSD that constitute a breach of the 
patent.
In particular, developers are not allowed to develop Free Software that uses such a stan-
dard, and distributors are not allowed to distribute this software.
153 This is a result of the so-called “doctrine of equivalents” (See, e.g., Wikipedia, Doctrine of 
equivalents, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doctrine_of_Equivalents. See also: Timothy 
R. Holbrook, The paradoxical nature of U.S. patent scope, in: Maciej Barczewski et al. 
(eds.), When Worlds Collide: Intellectual Property, High Technology and the 
Law (Wolters Kluwer 2008), 65.
154 The restriction is possible even if the specifi cation of a patented interface, protocol, or 
data format is publicly available. Conversely, patent claims are usually not expressed in a 
way that constitutes a complete specifi cation of protocols, interfaces, or data formats 
covered in whole or in part by them. Thus, patents may form an additional layer of pro-
tection on top of the protection resulting from the mere fact that the interoperability infor-
mation is kept secret. The practice of not disclosing the specifi cations or source code 
implementations in patents is contrary to the basic quid pro quo rule of patent law, which 
conditions the patent grant on the disclosure of the invention to the public.
155 See WIPO (Standing Committee on the Law of Patents), Standard and Patents, (18 February 
2009, SCP/13/2), at: http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/scp/en/scp_13/scp_13_2.pdf.
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This rule (RU16b), as a refinement of the general rule of closed standards, is 
in relation with the grant of freedoms in a way already described above (RE24). 
The coverage of this rule of the combinations presented in Table 3.1 as com-
pared to the general rule of closed standards extends only to cases when the 
standard is protected by patents. If the patent protection does not apply, user 
freedoms are not affected by this rule. We remark that patent holders can 
authorize users to exercise the freedoms, so patents restrict the freedoms 
only if the patent holders refuse to provide such an authorization (patent 
license). But there is no obligation to license patents to users of Free Soft-
ware. The patent holders may also place conditions on the exercise of the 
freedoms, or even prohibit the exercise of the freedoms completely (under 
particular circumstances).
(3) Scrambling of interoperability information
Interoperability information necessary to use a standard is initially known to 
the designer of the standard only. Sometimes, the designers of an interface, 
protocol, or data format do not even embody the information in any docu-
mentation (such as a specification) but merely implement the standard 
directly in a program that uses it. If, in such a case, the program is distributed 
in a binary form only, then the reconstruction of interoperability information 
is usually impossible or impractical. Often, even if source codes of the pro-
gram are available, the information cannot be easily reconstructed from 
them. Actually, the information expressed in any other form than a complete 
and accessible specification is effectively scrambled, i.e., it cannot be easily 
used to implement the standard in an independently developed program.
The advantage of scrambling over trade secrets or patents is that it only 
requires protecting the information physically and designing one’s products 
in a specific way. It does not require in particular any specific conduct regu-
lated by law. Certainly, scrambling alone may not be used to prevent 
attempts to extract the hidden interoperability information or to prevent the 
design of Free Software that uses the extracted information. Still, scrambling 
may be used to make it impossible, impractical, or at least burdensome to 
access the interoperability information. Usually, scrambling is used together 
with trade secrets or patents. In such a way, it provides for an additional 
layer of restrictions on an already closed standard. So, the general rule of 
closed standards may be refined in the following way.
Scrambling of interoperability information: As long as the interoperability information 
for a given standard is not expressed in a complete and accessible standard specifi cation, 
users of programs that use the standard cannot exercise some or all activities covered by 
the FSD with regard to these programs.
In particular, developers cannot develop Free Software that uses such a standard, and 
distributors cannot distribute this software.
This rule (RU16c), as a refinement of the general rule of closed standards, is 
in relation with the grant of freedoms in a way already described above (RE24). 
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The coverage of this rule of the combinations presented in Table 3.1 as com-
pared to the general rule of closed standards extends only to cases when the 
standard is not expressed in a complete and accessible specification (that is 
to cases when the access to interoperability information is restricted or lim-
ited using technical means). If this is not the case, user freedoms are not 
affected by this rule.
(4) Locking in
Access to interoperability information for a standard is a necessary condition 
for the development of a program that uses the standard. Consequently, it is a 
necessary condition for the distribution of such a program to users. However, 
it is not a sufficient condition that users will prefer programs that use open 
standards instead of programs that use closed standards. Sometimes, the 
costs of using an open-standards-based program are higher than the benefits. 
An important part of such costs are switching costs. Switching costs are a type 
of transaction costs related to the fact that users have to use programs that 
properly interoperate with other elements of their system, as well as with pro-
grams used by other users. Thus, a user will use a program that implements 
a given standard if (1) the rest of the user’s system already supports the stan-
dard or may be easily adapted to support it, and (2) if other users already use 
programs that support that standard or may be easily adapted to support it.
Should the overall switching costs be high, users might be effectively 
stimulated not to switch to programs that use other standards than the 
already popular standard. If such a popular standard is an open standard, 
user freedoms are not restricted (ceteris paribus). However, if such a popular 
standard is a closed standard, switching to programs that use another stan-
dard is not viable economically. This means that users are locked in to pro-
grams that are designed to interoperate using that standard. As a result of a 
lock-in users cannot afford abandoning a particular closed standard. It fol-
lows, that if a designer of a closed standard succeeds in making its own 
closed standard popular, the designer can then effectively restrict user free-
doms.156 For a successful lock-in, the popularity has to be coupled with the 
156 User choices of programs are to a signifi cant extent driven by network effects. As defi ned 
by economics, network effects cause goods to gain value, as perceived by their users each 
time the number of the users increases (See, e.g., Wikipedia, Network effects, at: http://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_effects). Network effects exist, for example, in markets of 
products that allow people to communicate with themselves. Ceteris paribus, if it is possi-
ble to offer a product that makes it possible to connect to a bigger number of people, then 
such product will prevail over the competition. The network effects of such a product 
would be higher than that of competing products. Conversely, if two products have the 
same network effects (i.e. allow to connect to the same people) then their market success 
will be determined by other factors, such as the quality of communications they provide. 
See: Arun Sundararajan, Network Effects, at: http://oz.stern.nyu.edu/io/network.html. 
Network effects are strongly related to Metcalfe’s law. As explained in the Wikipedia, 
Metcalfe’s law states that the value of a telecommunications network is proportional to 
the square of the number of users of the system (Wikipedia, Metcalfe’s law, at: http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metcalfe%27s_law).
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application of at least one of the already identified rules that lead to closed 
standards. Otherwise, developers could succeed in development of Free 
Software that is able to interoperate with the popular standard, and the free-
doms would not be materially restricted. So, the general rule of closed stan-
dards may be refined in the following way.
Lock-in: If the costs (in particular switching costs) of using a Free Software program that 
does not support a particular closed standard are higher than benefi ts, users will not exer-
cise their freedoms in such a Free Software program.
In particular, developers will not develop such Free Software, and distributors will not 
distribute it.
This rule (RU16d), as a refinement of the general rule of closed standards, is 
in relation with the grant of freedoms in a way already described above (RE24). 
The coverage of this rule of the combinations presented in Table 3.1 as com-
pared to the general rule of closed standards extends only to cases when the 
standard is restricted using above-described market regulation. We note that 
although this rule is a result of the market, it does not affects only such users 
who have to follow the cost/benefit calculus. Namely, if such users do not 
switch to open standards due to the fact that their costs outgrow monetary 
benefits, other users who could afford the switch cannot do so if they want 
to interoperate with the former users.
Here, we may conclude that the general rule of closed standards (RU16) con-
sists of four specific rules (RU16a-d), each a result of a different issue discussed 
in this subsection. Each of these specific rules is in the same relation (RE24) 
with the grant of freedoms as described at the beginning of this subsection.
3.2.2 Rules that lead to open standards
Access to standards may be restricted using (1) the law (i.e., trade secrets or 
patent law), (2) the architecture (i.e., scrambling of interoperability informa-
tion), and (3) the market (i.e., locking in). Usually, the access is restricted 
using a combination of all these three regulators. Obviously, from the point 
of view of user freedoms access to standards should not be restricted and the 
standards should be open. Thus, apart from (1) the rules that allow to restrict 
access to standards identified above, we have to identify (2) rules that allow 
to access standards and make them open. All these rules should be included 
in the framework. We may identify the latter rules by analysing the activities 
that are usually attempted in order to remove some or all restrictions on 
standards. These activities are: (1) reverse engineering, (2) standard setting, 
and (3) claiming essential facilities. Below, we elaborate on all three of them.
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(1) Reverse engineering
In the previous subsection we indicated that it is possible to make a standard 
closed by scrambling interoperability information. Namely, the specification 
of the standard is not made available to users, only the program that uses the 
standard is available. In such a situation, a sufficiently skilled person may 
still be able to extract the necessary interoperability information by reverse 
engineering the program. To reverse engineer a program means to analyse it, 
and to extract certain information.157 The extracted information can be in 
particular the interoperability information, which then can serve to recon-
struct the specification of the standard embodied in the reverse-engineered 
program. After the reconstruction, the specification can be used in the devel-
opment of another program that is able to interoperate using that standard.
Generally, there are two methods to reverse engineer a program: (1) anal-
yse its source codes, and (2) analyse how the program works (its input and 
output data). Obviously, the first method can be used if only the source codes 
are available. If they are not readily available, it may be possible to recon-
struct them during decompilation of binaries.158 The second method does 
not require source codes or decompilation, it is performed by running the 
reverse-engineered program on different sets of data. However, any method 
of reverse engineering does not guarantee completeness of the interoperabil-
ity information extracted. Even if source codes of a program are available, 
they may be not sufficient to prepare a complete and useful specification of a 
standard used in the program. Also, the developer of the reverse engineered 
program could release a new version of the program that uses a modified 
standard. Provided that all or most of the users of the old version switch to 
the new one, the information reverse-engineered from the older version of 
the program becomes obsolete.
Apart from technical constraints, reverse engineering is legally limited 
as well. Proprietary licenses usually attempt to prohibit reverse engineering. 
157 In a more general context, “[r]everse engineering is the process of analyzing a subject 
system to create representations of the system at a higher level of abstraction.” E.J. 
Chikofsky, J.H. Cross II, Reverse Engineering and Design Recovery: A Taxonomy in IEEE Soft-
ware, IEEE Computer Society: 13–17 (January 1990), as quoted by the Wikipedia (Wiki-
pedia, Reverse engineering, at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_engineering).
158 Precisely speaking, apart from decompilation, a person may also perform disassembly. 
The result of decompilation is a source code, while the result of disassembly is an assem-
bly code. Assembly code is a human-readable expression of a computer program in a 
low-level programming language, as opposed to source code, which is an expression in a 
high-level language. For the sake of simplicity, we do not distinguish between decompi-
lation and dissasembly. We may here assume that there are no differences between source 
code and assembly code, which would be material from the point of view of the construc-
tion of the model of the current regulatory framework of Free Software. Both methods 
may be used to reconstruct a specifi cation of the standard used by the disassembled (or 
decompiled) program. (See: Wikipedia, Reverse engineering, at: http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Reverse_engineering).
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The enforceability of such restrictive provisions varies across jurisdictions.159 
Also, elements extracted from a program during reverse engineering may 
be still subject to copyright, trade secrets, or patent protection. Addition-
ally, reverse engineering is usually subject to strict legal regulation, and if 
improperly performed it could give raise to civil or criminal liability.160 This 
requires extreme diligence during the process, for example by using meth-
ods such as “clean room design”.161 As a result of such legal considerations, 
it takes much efforts to reverse engineer a program in such a way that a pro-
gram developed according to the reconstructed specification could be legally 
used. In case of a patented standard, it is quite probable that this would still 
require authorization of the patent holder.
Here, we may conclude that reverse engineering is not a sufficient meth-
od of making a standard open from the point of view of user freedoms. It 
does not affect materially any of the rules identified above that lead to closed 
standards. In particular, it does not guarantee that the specification recon-
structed using the extracted interoperability information is complete, useful, 
and that it can be used legally and without other restrictions. Additionally, 
the use of such Free Software programs may be restricted with third party 
patents, even if the reverse engineering is successful. Consequently, Free 
Software programs that are designed according to such reconstructed speci-
fications may work improperly. Also, their use could lead to liability of users, 
developers, or distributors. Additionally, the exercise of the freedoms in such 
a program may still be subject to authorization of the holder of patents mate-
rial to the standard.
Since reverse engineering does not materially affect any of the previous-
ly identified rules that lead to closed standards, we do not find any addi-
tional rule that follows from reverse engineering that could be included in 
the framework.
159 See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Reverse Engineering Under Siege, 10 Communications of the 
ACM 15 (2002).
160 For example, according to Polish law under certain circumstances it is possible to decom-
pile a program in order to provide means for interoperability (Polish Copyright Act Art. 
75, which implements Software Directive Art. 6). But the information obtained during 
reverse engineering may constitute a trade secret. Under the Polish Unfair Competition 
Act Art. 11.1 it is an unfair competition tort to communicate, reveal or use trade secrets of 
another entrepreneur, or to acquire them from an unauthorized party if it endangers or 
threatens the interests of the entrepreneur. It is not clear how this provision relates to the 
Copyright Act. Additionally, the use of information extracted from a protected device 
may constitute a criminal offense. According to art. 267.1 of the Polish Criminal Code it is 
a crime to obtain without authorization an information not addressed to the person, by 
opening a closed letter, connecting to a wire transmitting the information or by circum-
venting electronic, magnetic or other particular security mechanism. It is not clear how 
this provision relates to decompilation right as well.
161 See, e.g., Wikipedia, Clean room design, at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clean_room_
design.
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(2) Standard setting
Naturally, the source of the most complete interoperability information is 
the designer of the protocol, interface, or data format in question. Under cer-
tain circumstances, the designer might be interested in making the specifica-
tion of the standard available. Indeed, there are numerous examples of 
designers cooperating by exchanging technical specifications. They usually 
do it within standard-setting organizations.162 There, they attempt to reach 
consensus over the requirements for interoperability and to adopt common 
standards.
The consensus over a standard usually encompasses both the technical 
content of specifications and the legal conditions for their use. The conditions 
that the participants in standard-setting organizations (SSOs) are expected to 
agree are often codified in the internal rules (so-called “policies”).163 Ulti-
mately, the conditions are expressed in licenses granted to copyrights, trade 
secrets, patents, etc., related to the standard by their respective holders. The 
conditions may be generally divided into (1) royalty-free conditions (RF), 
and (2) reasonable and non-discriminatory conditions (RAND). Under RF,
participants of SSOs are required to license their technology related to the
standard on a royalty-free basis, whereas under RAND they are only required
to impose reasonable and non-discriminatory license terms. The exact mean -
ing of RF and RAND varies from SSO to SSO.164 Many SSOs avoid making
the meaning precise and leave it for the parties to negotiate. As a result, what 
constitutes RAND for some parties can be unacceptable for others.
Given the above and given the definition of an open standard as used in 
this thesis, only a situation where there are no material conditions on the 
exercise of the freedoms may lead to open standards. Many SSOs do not 
guarantee that a standard may be used in a Free Software program, since 
they might allow to impose restrictions incompatible with the freedoms. 
Even some major organizations allow participants to impose such restric-
162 Some parties cooperate by organizing so-called “plug fests” or exchange know-how 
using other means, without engaging formally with SSOs. Standards adopted in such a 
way are usually not open, but they may serve as a basis for the discussion in an SSO that 
could lead to making them open standards.
163 There exist various bodies that deal with standard-setting including “offi cial” organiza-
tions with government backup or participation, such as ISO, more informal consortia 
such as W3C. It is also possible to treat as standard-setters organizations that manage 
patents included in patent pools (e.g., MPEG LA). Here, we refer to all of them as SSOs, 
since all of them involve a degree of cooperation in standard setting that affects the open-
ness of standards.
164 RF is differently understood in various SSOs. It is often allowed by SSOs for patent hol-
ders that follow RF to impose or agree on certain licensing conditions. See: WIPO (Stand-
ing Committee on the Law of Patents), Standards and Patents, (18 February 2009, 
SCP/13/2), at: http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/scp/en/scp_13/scp_13_2.pdf 
(Chapter IV discussing policies of various SSOs).
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tions,165 or they do not prescribe any requirements at all.166 Additionally, any 
such requirements follow from internal rules of the organization only.167 As 
such they may not bind third parties (non-participants), and they may even 
be hardly enforceable against the participants in a SSO.168
Here, we may conclude that standard setting is by itself not a sufficient 
guarantee that the resulting standards are open and that they may be used in 
Free Software. The necessary condition is that the standard setting proce-
dure is properly organized. In particular, it has to lead to the designing of 
useful and complete specifications that fully conform to the definition of an 
open standard. We identify the following rule that follows from open stan-
dards (RU17).
165 The most prominent example is probably the common policy of ISO/IEC/ITU (see: 
http://www.iso.org/patents). Perens (2006) calls for elaborating such policies by the 
adoption of obligations to publish a reference implementation for any extensions to the 
standard (Bruce Perens, Open Standards Principles and Practice, at: http://perens.com/
OpenStandards/Defi nition.html, referring to Sun Industry Standards Source License as 
an example). See also: Sun Industry Standards Source License, v.1.1., Sec. 3.1, at:  http://
www. OpenOffi ce .org/licenses/sissl_license.html (“In the event that the Modifi cations 
do not [comply with the standard], You agree to publish either (i) any deviation from the 
Standards protocol resulting from implementation of Your Modifi cations and a reference 
implementation of Your Modifi cations or (ii) Your Modifi cations in Source Code form, 
and to make any such deviation and reference implementation or Modifi cations available 
to all third parties under the same terms as this license on a royalty free basis...”).
166 As far as we are aware, Polish Standardization Committee (PKN) does not have any pol-
icy with regard to copyright or patent rights (apart from requiring the transfer of all cop-
yrights to translations of standards prepared by its members).
167 Albeit internal, they may still be subject to external review. For example in 2005 the Com-
mission closed an antitrust investigation of the ETSI policy, after they had been amended 
to remove the risk of „patent ambushes” (The Register, EC acts on patent ambushes, at: 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/12/14/patent_ambush/).
168 See, e.g., Rambus Inc. v. Infi neon Technologies Holding North America Inc., 318 F.3d 1081 
(C.A.Fed. Va. 2003) (Analyzing a policy of a standard-setting organization and holding 
that it contained a duty to disclose, but that it extended only to claims in patents or appli-
cations that „reasonably might be necessary to practice the standards” (at 1100). The duty 
did not cover „improvement patents, implementation patents, and patents directed to 
the testing of standard- compliant devices” (at 1101). The court did not fi nd the policy to 
be clear enough to constitute the basis for a fraud verdict (at 1102). The dissenting opi-
nion construes the scope of the duty to disclose to cover „patents and pending applicati-
ons that might be involved in the work of the committee” (at. 1115)). See also: Symbol 
Technologies Inc. v. Proxim Inc., 2004 WL 17701290 (D.Del.) (Admitting that laches is a 
defense to a patent infringement suit (at 3), but refusing it due to lack of proof that the 
patent holder had knowledge of infringing activity, (4-5) as well as the lack of requisite 
prejudice (5-7). The court did not fi nd satisfactory reasons to allow equitable estoppel 
defense as well. The defendant claimed that the plaintiff was under an obligation to dis-
close any patents related to the standard elaborated by the organization to which both 
parties were members. However, the organization’s bylaws allowed for non-disclosure 
with a statement that a license will be made available under RAND terms (7-9)).
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Open standards: Users of a program are allowed to exercise (and can exercise) all six activ-
ities covered by the FSD with regard to the program, as long as the program uses an open 
standard.
In particular, developers are allowed to (and can) develop Free Software that uses such a 
standard, and distributors are allowed to (and can) distribute this software.
This rule is in relation to closed standards (RE25). Namely, open standards 
and closed standards exclude each other in the sense that a particular stan-
dard can be either open or closed (although a combination of different stan-
dards could be employed in a computer program). Also, the rule of open 
standards is in a direct relation with the grant of freedoms (RE26). Namely, if 
the program in question uses an open standard then (ceteris paribus) copy-
right holders are not stimulated not to grant users their freedoms. Addition-
ally, third parties cannot restrict the freedoms if they are granted to a pro-
gram that uses open standards (ceteris paribus).
The rule of open standards affects all four combinations presented in 
Table 3.1. Namely, it removes the limitations and restrictions that are the 
result of closed standards regardless of from whom the program is obtained 
and regardless of whether the program is original or improved Free Soft-
ware. However, this is the case only to the extent that the program uses (or is 
developed in an attempt to use) open standards. In other cases, the rule does 
not apply. This means that for an efficient regulation using that rule, it is not 
sufficient that a relevant open standard exists, it is also necessary that it 
becomes popular and is actually used in programs.
We include in the framework:
(1) open standards (RU17),
(2) the relation between open standards and closed standards (RE25), 
and
(3) the relation between open standards and the grant of freedoms 
(RE26).
(3) Essential facilities
There are situations when designers of protocols, interfaces, or data formats 
fail to cooperate in the setting of an open standard.169 For example, in a 
recent CFI case Microsoft v. the Commission, one of the issues was the extent of 
the right of a dominant company to restrict access to protocols used in its 
169 Protocols, interfaces, and data formats may be developed individually by dominant mar-
ket players, or collaboratively by multiple participants associated in a standard-setting 
organization. Under some circumstances, market dominants may develop their standards 
as open. These circumstances are unlikely to occur because of switching costs and net-
work effects, as well as the ineffi ciencies created by non-market entities involved in the 
process. (See: Nicholas Economides, The Economics of Networks, 4 International Jour-
nal of Industrial Organization 673 (1996) at: http://www.stern.nyu.edu/net-
works/94-24.pdf; S.J. Liebowitz, Stephen E. Margolis, Network Externalities (Effects), at: 
http://www.utdallas.edu/~liebowit/palgrave/network.html.) Development of open 
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software, i.e., the right not to reveal the specification and to keep the proto-
cols a closed standard. A question put before the court was whether the pro-
tocols constituted an essential facility170 for competitors. The Commission claimed 
that refusing access to interoperability information (i.e., specification of the proto-
cols) constituted an abuse of Microsoft’s dominant position and therefore 
the Commission demanded to make the protocols available under RAND 
conditions. The CFI upheld the Commission’s decision, and the Commission 
agreed on the method of compliance proposed by Microsoft.171 However, it 
has been observed that the particular conditions initially offered by Micro-
soft still restricted Free Software developers in their efforts to use the specifi-
cations in question.172 Even the conditions offered at a later time seem to be 
still encumbered with restrictions that do not make the standards in ques-
tion open.173
Here, we may conclude that the doctrine of essential facilities is again 
not a sufficient guarantee that the standards made available after the appli-
cation of the doctrine are open and may be used in Free Software. First, the 
doctrine can be applied only towards dominants that abuse their market 
power. Second, license conditions imposed on such dominants might still 
discriminate Free Software developers.174 Third, the effectiveness of essen-
tial facilities doctrine is further limited since competition law procedures are 
 standards by individual market players is unlikely especially if there is no perfect compe-
tition in the market. See: Stephen E. Margolis, S.J. Liebowitz, Path dependence, at: http://
www.utdallas.edu/~liebowit/palgrave/palpd.html. A natural market process leading to 
open standards may be observed in the Internet. See: Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust and the 
Internet Standardization Problem, 28 Connecticut Law Review 1041, 1046 (“Indeed, the 
Internet is currently “owned” by a decentralized combination of [various entities] ... But 
the Internet can exist in this distributed condition only because each of the participants 
has agreed ... to a set of protocols that allows them to read and pass through messages 
sent by other participants.”). However, open standards are more likely to be developed 
by standard-setting organizations that adhere to specifi c policies for this purpose (name-
ly RF policies).
170 See: Wikipedia, Essential Facilities Doctrine, at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Essential_
facilities.
171 Case T-201/04.
172 Microsoft offered conditions satisfactory to Free Software developers (namely Samba) 
only later on. See, e.g., Andrew Bartlett, A year since Microsoft’s appeal failed, at: http://
people.samba.org/people/abartlet/a-year-since-microsofts-appeal-failed.html.
173 Although Microsoft made a great number of specifi cations available through its WSPP 
(Microsoft Work Group Server Protocol Program) and MCPP (Microsoft Communication 
Protocol Program), these standards are not maintained by an independent organization 
in an open decision-making procedure.
174 For example, the Commission required Microsoft to grant access to the specifi cations 
under RAND terms, which are generally not acceptable from the point of view of the FSD 
which does not allow to impose payment or any other material conditions as a considera-
tion for the grant of freedoms.
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time consuming.175 Thus, essential facilities doctrine does not affect the rules 
identified so far, that restrict access to standards. Consequently, we do not 
find any rule that follows from essential facilities that should be included in 
the framework.
3.2.3 Conclusion on rules for standards and relations between them
In the preceding two subsections, we identified rules that limit or allow to 
restrict access to standards, as well as rules that regulate access to standards. 
We also identified relations between the rules, and the relations between 
them and other rules included in the framework so far. We present these 
rules and the relations in Figure 3.6.
Figure 3.6: Rules for standards and relations between them
Here, we may conclude that we identified rules related to the standards 
scene and relations between these rules (as well as the relations between 
them and the rules related to the software scene). We include the rules and 
relations in our model of the current framework.
175 Remarkably, Microsoft v. the Commission case took roughly 5 years. See also: James Tur-
ney, Defi ning the Limits of the EU Essential Facilities Doctrine on Intellectual Property Rights: 
The Primacy of Securing Optimal Innovation, 2 Northwestern Journal of Technology 
and Intellectual Property 179 (2005). A similar case concerning IBM in the 80s resul-
ted in the company’s undertakings accepted by the Commission in lieu of an offi cial deci-
sion. IBM pledged to disclose certain interface information for its hardware and software. 
See: F.M. Scherer, Microsoft and IBM in Europe, 2090 Antitrust & Trade Regulation 
Report 65, 66 (2003).
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3.3 Reconstruction of a model of the current framework
In this section we reconstruct a model of the current framework. The model 
includes all rules and relations between them identified in previous sections. 
For a clear picture, we present separately the rules that regulate software 
(Subsection 3.3.1) and the rules that regulate standards (Subsection 3.3.2). 
Then, we present the regulatory environment in which all these rules oper-
ate (Subsection 3.3.3). Finally, we present all rules and relations between 
them in Figure 3.9 (Subsection 3.3.4).
3.3.1 Rules that regulate software
The basic rule that we included in the framework is (RU1) the default rule. 
Under the default rule, software is subject to exclusive copyrights which may 
be licensed or subject to a contract. The rule allows for private ordering using 
Free Software licenses. The following rule in the framework, based on the 
default rule is (RU2) the grant of freedoms. The freedoms are granted in Free 
Software licenses that allow users to undertake all six activities covered in 
the FSD (to run, study, adapt, modify, improve, redistribute, and release pro-
grams). Free Software licenses are also the source of other rules that we 
included in the framework. Namely, these are (RU3) the right to fork, (RU4) 
copyleft, and (RU5) the hacker immunity. The right to fork and copyleft attempt to 
provide the basic protection of the freedoms. They attempt to turn the free-
doms from inter partes rights into negative and positive freedoms (respec-
tively). In turn, hacker immunity attempts to provide for the basic incentive 
mechanism to developers and distributors of Free Software. Namely, it 
attempts to remove the most important demotivator, which is liability.
The remaining rules for software that we included in the framework are 
rules that limit or restrict access to software. After a thorough analysis, we 
included in the model of the framework the rules that follow from: (RU6) 
license proliferation and incompatibilities, (RU7) license revocability, (RU8) 
inter partes nature of licenses, (RU9) software-related patents, (RU10) contracts 
with distributors, (RU11) liability rules, and (RU12-15) non-legal regulators.
3.3.2 Rules that regulate standards
We have identified two rules for standards that are important from the point 
of view of the reconstruction of the model of the framework. These are 
(RU16) rule of closed standards, and (RU17) rule of open standards. After 
the analysis of issues related to closed standards, we identified four specific 
rules of closed standards included in the general RU16: (RU16a) trade 
secrets, (RU16b) patents, (RU16c) scrambling of interoperability information, 
and (RU16d) lock-ins. Additionally, after the analysis of issues related to 
open standards, we identified the rule of open standards (RU17).
Thus, we included in the model of the framework additional rules: 
(RU16) closed standards (with refinements), and (RU17) open standards.
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3.3.3 Regulatory environment
The reader may attain an impression that under the model of the framework 
the relations between the licensor of a given Free Software program and all 
its users are the same from the legal point of view. In particular, the rights 
and obligations of the parties that result from these relations appear as uni-
form. We illustrate this in Figure 3.7.
Figure 3.7: Uniformity
In Figure 3.7 solid lines represent relationships between the licensor (black 
dot) and users (grey dots). We draw all lines in the same pattern, in order to 
illustrate that all licensor-user relationships appear as uniform.
However, the uniformity should not be automatically assumed. Despite 
the adjustment, all legal rules in the framework operate in a regulatory envi-
ronment. This environment is the result of national laws (the applicable 
laws). Notwithstanding some harmonization that has happened over the 
years, these laws are different across various jurisdictions. It means that there 
is no single set of legal provisions in which the licenses operate. Rather, in 
each particular case (e.g., to every particular user of Free Software) different 
laws may be applied. The applicable law would be indicated using the rules 
of private international law of the forum. Given the fact that users are scat-
tered all over the world, there are multiple fora. So, it is impossible to indicate 
Figure 3.8: Regulatory environment
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a priori one law that would apply. On the contrary, we should assume that 
users who are based in different jurisdictions are subject to different laws. 
The result is illustrated in Figure 3.8, with regard to relations between users 
and Free Software licensors (similar figures can be presented to illustrate 
relations between users and developers, distributors, patent holders, etc.).
In Figure 3.8, the black dot represents a Free Software licensor. The licensor 
is based in a certain jurisdiction, demarcated by solid circle. A pair of licens-
ees (grey dots) is based in the same jurisdiction as the licensor, while three 
others are based in different jurisdictions. Although all relations with licens-
ees are regulated using the same license, the final result of this regulation 
may vary because of the fact that different national laws apply to licensees 
based in different jurisdictions.176
It follows that there are as many regulatory environments, as there are 
many jurisdictions with different laws. We have to account for the differenc-
es between jurisdictions that materially affect user freedoms in the model of 
the regulatory framework.177 We do not find any material differences on the 
general level. All national laws known to us authorize copyright holders to 
license their rights (or subject them to a contract). The exclusive copyrights 
and the freedom of contract which are the basis of the Free Software licenses 
have remained unquestioned, at least in jurisdictions that follow the rule of 
law. If under a particular national law Free Software licenses were invalid, 
this would lead to the conclusion that Free Software is used in breach of 
copyrights (certainly in case of developers and distributors, arguably also in 
case of all other users of this software). Such a conclusion would be hardly 
acceptable for anyone. In such a situation we expect that the law would be 
applied and interpreted in a way to find that the freedoms were effectively 
granted. So, we assume that national laws are the same to the extent they all 
generally allow Free Software licensing, and that the licenses are binding 
under all these laws.178
176 For example, under Polish Private International Law, when there is no agreement of the 
parties to the contrary, it would be the law of the residence, or of the seat, of the licensee 
(Janusz Barta and Ryszard Markiewicz, Oprogramowanie open source w świetle 
prawa, między własnością a wolnością [Open Source in the light of law, between 
property and freedom], 149 (Zakamycze 2005)). Free Software licenses usually do not 
contain choice of law clauses. The MPL is an exception here, since it points to the law of 
California, although in a somewhat vague way (most probably because it attempts to 
take into account the so-called “mandatory rules”): “This License shall be governed by Cali-
fornia law provisions (except to the extent applicable law, if any, provides otherwise), excluding its 
confl ict-of-law provisions” (See:  http://www.mozilla.org/MPL/MPL-1.1.html).
177 An interesting source of information about differences in national laws is the IDABC 
document titled Translation of EUPL v.1.0 into the offi cial languages of the European Union - 
Report on comments received by IDABC, at: http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/servlets/
Doc?id=29987. It is the record of comments received from national experts in the course 
of translating the European Union Public License into 22 EU national languages.
178 Cf. FN 82. See also: Andrew M. St. Laurent, Understanding Open Source and Free 
Software Licensing (O’Reilly 2004) 153.
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National laws differ materially on more specific issues. For example, 
some of them provide for certain requirements as to the validity of licenses 
by requiring a specific wording for a license to cover all six activities speci-
fied in the FSD effectively.179 Some national laws also contain non-waivable 
copyright restrictions, such as moral rights180 or non-waivable royalties.181 
They additionally allow to revoke a license if it fails to meet certain criteria 
or perhaps even to revoke any license at all.182 Moreover, national laws con-
tain different liability rules. Some national laws provide even for non-
waivable liability.183 In order to account for such specific differences in 
national laws we have to include in the framework a general rule that limits 
all legal rules in the framework. Importantly, this rule does not affect non-
legal rules (the ones which follow from regulators other than the law). We 
call this rule the “regulatory environment” (RU18).
Regulatory environment : All legal rules in the framework are subject to the applicable 
national law.
Since there are fourteen legal rules that we included in the framework so far, 
there are fourteen relations between this rule and the legal rules (RE27-39).
3.3.4 Graphical presentation of the model of the current framework
In Figure 3.9 we present the model of the current framework reconstructed 
in this chapter.
179 Under Polish copyright law a license covers only such “fi elds of endeavour” which are 
specifi ed in the license. A program cannot be used by the licensee on other fi elds. Also, 
the term of a license is 5 years unless the parties decide otherwise (i.e., unless the license 
was expressly granted for an unlimited period of time). Additionally, if the license is 
silent on the covered territory, the licensee may use the program in Poland only.
180 See e.g., Lucie Guibault, Ot van Daalen, Unraveling the Myth around Open Source 
Licenses. An Analysis from A Dutch and European Law Perspective (TMC Asser 
Press 2006) 122.
181 Under Polish copyright law moral rights have been signifi cantly limited with regard to 
computer programs. Still, an author of a program has an non-waivable right of author-
ship and attribution. Other jurisdictions could provide for a broader (and non-waivable) 
protection of moral rights, for example against certain modifi cations or uses of a pro-
gram, while under Free Software licenses such activities are not restricted. Also, under 
Polish copyright law the royalties from private copying levies are non-waivable, while 
under Free software licenses the licensee is not required to pay any royalties.
182 Under Polish Copyright Act, a license granted for unspecifi ed period of time can be ter-
minated by either party. Non-revocability of licenses is a condition of FSD-compliance 
(see Subsection 2.1.2). This means that licenses found FSD-compliant in some jurisdic-
tions could fail compliance test in some other jurisdictions (e.g., in Poland). However, the 
FSF has not undertaken such a test across jurisdictions so far. Still, the differences as to 
the revocability of licenses do affect user freedoms.
183 Under Polish law, it is not possible to waive liability for damages caused wilfully. Additi-
onally, consumer protection laws prohibit waiving liability in consumer relations.
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Figure 3.9: Graphical presentation of the model of the current framework
Figure 3.9 contains rules and relations between them as already presented in 
Figure 3.5. In Figure 3.9 we additionally include rules for standards and rela-
tions between them. We note that we do not present all 39 relations between 
the rules that we identified throughout the analysis; we present only the 
relations that we find most relevant for the purpose of our study. We also 
include the regulatory environment rule. This rule affects all legal rules in 
the framework. It does not affect the non-legal regulators. For the sake of 
clarity, instead of representing all 14 relations between the regulatory envi-
ronment and other rules with lines, we mark them by filling the boxes that 
represent the rules affected by the regulatory environment in light grey. The 
boxes of non-legal rules (and of the regulatory environment itself), which are 
not affected, are white.
In Figure 3.9 we continue to present the rules grouped in three levels, as 
in Figure 3.5. On the first level there is the default rule. This is the rule which 
empowers copyright holders to grant user freedoms or to refuse to grant them. 
On the second level there are 4 rules of software that result in the grant of user 
freedoms or in the protection of the freedoms (the grant of freedoms, the right to 
fork, copyleft, and the hacker immunity). These rules were already presented on 
that level in Figure 3.5. In Figure 3.9 we amend the second level with one more 
rule that protects user freedoms. This is the rule of open standards. On the 
third level there are 10 rules that constitute limitations or restrictions of user 
freedoms, as it was the case in Figure 3.5. In Figure 3.9 we amend the third 
level with rules of closed standards and with the regulatory environment rule.
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We note that the third level currently contains the following items: (1) 
license proliferation and incompatibilities, (2) license revocability, (3) the 
inter partes nature of licenses, (4) software-related patents, (5) contracts with 
distributors, (6) liability rules, (7) non-legal regulators (a class that includes 
4 non-legal rules of software), (8) closed standards (a rule that consists of 4 
rules of closed standards), and (9) the regulatory environment. We will refer 
to all these nine items as “limitations and restrictions of the freedoms” (in 
Chapter 6 we will refer to them jointly as the “inefficiencies of the current 
framework”).
3.4 Chapter conclusions
In this chapter we reconstructed a model of the current regulatory frame-
work of Free Software. The framework consists of (1) rules that regulate the 
freedoms and (2) relations between the rules. The rules included in the mod-
el regulate both (1) access to software and (2) access to standards. They regu-
late user freedoms in all four combinations presented in Table 3.1.
The framework includes the rules that grant and attempt to protect user 
freedoms, as well as the rules that limit or restrict the freedoms. Many of the 
limitations and restrictions are not sufficiently addressed by the rules that 
we included in the model. It follows from the model that the freedoms are 
not sufficiently protected under the current framework.
Thus, we shall proceed to analyse the relations between software com-
munities and eGovernments in order to identify how they affect the frame-
work in the protection of user freedoms. If after the analysis we should still 
find no adequate protection, we shall design necessary improvements of the 
current framework and propose an improved framework.
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of user freedoms
In this chapter we focus on software communities and on how they affect the 
model framework reconstructed in Chapter 3. We identify relations between 
software communities and user freedoms. Below, we recall our findings so 
far and then stipulate the working programme.
In Chapter 1 we found that conditions of user freedoms are the same as 
the conditions of the control over the working of the programs. They are: (1) 
access to source codes and (2) access to specifications of standards. Only giv-
en the access, users are able to exercise their freedoms, that is to perform all 
six activities covered by the FSD: (1) to run, (2) to study, (3) to adapt, (4) to 
improve, (5) to release, and (6) to redistribute programs. In Chapter 2 we 
found in particular that in order to allow users to exercise all these activities, 
it is necessary that copyright holders allow users to exercise all activities cov-
ered by copyright. In Chapter 3 we explained in particular that copyright 
holders that follow the Free Software approach do so by granting to users 
licenses that comply with the FSD – the Free Software licenses.
In Chapter 3 we established that under the licenses users are allowed not 
only to use, but also to develop and distribute Free Software. The rules that 
are a result of Free Software licenses (i.e., the grant of freedoms, the right to fork, 
copyleft, and the hacker immunity) together with other rules that regulate the 
use, development, and distribution of Free Software, and relations between 
the rules form the regulatory framework. Moreover, we reconstructed a 
model of the framework. In the model, we included also the rules that con-
stitute limitations and restrictions of user freedoms. Ceteris paribus, given 
these limitations and restrictions users cannot exercise their freedoms in an 
undisturbed manner. It follows that user freedoms are not sufficiently pro-
tected under the model.
After this summary of findings, we emphasize the course of research 
activities culminating in an attempt to answer the Problem Statement 1 (PS1). 
In Chapter 1 we found that software communities play an important role on 
the Free Software scene. Within the communities, the participants are guided 
and supported in their efforts to use, develop, and distribute Free Software. 
Precisely speaking, in this thesis (see Chapter 2) we define a software com-
munity as a group of entities that collaborate in the development of a Free 
Software project and that may also distribute the project to other users, as 
well as that provide guidance on its use. Additionally, we stated that in our 
research we focus on communities of hierarchical and quite formalized 
structures because we anticipate that such communities have the strongest 
possible impact on user freedoms. In Chapter 3 we formulated an assump-
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tion that communities enter into relations with the freedoms.184 In this chap-
ter we identify these relations. We do it in order to answer the PS1 and RQ1 
of this thesis, which we repeat below.
PS 1: What are the relations between user freedoms and software communi-
ties?
We answer the Problem Statement 1 by answering the Research Question 1, 
which is:
RQ 1: In what way do software communities affect the current regulatory 
framework concerning the protection of user freedoms, as articulated by 
Stallman?
In order to answer the RQ1, we start by elaborating on limitations and 
restrictions in the exercise of the freedoms undertaken by users individually 
(Section 4.1). Then, we elaborate on the exercise of the freedoms as organized 
in software communities (Section 4.2). In the end, we present chapter conclu-
sions, an answer to the RQ1, and an answer to the PS1 (Section 4.3).
4.1 Limitations and restrictions of the freedoms
All programs usually have bugs, lack all necessary features, and are not per-
fectly interoperable with other programs. So, the development and distribu-
tion of programs have to be organized and repeated whenever new bugs are 
found and fixed, new features are requested and added, or interoperability 
is broken and provided for again. Otherwise, the programs will not work 
properly. Repeated and organized development and distribution are usually 
referred to as “maintenance”. Unless software is maintained it quickly dete-
riorates in one way or another. Conversely, if software is maintained, it 
means that at any given point of time it is possible to fix bugs, include new 
features, and provide means for interoperability effectively. Maintenance is a 
means for making sure that software works properly. In other words, main-
tainers control the working of programs. Theoretically, it is possible to con-
trol the working of a program that has not been maintained for some time, 
but this requires much more efforts and usually proves impracticable.
User freedoms granted in the Free Software licenses allow users to main-
tain programs on their own (generally, maintenance means that all six activi-
ties covered in the FSD are undertaken in an organized and continuous pro-
cess). On average, however, users do not have skills and resources (hardware, 
development tools, data, know-how, etc.) necessary to maintain programs 
184 See FN 103.
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effectively.185 Usually, only qualified engineers (e.g., hackers) or specialized 
firms possess some or all such skills and resources. Average users are not 
able to maintain programs effectively even if they have the rights to do so. 
Such users have to have their programs maintained for them by someone 
else. This does not mean, however, that average users are unable to control 
the working of programs. If they are allowed to exercise all six activities cov-
ered in the FSD, they can outsource the maintenance to persons of their 
choice.186 As a result, they control the working of programs through such 
outsourced maintainers. It follows that as long as users are allowed to exer-
cise all six activities covered in the FSD they can control the working of pro-
grams even if they personally lack the necessary skills and resources. What 
is essential here is not who has the skills and resources, but whether users 
can freely outsource the maintenance of software.
Let us assume a hypothetical situation that there is no community 
around a Free Software program. In such a situation, users of the program 
can still attempt to exercise their freedoms granted in the Free Software 
license of the program individually. By individual exercise of the freedoms we 
mean either of two scenarios: (1) users become actors on the software scene 
by maintaining Free Software themselves, or (2) users outsource the mainte-
nance to a person of their choice.187 In both of these scenarios users perform 
some or all of the six activities covered in the FSD (or benefit from the perfor-
mance of these activities by persons to whom the maintenance is out-
sourced). However, users do not enter into any complex relations with other 
users in maintaining software. In particular, users do not form a software 
community.
The individual exercise of the freedoms is limited and can be further 
restricted in a relatively easy way. This is due to the rules that limit or allow 
to restrict the freedoms that we already identified and included in the model 
of the framework reconstructed in Chapter 3. Below, we identify how these 
limitations and restrictions affect the individual exercise of the freedoms 
exactly, by drawing from our findings presented in Chapter 3. We address 
them in the following order: (1) license proliferation and incompatibilities, 
185 This holds true not only in case of individuals, but also in case of corporate users, such as 
fi rms, who nevertheless have to outsource maintenance of software due to various con-
siderations.
186 To put it in another way: If users who possess all necessary skills and resources are 
allowed to exercise the freedoms without limitations and restrictions, there is nothing 
that legally prevents them from maintaining the programs for average users.
187 These two scenarios are to a large extent two sides of the same coin. Namely, users who 
maintain software themselves usually do it for other users who outsource the maintenan-
ce. Certainly, there are users who maintain software for themselves only. Here, under the 
heading of “users who maintain software themselves” we include both “users who main-
tain software for other users” and “users who maintain software for themselves only”. 
Needless to say, from the point of an average user, the ability of the former users to exer-
cise the freedoms is most important.
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(2) license revocability, (3) inter partes nature of licenses, (4) software-related 
patents, (5) contracts with distributors, (6) liability rules, (7) non-legal regu-
lators of software, (8) closed standards, and (9) regulatory environment. 
After discussing all of them we present (10) conclusion on limitations and 
restrictions in the individual exercise of the freedoms.
4.1.1 License proliferation and incompatibilities
The proliferation and incompatibilities of Free Software licenses materially 
affect user freedoms. Certainly, there are tendencies that result in a gradual 
decrease of the number of model licenses used in practice, as well as tenden-
cies that allow to overcome incompatibilities (such as dual licensing, amend-
ing licenses with compatibility clauses). However, despite these tendencies 
it is still the case that any user who wants to exercise the freedoms individu-
ally in a combination of selected programs has to undertake a two-step legal 
analysis. First, the user has to determine whether each license of programs 
included in the combination allows to exercise all six activities covered in the 
FSD. Second, the user has to determine whether the licenses allow to exer-
cise them with regard to the combination as a whole.188
In the first step of the analysis the user can benefit from the work already 
performed by the FSF. Here, we should recall that the FSF scrutinizes the 
compliance of various licenses with the FSD and publishes an official list of 
the analysed licenses. Licenses found by the FSF as FSD-compliant are also 
commonly recognized189 as allowing to exercise all six activities covered in 
the FSD. It follows that any user can attempt to mitigate the effects of license 
proliferation by exercising the freedoms only in the software that is available 
under FSD-compliant licenses. Still, the user has to find programs under 
these licenses, which is not necessarily an easy task. It involves searching 
through various sources which can differ extremely both as to the type and 
quality of software they offer, as well as to the way they present their licens-
ing terms. There is no single point of reference where users could browse for 
FSD-compliant software, but there exist some popular public repositories.190 
Using such repositories can be helpful, since they offer useful querying 
interfaces. Some of them, for example, allow to query the database of hosted 
software using license as a criterion, but naturally such services are not pro-
188 For an excellent description of the procedure of such an audit see Heather J. Meeker, 
The Open Source Alternative Understanding Risks and Leveraging Opportuni-
ties (Wiley, 2008), 53 et. seq. as well as 71 et. seq.
189 Such common recognition may be helpful since Free Software licenses are model licenses. 
The exact scope of user rights and obligations depends on how a model license is applied 
between parties to a transaction. Common recognition is a custom or trade practice, 
which are legally relevant in determining how the license is applied between the parties.
190 Examples include SourceForge (http://sourceforge.net), FreshMeat (http://freshmeat.
net), or (last but not least) the Free Software Directory http://directory.fsf.org/.
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vided under any legal guarantee.191 At the end of the day, the user has to 
review each program and its license separately, and seek for legal advice if 
necessary.192
The second step of the analysis is performed on programs under licenses 
identified in the first step. Given our findings in Chapter 3, it is legally 
impossible to distribute programs under incompatible licenses in some com-
binations. So, the second step comprises identification of incompatibilities 
between these licenses. If the identified incompatibilities cannot be resolved 
(e.g., by combining programs in a way that does not trigger incompatible 
obligations), the second step comprises also the removal of respective pro-
grams from the combination.193 Notably, the second-step analysis has to be 
performed only by users who want to distribute the combinations (i.e., those 
who intend to maintain them for other users). Users who maintain software 
only for themselves can proceed immediately after step one. This means that 
the results of the second step materially affect average users, i.e., the ones 
who do not maintain software themselves and outsource maintenance. With-
out the completion of the second step, provision of maintenance to such 
users might constitute license infringement.194
In the second step, similarly to step one, a prima facie identification of 
incompatibilities can be found at the FSF’s webpage. Namely, the FSF does 
not only analyse licenses for their FSD-compliance, but also they indicate 
whether a given license is GPL-compatible. This means that all users have a 
point of reference, at least as far as GPL-compatibility is concerned.195 Some 
additional information can be deducted by identifying what software is dis-
tributed by major Free Software distributors and the manner they distribute 
it (in which combinations, etc.). Users could assume with some degree of 
risk196 that these distributors comply with all licenses of the hundreds of 
191 From the formal point of view, such a query is not suffi cient to determine that a particular 
license was granted. This might become important if under the applicable law mere use 
of Free Software is insuffi cient for concluding a valid license (for example because license 
terms were not communicated to the user clearly enough).
192 Even FSD- and OSD-compliant licenses, still include obligations for the licensees, which 
have to be complied with.
193 The removed programs have to be maintained separately, or at least not distributed 
together with the combination.
194 Most probably, mere outsourcing of the maintenance of software would not constitute 
distribution by a user, or at least not to the extent necessary to fi nd a material license 
infringement. However, provision of maintenance services for such a user might involve 
distribution (e.g., of improvements of software). In such a situation the distributor has to 
identify applicable obligations and resolve any incompatibilities.
195 Even the FSF’s opinions are not legally binding and are not provided with any legal guar-
antee. Additionally, what matters is how the license is interpreted in a particular transac-
tion.
196 Actually, this risk can be considerably high, because distributors could proceed accord-
ing to individual arrangements with particular licensors, not on the basis of publicly 
granted model licenses.
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Free Software programs they distribute, or at least refer to the conduct of the 
distributors as an established market practice.197
Still, even if a user exercises the freedoms only in the combinations of 
programs released under compatible licenses, the user has to comply with 
all obligations specified in the licenses of all programs in a combination. In 
order to do so, the user has to identify these obligations. A brief analysis of 
the most popular Free Software licenses reveals that they usually require 
providing certain information to users to whom the programs are distribut-
ed (preserving copyright notices, passing through license texts, communi-
cating warranty disclaimers and liability limitations, etc.). Also, given the 
popularity of copyleft licenses, there is a high probability that at least some of 
the licenses of the programs in the combination require making source codes 
available,198 if the programs are distributed.199 Since there is a dozen of FSD-
compliant licenses, the complete list of exact obligations can be quite long. 
However, in any given combination of Free Software programs there is a 
definite number of such obligations. So, the completion of the second step of 
the analysis is not impossible, but may prove impractical for some users.
Here, we may conclude that license proliferation and incompatibilities 
stimulate some users not to exercise the freedoms individually. They espe-
cially stimulate some users not to maintain certain combinations of software 
for other users. The more programs in a combination and the more complex 
the resulting license relations are, the fewer users are willing to maintain it. 
The stimulation does not materially affect users who possess skills and 
resources necessary to maintain the software themselves, as well as those 
who can afford completing both steps of the legal analysis. So, most average 
users who want to control the working of Free Software do not have as wide 
a choice of maintainers as they would have if there was no license prolifera-
tion and incompatibilities. Also, due to costs of the legal analysis, the main-
tainers are not as effective in developing and distributing software as they 
could be. Certainly, at least some resources that they could direct to mainte-
nance has to be directed to legal analysis.
4.1.2 License revocability
License revocability allows to restrict user freedoms. In fact, it leads to a com-
plete removal of the freedoms. We found in particular that even a significant 
197 See FN 189.
198 Depending on the scope of the respective copyleft clause and the facts of the particular case, 
this obligation can apply to the program itself, to the whole combination, or to something 
in-between. We are unaware of a copyleft clause that would require to make available source 
codes of all imaginable combinations. Even the copyleft clause of the GPL seems to be lim-
ited to derivative works and “mere aggregations” are explicitly excluded from its scope.
199 Usually, users who do not distribute the software but only use and develop it internally 
are not bound by these obligations (even Affero GPL or Open Software License are con-
cerned with making software available to third parties, not internal use).
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user base or a developed downstream distribution does not make it impossi-
ble to unilaterally terminate the license in practice, if this is allowed by the 
applicable law. After the licensor unilaterally revokes a Free Software license 
effectively or otherwise terminates the legal relationship with users, then the 
default rule of exclusive control over software is reinstated. Also, in such a 
case users cannot rely on the right to fork or copyleft to defend their freedoms, 
as both of them require a binding license to exist. More importantly, they do 
not have any freedoms to defend, as only the terminated license constituted 
their source.
Here, we may conclude that if the license terminates, then from the legal 
point of view users cannot exercise their freedoms in any way, also not indi-
vidually. From the practical point of view, the licensor would probably not 
take legal steps against users who continued to use and maintain the soft-
ware for themselves only, without distributing it. More importantly, howev-
er, users could not legally maintain software for other users. All users would 
be precluded from the control over the working of the programs, maybe 
apart from a few.
4.1.3 Inter partes nature of licenses
Free Software licenses form inter partes relations between licensors (copy-
right holders) and licensees (users). As a consequence, unless there is a legal 
rule to the contrary, third parties (i.e., entities other than the licensors) cannot 
easily enforce copyleft clauses against the licensees. Specifically, if there are 
no rules in the applicable law that allow third parties to benefit from an inter 
partes relation effectively, the enforcement of copyleft remains in the hands of 
the licensors only. We illustrate this in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1: Copyleft
In Figure 4.1 we present two example sets of relations under copyleft. On the 
left of Figure 4.1 we see user A who creates an improvement of an original 
Free Software program but does not offer it to other users under a Free Soft-
ware license. Specifically, the terms of user A contain restrictions that prevent 
users from exercising their freedoms individually in the improvement. This 
is represented by the dashed line as opposed to the solid lines of relations 
based on the Free Software license to the original. Thus, users may not exer-
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cise their freedoms individually in the improvement. However, as the origi-
nal is subject to a copyleft clause, the licensor of the original may legally 
enforce that the improvement is released under a Free Software license, and 
all its users allowed to exercise the freedoms in it. The enforcement relation 
is marked by 1. Then, depending on the exact legal structure of the particular 
copyleft clause, user A grants the freedoms to the improvement to the original 
licensor (relation marked by 2), or user A grants the freedoms directly to 
other users (relation marked by 3). On the right of Figure 4.1 we illustrate an 
even simpler use of copyleft. Therein, the original licensor does not interfere. 
Other users address their claims based on copyleft directly to user A. This is 
possible if only the applicable law empowers the users to enforce the inter 
partes relation between user A towards the licensor. If not, then the users 
have to follow the scenario presented on the left of Figure 4.1.
Obviously, the enforcement requires the enforcing person’s resources 
invested in gathering evidence, communicating with the infringing party, 
obtaining legal advice, and supporting the case before a court.200 As long as 
the person is an average user that does not have the necessary resources, the 
ability to enforce copyleft is effectively limited, even if the applicable law 
allows such a person to enforce copyleft. This means that the inter partes nature 
of the licenses limits users in exercising their freedoms individually. Namely, 
in case a user wanted to exercise their freedoms in Free Software programs 
distributed in breach of a copyleft clause, the user would have to invest con-
siderable resources in enforcing the clause, or even have to rely on the licen-
sor to enforce the copyleft (if the applicable law restricted third party stand-
ing). Until the copyleft was successfully enforced, the user could not maintain, 
or outsource the maintenance of the program “appropriated” by user A.
Certainly, the user could avoid the above-mentioned limitation by exer-
cising the following sequence: (1) obtaining the program in question directly 
from the licensor, (2) exercising the right to fork, and (3) creating a substitute 
improvement. We illustrate this in Figure 4.2.
Figure 4.2: The right to fork
200 According to Eben Moglen most of the disputes related to Free Software licenses have 
been settled out-of-court (See: Eben Moglen, Enforcing the GNU GPL, at: http://www.
gnu.org/philosophy/enforcing-gpl.html).
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In Figure 4.2 we present two example sets of relations under the right to fork. 
On the left of Figure 4.2 we see the same initial situation as on the left of Fig-
ure 4.1: user A does not offer the improvement to other users under terms as 
permissive as the Free Software license of the original program. If the origi-
nal is not subject to a copyleft clause, or if the enforcement of copyleft obliga-
tions is impossible or impractical, users can still resort to the right to fork. 
Under the right to fork, users may attempt to develop a substitute improve-
ment individually and maintain it themselves. Alternatively, (see the right of 
Figure 4.2) another user (user B) could fork the program, improve it, and 
offer the improvement to other users under the terms as permissive as the 
original license. Notably, under the right to fork, users may not exercise their 
freedoms in the improvement developed by user A. Instead, they are only 
allowed to develop (or wait until the licensor or user B develops) substitute 
improvements on the basis of the original program. Definitely, developing 
and maintaining a substitute improvement requires more skills and resourc-
es than maintaining an already developed improvement of user A, made 
available in performance of copyleft obligations or out of free will of user A.
Here, we may conclude that the inter partes nature of licenses limits some 
users in becoming maintainers of certain improvements of software for other 
users. Similarly to other limiting and restricting rules described so far, it does 
not materially affect users who possess skills and resources necessary to 
maintain the software themselves, as well as those who can afford enforcing 
copyleft (provided that the applicable law does give them standing). So, it 
mostly affects average users, but other users can be also materially affected 
in specific circumstances.
4.1.4 Software-related patents
It is possible to restrict user freedoms using various rights that are not or 
may be not licensed by a Free Software licensor, such as patent rights. Despite 
the territorial limitation of patents, we did not find any major jurisdiction 
that would not allow to obtain patents in one way or another related to soft-
ware. We found that patents can be used to restrict user freedoms even by a 
patent holder who is a third party completely unrelated to the parties of a 
Free Software license. As a result, parties to any such license cannot easily 
avoid the threat of patents, in particular by contracting this risk away 
between themselves.201 If any party infringes a patent, the party may be lia-
ble towards the patent holder. More importantly, the patent holder could 
prevent the exercise of the freedoms, or subject it to conditions not compati-
ble with the freedoms.
Usually, it is not easy to discover that there is a risk of patent infringe-
ment. The discovery is possible using patent searches, but the searches 
201 As a matter of facts, such risk cannot be easily avoided by parties to a proprietary license 
as well.
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involve browsing through large amounts of patent documentation. The doc-
umentation is not always easily accessible and complete.202 It is also not easy 
to analyse, mostly because it does not usually disclose the actual source code 
implementation of software-related inventions, or at least the exact algo-
rithm used in these inventions. This means that many patent infringements 
may be accidental, while their avoidance requires considerable skills and 
resources.
Here, we may conclude that software-related patents allow to restrict 
some users not only in becoming maintainers of certain software for other 
users (i.e., such software that is found to infringe a patent), but even in a 
simple use of such software. Patents do not affect only such users who pos-
sess skills and resources necessary to avoid the risk of patent infringement or 
to work around the patent (assuming that this is legally and technically pos-
sible). So, software-related patents definitely affect average users, and it is 
likely that most other users are also materially affected by them.
4.1.5 Contracts with distributors
Contracts may be used to restrict user freedoms regardless of other limiting 
and restricting rules. Given the autonomy of the parties to a contract, there 
are practically no boundaries as to what the restrictions may be. Generally, it 
is possible and has been observed in practice that users accept contracts that 
prevent them from exercising their freedoms individually. From the point of 
view of the individual exercise of the freedoms, it is important that such con-
tracts include contracts whereby (1) users undertake not to maintain soft-
ware themselves, (2) users undertake not to outsource maintenance other-
wise than to the other party of the contract, or (3) users undertake not to 
perform both of the above. Sometimes, users do not undertake anything, but 
the contract conditions the performance of warranties or services related to 
Free Software on the user not performing the maintenance. This alone may 
effectively prevent many users from maintenance.
Here, we may conclude that distributors can use contracts to restrict 
some users in practically any exercise of the freedoms. In particular, they 
could restrict users in becoming maintainers of certain software for other 
users (e.g., the software as improved by the distributors). Certainly, such 
contracts do not affect users who do not accept them, but naturally average 
users are more likely to accept such contracts than users who possess skills 
and resources necessary to maintain the software themselves. At the same 
time, average users are most affected by such contracts, since as a result they 
cannot outsource the maintenance otherwise than to their contractors, while 
they would not maintain the software themselves anyway.
202 See: WIPO (Standing Committee on the Law of Patents), Report on the International Patent 
System, (3 February 2009, SCP/12/3 Rev. 2), p. 22 et. seq.
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4.1.6 Liability rules
Liability rules existing in various national laws affect the hacker immunity. 
Here, we should recall that the hacker immunity is a broad warranty disclaim-
er and liability limitation clause. The immunity attempts to cover nearly all 
possible liability related to Free Software (warranties, contract or tort liabili-
ty, sometimes also third party claims, etc.). This means that the hacker immu-
nity attempts to pass to the user the risk related to software.
If the hacker immunity is fully enforceable, users are left in the same situa-
tion as users of proprietary software, as far as such a risk is concerned. 
Namely, unless they are able to repair the program or remedy the infringe-
ment of third party rights themselves, or unless distributors of software offer 
separate warranty or indemnification, users bear the risk of damages or lia-
bility. In such a case, the exercise of the freedoms could constitute a heavy 
economic burden for users. This means that the full enforceability of the hack-
er immunity stimulates users not to maintain software themselves. Users are 
stimulated to outsource maintenance to persons who can guarantee good 
quality, most preferably together with some kind of indemnification against 
third party rights. Consequently, the full enforceability of the hacker immunity 
limits users who cannot offer that quality and indemnification in their ability 
to offer maintenance services.
Conversely, if liability rules do not allow to enforce the hacker immunity in 
whole or in part, developers or distributors of Free Software might be 
required to pay damages or otherwise bear liability for defective Free Soft-
ware programs. In such a case, the rule of the hacker immunity would fail to 
remove an important demotivator for prospective contributors to Free Soft-
ware projects, including those who would be willing to maintain software 
on behalf of others. Only those who possess necessary resources would then 
be willing to undertake to maintain the software.
From the legal point of view, the relation between the hacker immunity 
and liability rules boils down to the question who will bear liability for defec-
tive software and reimburse damages. However, from the practical point of 
view it is often the case that the damages are not the main issue, since the 
operation of the user’s enterprise or the safety of data, etc. is much more 
important. Then, it is crucial whether the user can rely on someone who not 
only guarantees certain level of service and is liable for not meeting the level, 
but also on someone who can be called upon in order to repair the defects 
and bring the software back to operation. Obviously, users who possess suf-
ficient skills and resources can provide such a service themselves, if only 
they have access to source codes of the software and specifications of stan-
dards used in this software. For users who have to outsource maintenance, 
this is not sufficient.
It follows that the freedoms will be exercised in an unencumbered way if 
it is possible for users to maintain or outsource the maintenance of Free Soft-
ware in a way that allows for a prompt removal of defects. It is less impor-
tant that as a result of the relation between the hacker immunity and liability 
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rules the liability can or cannot be attributed to certain actors. It is more 
important whether there exist actors who provide maintenance services, and 
in particular offer to remove defects found in software.
4.1.7 Non-legal regulators of software
User freedoms may be restricted using non-legal regulators. In particular, it 
is possible to restrict user freedoms using a special architecture, e.g., by mak-
ing software a part of a service or a device. User freedoms are also limited by 
the way a market operates and norms are imposed. Market and norms affect 
mostly copyleft, but we also found a material limitation on the exercise of 
user freedoms in general through market regulation.
Here, we may conclude that from the point of view of the individual 
exercise of the freedoms it is important that all the identified non-legal regu-
lators affect maintenance of software. The result of the architecture is similar 
to the result of contracts with distributors, but instead of legally obliging 
users to refrain from maintaining software on their own or from outsourcing 
it to a third party, the architecture makes it simply impossible or impractical. 
The market regulation can additionally limit or restrict users from maintain-
ing software. Transaction costs make it costly to become an actor in the Free 
Software scene. The market also fails to stimulate users to perform their 
copyleft obligations in a way that would allow users to access source code of 
some programs and exercise their freedoms in practice. Finally, integration 
costs can prevent users from undertaking maintenance of software, even if 
this is legally and technically possible.
4.1.8 Closed standards
Trade secrets, patents material to standards, scrambling of interoperability 
information as well as locking-in lead to closed standards and affect user 
freedoms. Also, neither reverse engineering, nor standard setting as such, 
nor the doctrine of essential facilities is sufficient for removing the identified 
limitations and restrictions on standards and making them open standards. 
It is additionally necessary that the standard setting procedure is properly 
organized so that the resulting standards are open. It is also necessary that 
such open standards become popular and are actually used in software. Oth-
erwise, the software will continue to be developed according to closed stan-
dards.
Here, we may conclude that due to closed standards, there are limita-
tions and restrictions on the maintenance of software. Users who are not able 
to access standard specifications (or legally use information contained there-
in) are precluded from maintaining the software, at least as far as mainte-
nance involves providing for interoperability using a closed standard. 
Depending on circumstances, they are precluded either from maintaining it 
for other users only, or from maintaining it for themselves as well.
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4.1.9 Regulatory environment
The framework operates in a regulatory environment. In fact, there are as 
many regulatory environments, as there are many jurisdictions (national 
laws) involved in a particular case. As a result, we subjected all rules in the 
framework to the applicable national law. We did not find any laws that 
invalidate any of the rules included in the model of the framework as a 
whole. Still, we found that due to the differences between various national 
laws the rights and obligations that follow from these rules could differ 
across jurisdictions. For example, we can assume that there may be jurisdic-
tions where despite copyleft clauses licensees would not be obliged to deliver 
some improvements as Free Software, or where the law would not allow to 
enforce this obligation as effectively as in other jurisdictions. Additionally, in 
some jurisdictions, developers and distributors may not be allowed to waive 
their liability for Free Software as much as in other jurisdictions.
Given that there is a number of regulatory environments, if a user 
attempted to maintain software for other users, such a user would start 
entering into numerous relations with other users. For example, the user 
would become the licensor with regard to the improvements made to the 
software. The user could also conclude contracts with other users (distribu-
tion contracts, maintenance contracts, etc.). Obviously, given the globaliza-
tion and the use of the Internet in the trade, such other users would most 
probably come from many different jurisdictions. Thus, there is a high prob-
ability that a different national law could apply in each case. It follows that 
the user would have to verify the impact of each national law on all rela-
tions.203 Not everyone can or is willing to cover costs of such a verification.
Hence, differences between national laws constitute a limitation on the 
individual exercise of the freedoms performed by maintaining software for 
other users that come from different jurisdictions. The differences only do not 
affect the users who possess skills and resources necessary to (a) verify the 
legality of their conduct in all jurisdictions involved, and (b) to work around 
any identified legal obstacles. So, it definitely affects average users, and it is 
likely that many other users are also materially affected by the differences.
4.1.10 Conclusion on limitations and restrictions of the freedoms
As follows from the above, the individual exercise of the freedoms may be 
subject to severe restrictions and limitations in practice. Despite the grant of 
freedoms in Free Software licenses and despite some rules that attempt to pro-
tect the freedoms, such as the right to fork and copyleft, users may not at all 
times freely use Free Software by undertaking some or all activities covered 
203 Certainly, some of these problems could be avoided using choice of law clauses in the 
contracts with users (pointing to one jurisdiction only). However, there are some laws 
(so-called mandatory rules), the applicability of which cannot be avoided.
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by the FSD. Thus, we may conclude that elimination of these restrictions and 
limitations is a necessary condition in order to allow users to exercise their 
freedoms effectively.
More precisely, in order to conclude that the software communities affect 
the framework by contributing to the protection of the freedoms, we have to 
establish whether the communities:
(1) decrease the number of Free Software licenses and minimize in-
compatibilities between them,
(2) effectively petrify the legal relationship between licensors and li-
censees,
(3) stimulate effective enforcement of copyleft or simply effective per-
formance of copyleft obligations,
(4) prevent infringement of software-related patents or the use of such 
patents against Free Software users,
(5) prevent the use of contracts by distributors in order to restrict user 
freedoms,
(6) remove liability for Free Software while at the same time reduce the 
number of defects in Free Software (both technical and legal, if any),
(7) provide for proper organization of Free Software development,
(8) regulate standard-setting procedures in a way that the resulting 
standards are open standards and become popular, and
(9) minimize differences between national laws.
Conversely, if we do not find all of the above we will most probably con-
clude that the communities do not affect the framework positively or that 
they affect it to a detriment of user freedoms.
4.2 The freedoms in software communities
In the previous section we worked under the assumption that users attempt 
to exercise their freedoms individually. Under that assumption, while main-
taining a program for themselves or even for other users, such users did not 
enter into any complex relations with other users. Let us change this assump-
tion and assume that there are users who form a software community around 
the program and who maintain it as a Free Software project (the project may 
consist of the program alone or of a combination of many programs).204 
Briefly speaking, such a community consists of various entities that collabo-
rate in the development of the project and that may also distribute the proj-
ect to other users, as well as that provide guidance on its use.
204 For the explanation of “project” and “software community” see Section 2.4. See also: Lucie 
Guibault, Ot van Daalen, Unraveling the Myth around Open Source Licenses. An 
Analysis from A Dutch and European Law Perspective (TMC Asser Press 2006) 25.
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In particular, in a community there are usually some (often quite numer-
ous) participants that contribute to the project in many ways. Contributions 
include all kinds of improvements to programs incorporated in the proj-
ect.205 The resulting copyright structure of the project highly depends on the 
specific circumstances as well as on the applicable law. Generally, a Free Soft-
ware project maintained by a community can constitute: (1) a collective 
work,206 (2) a work of joint authorship (shortly, a joint work),207 or (3) a 
derivative work of other programs.208 First, if a project is a collective work it 
most probably means that there is a person, or a group of persons that hold 
copyrights to the project as a whole.209 This copyright is separate from copy-
rights in contributions included in the whole project. Second, if the project is 
a work of joint authorship the joint authors hold “shares” in copyrights to 
the whole.210 Third, if a project is a derivative work, its copyright holder has 
205 Here, we focus on direct contributions to the program (patches, upgrades, updates). 
However, there are many community participants who do not write code but contribute 
to the project in many other ways.
206 “Collective work” is the term used in the U.S. Copyright Act to denote a subset of “com-
pilations” (Sec. 101). Berne Convention uses the term “collection” (Art. 2.5). Although the 
exact meaning of these or similar terms differs under various laws, for the sake of simpli-
city we use here the term “collective work” to denote all types of works copyrights of 
which as a whole belong to one person while copyrights to its building blocks (if any) are 
retained by respective authors.
207 See: Lucie Guibault, Ot van Daalen, Unraveling the Myth around Open Source 
Licenses. An Analysis from A Dutch and European Law Perspective (TMC Asser 
Press 2006) 90 et seq.
208 Other possibilities include, for example, a database or an audiovisual work (see, e.g., 
Droit & Technologies, La cour d’appel de Paris prend position concernant la qualifi cation jurid-
ique du jeu vidéo, http://www.droit-technologie.org/actuality-1103/la-cour-d-appel-de-
paris-prend-position-concernant-la-qualifi cation-ju.html, in French). Here, we do not 
elaborate on these possibilities.
209 The copyright holder of the collective work is usually its producer (editor). A producer is 
a person that creatively arranges or directs the arrangement of various contributions into 
a collective whole. Depending on the applicable copyright law either the contributors 
retain their rights to contributions (unless they assign them contractually), or the rights 
are also granted to the producer as a matter of law. For example, under Polish Copyright 
Act Art. 11 copyrights to a collective work belong as a matter of law to its producer (or 
editor), while contributors retain rights to their respective contributions (if such contribu-
tions are separable). Similarly, a person that creates a copyrightable collection of various 
items (that can include copyrighted works) becomes copyright holder of the collection. 
Many communities or fi rms that maintain GNU/Linux distributions invoke collective 
works regulations. See, e.g., OpenSuSE, at: http://en.opensuse.org/OpenSUSE_License, 
but see Ubuntu, at: http://www.ubuntu.com/community/ubuntustory/licensing.
210 Various laws differently distinguish between a collective work and a joint work. For 
example, under the U.S. Copyright Act, contributions in a joint work have to be insepara-
ble, while the Polish Copyright Act allows a joint author to exercise the rights in an inde-
pendent part of the work, thus suggesting that a joint work can constitute of separable 
parts. Additionally, Polish law provides for a category of “works combined by authors 
for joint distribution” (Polish Copyright Act Art. 10), which is regulated similarly to a 
joint work.
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to follow directions of the copyright holder of the original in order to exer-
cise the freedoms in the derivative work.
Remarkably, all these three variants can intermingle in practice.211 For 
example, we should not rule out a possibility that a particular Free Software 
project can constitute a collective work created jointly by a group of persons. 
Namely, not only numerous participants contribute by separate contribu-
tions to the project, but also there is a number of persons who organize the 
contributions or select them to be included in the whole. Additionally, while 
including the contributions in the whole, some participants may modify 
them, and in particular create derivative works. For example, in a GNU/
Linux distribution, a packager of one program (e.g., a library) selected for 
inclusion in the distribution might create a derivative work of it, cooperate 
in the integration of the derivative work in another program with its devel-
oper (a program that uses the library), and finally the project maintainers 
might include both programs in the whole project.
Community participants not only contribute to the community project, 
but also organize themselves within the community. Depending on the size 
and nature of the project, the number of contributors, its development stage, 
etc., such an organization takes various forms. In small projects there is usu-
ally one person that supervises the maintenance of the whole project, while 
other contributors restrict themselves to submitting contributions only. In 
bigger communities the authority and responsibility for the project is distrib-
uted. The social structure of an average software community gathered 
around a medium or large Free Software project usually consists of (1) a few 
leaders who decide about the development of the project and (2) a number 
of contributors that follow the leaders. We shall refer to the leaders as project 
owners.
According to Eric S. Raymond (2000), “[t]he owner of a software project 
is the person who has the exclusive right, recognized by the community at 
large, to distribute modified versions.”212 More precisely, project owners 
serve as a source of official versions of the project. Unofficial versions are usu-
ally understood as versions maintained individually by users outside of the 
211 Actually, this seems to be a case of many GNU/Linux distributions such as Debian.
212 Eric S. Raymond, Homesteading the Noosphere, at: http://www.catb.org/~esr/writings/
cathedral-bazaar/homesteading/. Project ownership understood as a kind of exclusivity 
over the maintenance of the project may seem a paradox, as above we extensively 
explained that under the Free Software licenses every user is allowed to maintain Free 
Software on their own. In fact, there is no paradox, as long as we read Raymond carefully 
and note the distinction between (1) the legal right, which is indeed available to everyone 
as provided for in the licenses, and (2) the right “recognized by the community”, which is 
granted to certain individuals only. Indeed, project ownership may not be mistaken for any 
kind of legal title in software, in particular the copyright to the project, although it may 
accompany such a title. See also: Lucie Guibault, Ot van Daalen, Unraveling the 
Myth around Open Source Licenses. An Analysis from A Dutch and European 
Law Perspective (TMC Asser Press 2006) 25 et seq.
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community.213 Actually, even inside the communities it is every user’s right 
to modify Free Software for their own use, and to distribute such modifica-
tions in some “closed user or development group”.214 In fact, no project 
owner can legally prevent any user (including community participants) from 
releasing competing versions of the project on their own. Also, project own-
ers may not legally bind other community members to produce a particular 
contribution.215 Straightforwardly speaking, project owners merely accept or 
reject contributions that flow to the project, and a rejection does not prevent 
from including the contribution in an unofficial version.216 In order to exer-
cise this limited authority, project owners gather and manage resources nec-
essary to control the quality of the contributions (both technical and legal), 
and to integrate the contributions in the official version. The project owners 
assign these activities between themselves and recruit additional project 
owners from the community if there is such a need.217
213 See, e.g., Alan Cox, Cathedrals, Bazaars and the Town Council, at: http://slashdot.org/fea-
tures/98/10/13/1423253.shtml. (described by the author himself as “a guide to how to 
completely screw up a free software project”; since the decision to fi lter out “the masses” 
did not allow to take full advantage of the bazaar model). Even in such a situation, free-
doms are not taken away from users; they can still exercise them and attempt maintain 
the project individually.
214 Eric S. Raymond, Homesteading the Noosphere, at: http://www.catb.org/~esr/writings/
cathedral-bazaar/homesteading/.
215 However, a project owner might be able to legally prevent others from using the project’s 
resources, e.g., a trademark. Actually, trademarks are often used in software communities 
to indicate that the software originates from the offi cial version of the project, or that it 
conforms to certain criteria. See, e.g., http://www.linuxmark.org/. Some Free Software 
licenses, such as the Apache licenses contain prohibitions against using certain markings 
or otherwise suggesting endorsement by project owners (see: Andrew M. St. Laurent, 
Understanding Open Source and Free Software Licensing (O’Reilly, 2004), 17 and 
23).
216 Heather Meeker calls it “a free market with a specialist’s desk” (Heather J. Meeker, The 
Open Source Alternative Understanding Risks and Leveraging Opportunities 
(Wiley, 2008), 25.
217 There are even projects, such as Debian, that have developed quite formal mentoring 
rules. In Debian, participants from the lower levels of the hierarchy are trained and gui-
ded, and there are even recruitment and evaluation procedures in place. See, e.g., Andreas 
Barth, Adam Di Carlo, Raphaël Hertzog, Christian Schwarz, Ian Jackson, Debian Devel-
oper’s Reference, at: http://debian.org/doc/packaging-manuals/developers-reference/. 
or Debian, Debian New Maintainers, at: http://debian.org/devel/join/newmaint. See also 
E. Gabriella Coleman, The Social Construction of Freedom in Free and Open 
Source Software: Hackers, Ethics, and the Liberal Tradition, (Dissertation, Uni-
versity of Chicago, 2005), at: http://www.healthhacker.org/biella/freesoftware.html 
(Describing the process of adopting a new member of the Debian developer community, 
consisting of a thorough peer examination of the candidate’s technical skills, ethics and 
the knowledge of legal issues). One could argue that such rules are no longer mere norms, 
but they are regulated by law and subject to legal sanctions. Indeed, the law usually 
allows for informal arrangements to constitute source of legal rules. However, we are not 
aware of any communities that would heavily invoke the law when disputing rights and 
obligations of project owners vis-à-vis community participants.
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There is no general rule how project owners organize themselves.218 
There can be no formal organization, such as the “inner circle” in the Linux 
kernel community.219 Other project owners, such as the owners of Apache, 
follow quite formal documents that differentiate roles in the community.220 
Many projects formalize themselves even more by using umbrella organiza-
tions such as foundations or corporations.221 Umbrella organizations are 
means for an institutionalized control of project owners over the mainte-
nance of the project.222 Additionally, it is often the case that such an organi-
zation is the holder of valuable project resources, be it servers, development 
tools, web pages, mailing lists, or copyrights, trademarks, etc.223 The func-
tion of any such organization, whether formally incorporated, or being an 
ad-hoc committee, is to aid project owners in performing various project-
maintenance activities.
We shall now proceed to analyse how the maintenance of Free Software 
projects by software communities affects the limitations and restrictions in 
the individual exercise of the freedoms. We will address the limitations and 
restrictions in the already introduced order: license proliferation and incom-
patibilities (Subsection 4.2.1), license revocability (Subsection 4.2.2), inter 
partes nature of licenses (Subsection 4.2.3), software-related patents (Subsec-
tion 4.2.4), contracts with distributors (Subsection 4.2.5), liability rules (Sub-
section 4.2.6), non-legal regulators (Subsection 4.2.7), closed standards 4.2.8), 
and regulatory environment (Subsection 4.2.9). Afterwards, we will present 
our conclusion on the freedoms in software communities (Subsection 
4.2.10).
4.2.1 License proliferation and incompatibilities
License proliferation and incompatibilities are differently affected in projects 
that are collective works, joint works, or derivative works.
218 See, e.g, Chris Jensen and Walt Scacchi, Role Migration and Advancement Process in OSSD 
Projects: A Comparative Case Study, at: http://opensource.mit.edu/papers/Jensen-Scac-
chi-ICSE-2007.pdf.
219 See: Gary Murphy, The Linux Kernel, Blueprints for World Domination, (table of contents 
available at: http://kernelbook.sourceforge.net/pkbook.html).
220 See: Apache, at:  http://www. Apache .org/foundation/how-it-works.html.
221 Actually, many projects have been founded by corporations (fi rms) that continue to be 
their major contributions and community participants.
222 Such organizations are often legally mandated to maintain the project without revoking 
user freedoms, in the organization’s by-laws, articles of association, or even in mere 
“public deeds” published on the project’s web page.
223 Some projects require from contributors to vest some of their rights in the umbrella 
organization. For example, contributors to OpenOffice are required to sign an assign-
ment of joint copyrights to their contributions to Sun Microsystems, Inc., which founded 
the project on the basis of the StarOffice code base (OpenOffi ce, at: http://contributing.
openoffi ce.org/programming.html#sca.pdf). Similar approach is adopted in other major 
projects, such as the KDE or MySQL.
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In order to include a contribution in a collective work, an authorization of 
its copyright holder is necessary. We assume that all Free Software licenses 
contain such an authorization.224 More importantly, it is believed that the 
inclusion of programs under FSD-compliant licenses in a collective work does 
not create incompatibility problems in the sense that all obligations can be fol-
lowed separately with regard to each contribution, even though they could 
not be observed simultaneously with regard to a single piece of software.225 
So, most issues of license proliferation and incompatibilities should not arise 
in case of projects that constitute collective works, as long as only Free Soft-
ware is included in such projects.226 This, however, still implies the need of at 
least a basic legal audit of software included in the project and its licenses.
In order to create a joint work, the authors have to cooperate in combin-
ing their respective contributions. The cooperation necessarily implies that 
authors agree on such issues as the project’s license, not that they merely 
combine together contributions already subject to a license. Otherwise, the 
project would rather be a collective work or a derivative work, not a joint 
work. So, generally there should be no issues related to license proliferation 
and incompatibilities in projects that constitute joint works.
In order to create or use227 a derivative work, its author has to obtain 
224 Some Free Software licenses express this authorization better than others. Some licenses 
contain only implied authorization, included in the general consent for the use of the 
program in any way. Some national laws could require a particular wording for a consent 
to include the program in a collective work. There is no such specifi c requirement in the 
Polish law, but according to the general rules the consent should clearly follow from the 
license.
225 It is generally believed that the GPL does not require that the whole collective work is 
licensed under the GPL (partially because of its “mere aggregation” clause) and that it 
only requires not to restrict user freedoms in the covered work as included in the col-
lective work, not in the whole collective work. However, the inclusion in the collec-
tive work might involve creation of a derivative work of the contribution, which may 
lead to incompatibility problems. See: Free Software Foundation, GNU General Public 
License Frequently Asked Questions, at: http://www.fsf.org/licensing/licenses/gpl-faq.
html#GPLInProprietarySystem. See also: Andrew M. St. Laurent, Understanding 
Open Source and Free Software Licensing (O’Reilly, 2004) 82 and 159.
226 Many communities attempt to maintain projects that include software released under 
non-FSD compliant licenses. Usually, they keep such software in separate repositories, 
not distributed together with the rest of the project. Many fi rms that develop and distri-
bute projects based on Free Software include proprietary programs in the distributions, 
on the basis of separate agreements with their copyright holders. It is accepted in the 
market, that such collective works do not infringe Free Software licenses of programs 
included therein.
227 Various laws differently regulate this issue. Under Polish law the general rule is that the 
creation of derivative works is not restricted, only the use of them outside of the Polish 
equivalent of fair use requires authorization of the copyright holder of the original. Howe-
ver, under the specifi c regulation of programs in the Polish Copyright Act (in-line with 
the Software Directive), any modifi cation of a program is a breach of the author’s mono-
poly if not authorized by the copyright holder. Similarly, under U.S. law, authorization is 
necessary for the creation of a derivative work.
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authorization of the copyright holder of the original.228 But apart from the 
authorization, the copyright holder of the original does not have to interfere. 
Actually, further involvement of the copyright holder of the original would 
most probably lead to creation of a joint work. In the Free Software scene, 
derivative works can be developed, distributed, and used even without 
knowledge of the copyright holder of the original. The author of the deriva-
tive work simply exercises the authorization granted in advance in a Free 
Software license of the original. But the authorization may come bundled 
with an obligation incompatible with obligations related to other contribu-
tions. So, the author of the project has to perform the two-step legal analysis 
that we described in Section 4.1 when discussing the impact of license prolif-
eration and incompatibilities on the individual exercise of the freedoms.
It follows that negative consequences of license proliferation and incom-
patibilities on user freedoms are materially minimized in case of projects that 
constitute collective works or joint works. In case of collective works, even if 
contributions are licensed under many different and incompatible licenses, 
their inclusion in a collective work is still possible (provided that they are all 
licensed under an FSD-compatible license). In case of a joint work license 
proliferation and incompatibilities issue should not arise at all. Conversely, 
in case of projects that constitute derivative works of other programs, license 
proliferation and incompatibilities remain an important limitation of the 
freedoms. However, as we already noted Free Software projects cannot be 
easily attributed to one category of works or they can meet the criteria of a 
collective work, a joint work, and a derivative work at the same time. Pre-
cisely speaking, different criteria are usually met at different levels of the 
project’s structure. So, many communities, especially communities that 
maintain complex projects consisting of numerous programs, have to take 
license proliferation and incompatibilities into account while maintaining 
their projects.
Many communities do perform the legal audit necessary in order to 
overcome license proliferation and incompatibilities. For that purpose, they 
use the authority of project owners to accept or reject contributions to the 
official version. For example, many project owners require that the contribu-
tors document that they cleared copyrights to the contributions and that they 
are free to license them under a Free Software license.229 Usually a specific 
228 There is a (criticised) theory under Polish law that the rights to any modifi cations of a 
computer program belong as a matter of law to the copyright holder of the original. See: 
Małgorzata Byrska, Prawne aspekty modyfi kowania programu komputerowego [Legal aspects of 
modifying computer program], 4 Kwartalnik Prawa Prywatnego [Private Law Quar-
terly], 693, 715 (1996). For a discussion on the status of derivative works in the U.S. law 
see, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 Tex-
as Law Review 989, 1022 (1997).
229 The evaluation can be done by humans, but also by intelligent agents, such as the Virtual 
Stallman, a computer program whose task is to identify all non-free packages in a given 
GNU/Linux Debian distribution (Virtual Stallman, at: http://alioth.debian.org/proj-
ects/vrms/).
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FSD-compliant license is required for contributions (i.e., the project’s license). 
Additionally, in many projects elaborate and formal policies have been estab-
lished for scrutinizing whether a particular contribution conforms with the 
projects’ licensing and other legal requirements.230 In such projects, licenses 
of contributions are checked against such policies and any doubts are exten-
sively discussed in attempts to resolve them. Customarily, the record of such 
discussions is publicly available.231
Obviously, such a legal audit involves or even expands both steps of the 
legal analysis that we found necessary in order to be able to maintain combi-
nations of Free Software programs legally, despite license proliferation and 
incompatibilities.232 It allows to identify, which combinations of Free Soft-
ware programs can be maintained in spite of the proliferation and incompat-
ibilities. Properly organized communities are able to perform such an analy-
sis more effectively than many of the participants individually (and 
definitely more effectively than an average user could).
In any case the legal audit as such does not lead to a decrease of the 
number of licenses or to a removal of incompatibilities between them. Nev-
ertheless, if the communities gathered around significant projects implement 
and follow a well designed and sufficiently strict licensing policy they may 
indirectly cause such an effect. Namely, contributors who wish to have their 
contributions included in such projects would be stimulated to adjust their 
licenses to the policies of the communities. This may make them switch to 
more popular, compatible licenses.233 As a result, the communities indirectly 
support the tendencies that lead to a decrease of the number of licenses and 
an increase of their compatibility, which we already identified in Chapter 3.
230 See, e.g., Debian Free Software Guidelines (http://www.debian.org/social_contract) or 
Fedora Packaging Guidelines (http://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Packaging/Guidelines). 
Actually, many hackers who declare themselves as non-lawyers (by typing a customary 
“IANAL” abbreviation in almost every communication) often seek compliance with the 
licenses and the copyright law more diligently than a qualifi ed lawyer would (see, e.g., 
The Fedora Extras license audit, at: http://lwn.net/Articles/218977/; Ubuntu Daily, Propri-
etary drivers in Feisty: not by default but easy to activate, at: http://ubuntudaily.
com/2007/03/06/proprietary-drivers-in-feisty-not-by-default-but-easy-to-activate/). 
Community participants who follow such guidelines quickly identify and remove “non-
free” contributions, or at least clearly mark them for a user to be aware of FSD-incompli-
ant code. Sometimes, such contributions are moved to a separate, external repository, 
such as, Livna (http://rpm.livna.org/rlowiki/FAQ).
231 See, e.g., debian-legal mailing list archives, at: http://lists.debian.org/debian-legal/.
232 Given internal project policies, we can distinguish additional level of incompatibility, 
apart from license incompatibility. Namely, licenses of contributions can be found incom-
patible with project policies. Such incompatibility is often discussed e.g., within Debian.
233 At the time of this writing it is already the case that licensors rarely draft their own licens-
es. In the past, however, many licensors did not fi nd already existing model licenses satis-
factory. See, e.g., Andrew M. St. Laurent, Understanding Open Source and Free 
Software Licensing (O’Reilly 2004), 85 et. seq., 174. Nowadays, one of the OSI-certifi ed 
(and accepted by the FSF) model licenses is usually adopted by new projects. Communi-
ties augment this standardization trend (id. at 175).
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4.2.2 License revocability
License revocability is differently affected in projects that are collective 
works, joint works, or derivative works.
In case of projects that constitute collective works, the applicable law 
might allow the copyright holder of the whole project to revoke the license 
to the whole unilaterally. As a result, although particular contributions might 
remain under their respective Free Software licenses, this would still effec-
tively restrict the freedoms. It would definitely be the case if separate contri-
butions were not as usable as the whole project. So, if the community project 
is a collective work, license revocability remains a potential threat to user 
freedoms (to the extent a user would like to exercise the freedoms in a whole 
project, not separate contributions).
In case of projects that constitute joint works license revocability depends 
on how the applicable law regulates the scope of activities that each of the 
joint authors can exercise without the consent of others.234 In particular, 
licensing (and revoking the license) of the whole project in one way or anoth-
er might require unanimity, majority vote, or even could be possible for each 
of the authors on their own.
In case of projects that constitute derivative works, the exercise of the 
freedoms in the derivative work requires an authorization of the copyright 
holder of the original as a necessary condition. So, if the copyright holder of 
the original revokes the license that contains such an authorization, the 
respective licensees are prevented from the exercise of the freedoms, even if 
all authors of derivative works refrain from revoking their respective licens-
es. Usually, however, contributions that are derivative works are improve-
ments of the project. As a result of the improvements, the original version of 
the project is not of much importance. It follows that the copyright holder of 
the original might not have any practical interest in revoking the license.
Let us analyse a specific example of a project that constitutes a derivative 
work. Assume an original project is subject to a copyleft license, and it is 
improved in many iterations not only by other contributions, but also by the 
copyright holder of the original. This may lead to a situation where all of 
234 Under Polish law, enforcement of copyright is possible to be performed individually by a 
joint author. Disposing of each author’s share in the joint copyright as well as administe-
ring a separable contribution is usually also outside of the reach of other joint authors. 
Other activities usually require either unanimity, or a majority vote. If no agreement is 
reached, the dispute can be referred to a court. So, it seems that under Polish law a joint 
author could not unilaterally revoke the project’s license, but the removal of the contribu-
tion from the project seems possible. Under the U.S. Copyright law, the opposite seems 
possible (See: Raymond T. Nimmer, Legal Issues in Open Source and Free Software Distribu-
tion, Open Source Software Spring 2006 Critical Issues in Today’s Corporate Envi-
ronment, PLI Handbook no. G-861, 7, 49 (arguing that in the case of a joint work, a joint 
author is separately capable of granting licenses to the work as well as individually enfor-
ce copyright; it thus seems that the author could also individually terminate the license). 
See also FN 129.
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them are bound by copyleft clauses to each other. If any of them attempted to 
revoke their licenses and distributed their improvements as proprietary, it 
would most probably lead to a copyleft infringement. So, provided that copy-
rights in a project constitute such a “wickerwork”, license revocability may 
be effectively prevented.
Certainly, in every project, license revocability is subject to practical limi-
tations already presented in Chapter 3. However, given the importance of 
project owners for the maintenance of projects, it might suffice for the licen-
sor to revoke the license of project owners in order to prevent most users 
(especially average users) from exercising the freedoms successfully. It fol-
lows that license revocability is not effectively prevented by the mere fact that 
there exists a community that maintains the Free Software project in question. 
It strongly depends on the actual copyright structure of the project.
However, software communities are able to petrify the license relation-
ship effectively, regardless of such structure. The communities use the 
authority of project owners for that purpose. Namely, by accepting a particu-
lar contribution into a project, project owners present and expose it to the 
whole community. Such a contribution can still be maintained individually 
by anyone, but the skills and resources gathered and administered by the 
community usually outgrow the possibilities of the licensor of the contribu-
tion. So, if the license is not revoked, the licensor may continue to benefit 
from the maintenance provided for by the community. It follows that revok-
ing the license does not make much sense for licensors who cannot maintain 
their programs individually.
Remarkably, a licensor who does not value the maintenance performed 
by the community would not take this under consideration when revoking 
the license. As a result, the respective contribution has to be removed from 
the project. Substituting a removed contribution usually requires substantial 
skills and resources, which might not be available for individual users, espe-
cially average users. However, a properly organized software community is 
able to perform such a substitution, so that the maintenance of the whole 
project can still be provided for.
4.2.3 Inter partes nature of licenses
Existence of software communities does not affect the inter partes nature of 
licenses as such. Actually, the fact that there are numerous contributors to a 
Free Software project may make the enforcement of copyleft more troublesome 
than it already is. For example, if a copyleft to a joint work was not observed 
by a licensee, the applicable copyright law might require that all joint authors 
stand in a case against the infringing licensee.235 Even if most of the applica-
ble laws did not regulate these issues in such a way, this would still not affect 
the inter partes nature of the licenses to the benefit of user freedoms.
235 See FN 129.
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However, there are numerous examples of Free Software projects to 
which many participants contribute back despite the fact that software 
included in the project is not subject to copyleft.236 Actually, even in case of 
copylefted projects, such as the Linux kernel, we would not err in claiming 
that the most valuable contributions to it were not made as a result of the 
legal enforcement of copyleft clauses.237 Certainly, one could argue that such 
contributions are made in performance of obligations other than copyleft, 
since many of them are made by employees of various firms that assign them 
to work on Free Software projects. Obviously, if such employees contribute 
to these projects, they perform their obligations towards employers. This, 
however, does not by itself explain why these firms direct the employees to 
do so. Naturally, the firms themselves are not obliged to contribute, or they 
could avoid such an obligation given the inter partes nature of licenses.
There have been many attempts to identify the nature of the stimulation 
that makes numerous and diverse individuals and firms contribute to Free 
Software projects.238 Here, it is not necessary to identify what the stimulation 
really is. It suffices to observe that there are many community participants 
who find it more valuable to contribute to the project instead of keeping the 
contributions private. In other words, they value the participation in com-
munities more than trying to maintain the software individually. By accept-
ing their contributions to the official version of the project, project owners 
enable the community to maintain them, which stimulates the contributors 
to contribute more effectively than the legal rule of copyleft.239 We would like 
to refer to this stimulations as community copyleft, since it has a result similar 
to the intended result of copyleft clauses.
Clearly, the community copyleft does not affect such individuals or firms 
that find more value in keeping their improvements private. Such “free-rid-
ers” can be stimulated with the legal rule of copyleft only, with its inherent 
limitations. However, a properly organized community can serve as a source 
of improvements, which could substitute the appropriated ones. Definite-
ly, such a community is able to exercise the right to fork effectively. Also, in 
the long run, the “free-riders” would experience severe maintenance prob-
236 Most prominent examples include FreeBSD, OpenBSD, and NetBSD.
237 K.R. Lakhani, B.Wolf, J. Bates, C. DiBona, The Boston Consulting Group Hacker Survey, at: 
http://www.osdn.com/bcg/bcg-0.73/img1.html; Greg R. Vetter, „Infectious” Open Source 
Software: Spreading Incentives or Promoting Resistance?, 36 Rutgers Law Journal 53 (2004).
238 There is a lot of literature trying to explain reasons behind contributing to Free Software 
projects. See, e.g., Steven Weber, The Success of Open Source (Harvard University Press, 
2004); Eric S. Raymond, The Magic Cauldron, at: http://www.catb.org/~esr/writings/
cathedral-bazaar/magic-cauldron/; Didier Demazerie, Francois Horn, Nicolas Jullien, 
How free software developers work, at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1301572 (abstract); Didier 
Demazerie, Francois Horn, Marc Zune, The Functioning of a Free Software Community: Entan-
glement of Three Regulation Modes – Control, Autonomous, and Distributed, at: http://www.
sciencestudies.fi /v20n2DemaziereHornZunePDF; Francesco Rullani, Dragging developers 
towards the core, at: ftp://ftp.unibocconi.it/pub/RePEc/cri/papers/WP190Rullani.pdf.
239 See: Andrew M. St. Laurent, Understanding Open Source and Free Software 
Licensing (O’Reilly, 2004), 6, 83, 158, 171.
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lems.240 We assume that in such a case only a few firms would be able to 
keep the pace of a properly organized community. More importantly, even 
if they could, such communities would still be able to maintain the project 
in spite of the “free-riders”. Additionally, the reader should be aware that in 
the overall Free Software community, there are initiatives that support indi-
vidual licensors and users in enforcing copyleft obligations.241
4.2.4 Software-related patents
The existence of software communities does not invalidate software-related 
patents or make them inapplicable. However, many communities manage to 
stimulate some patent holders not to use their patents against user freedoms. 
For example, some major firms involved in the development and distribution 
of Free Software have publicly declared to refrain from enforcement of their 
patents in relation to Free Software users in one way or another.242 The reason 
for such pledges is similar to the already discussed reasons of not revoking 
Free Software licenses or contributing to projects irrespectively of copyleft lim-
itations. Namely, some patent holders find it more valuable to have their 
products properly maintained by a community than having to maintain them 
on their own. Precisely speaking, they care more for a wide adoption of their 
technologies than for directly benefiting from patent royalties.243
240 See: Jon Corbet, How to Participate in the Linux Kernel Community, at: http://ldn.linux-
foundation.org/book/how-participate-linux-community (“The truth of the matter is that 
keeping code separate ... is a false economy. ... Incorporation into the mainline solves a 
large number of distribution and support problems. ... [A]ny out-of-tree code requires 
constant upkeep if it is to work with new kernels. Maintaining out-of-tree code requires 
signifi cant amount of work just to keep that code working. ... So code which has been 
merged into the mainline has signifi cantly lower maintenance costs.”)
241 In the U.S. such cases are handled by the Software Freedom Law Center (see: http://
softwarefreedom.org), while in the EU they are handled by the GPL-violations project in 
cooperation with the FSFE (see: http://gpl-violations.org). However, these initiatives do 
not have their own standing in copyleft cases. Rather, they represent some licensors (copy-
right holders) who may or may not wish to support a particular case. If a user does not 
convince them to support a particular case, the user has to support the case alone.
242 See, e.g., CNN, IBM Pledges Free Access to Patents Involved in Implementing 150+ Software 
Standards, at: http://money.cnn.com/news/newsfeeds/articles/marketwire/0276035.
htm. See also: IBM, at: http://www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/21846.wss, 
RedHat, at: http://www.redhat.com/magazine/001nov04/features/patents/, or Novell, 
at: http://www.novell.com/company/policies/patent/.
243 Nevertheless, software-related patents might allow their holders to restrict user freedoms 
while at the same time benefi t from the maintenance as provided by software communi-
ties. Namely, a patent holder could offer a contribution covered by a patent to a Free 
Software project, under a carefully chosen Free Software license that does not contain any 
patent license. If project owners accepted that contribution, the patent holder would not 
enforce the patent against the community, but selectively enforce it, e.g., against competi-
tors who attempted to make commercial use of the project. Assuming that the community 
were not interested in using the project commercially, this strategy could work for a lon-
ger period. See: Andrew M. St. Laurent, Understanding Open Source and Free Soft-
ware Licensing (O’Reilly, 2004), 21.
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Certainly, there remain numerous patent holders who wish to enforce 
their patents. If there are many different copyright holders that hold differ-
ent titles to the project or its parts it might be harder for patent holders to 
enforce their patents against all of them. However, given the importance of 
project owners for a properly organized community, it would probably suf-
fice if the patent holders addressed their claims against project owners in 
order to prevent maintenance of the project effectively. In such a case, given 
enough resources involved, and a proper legal audit, communities might be 
able to identify any patents material to the project. Then, if project owners 
removed the patented technology from the project, or maybe worked around 
the patents, they might avoid liability and the project could still be main-
tained. However, it is rarely the case that community participants have 
expertise necessary in order to search and analyse patents.244 More impor-
tantly, the communities cannot usually afford following any conditions on 
the exercise of the freedoms that patent holders can impose.
4.2.5 Contracts with distributors
Communities as such do not prevent Free Software distributors from impos-
ing restrictions on user freedoms in relation to programs they distribute. 
However, if a program is maintained by a properly organized software com-
munity, any restrictive contracts with distributors do not make it impossible 
to obtain the same (or a substitute) program together with the freedoms from 
the community or from another distributor.245 Importantly, not only the pro-
gram as available from the community is free of any restrictions, but it is also 
properly maintained. As a result, distributors are not able to impose too 
restrictive contracts in the first place, unless at the same time they can offer 
users additional benefits that the users cannot obtain from the community 
(e.g., some additional services on top of the maintenance).
244 This usually requires qualifi ed patent attorneys, not hackers. Actually, performing such 
a research might have negative effects on a community since awareness of a patent 
might lead to fi nding of a deliberate infringement, which usually allows patent holders 
to claim higher damages. This is exactly the reason why many fi rms explicitly prohi-
bit their developers to read patents. But communities might be more effective in mini-
mizing the risk of patents by identifying prior art and thus helping to invalidate patents 
(see, e.g., Groklaw, RedHat is Asking for Prior Art, at: http://www.groklaw.net/article.
php?story=20090216150306923; see also: Peer-to-Patent, at: http://www.peertopatent.
org/). Also, participants in software communities or simply Free Software enthusiasts 
can be quite easily motivated to participate in various public events. The most promi-
nent example was the campaign against the so-called “Software Patents Directive”. These 
measures, however, are more a result of the existence of the overall “Free Software Com-
munity”, not any of the particular software communities. See also: Open Invention Net-
work, at: http://www.openinventionnetwork.com/.
245 A prominent example is CentOS, a GNU/Linux distribution based on the Red Hat’s 
distribution. See: Wikipedia, CentOS, at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Centos.
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Also, even if the distributors are able to restrict some users with such 
contracts, the program remains available without restrictions from the com-
munity that can attempt to substitute any additional benefits offered by the 
distributor.246 Certainly, all this is possible if only the community that main-
tains the program is properly organized and possesses sufficient resources, 
at least equal to the resources of the distributor that attempts to restrict user 
freedoms.
4.2.6 Liability rules
The fact that there are multiple copyright holders in a Free Software project 
might affect liability rules to a certain extent. Definitely, under a particular 
applicable law it might result in shifting the liability for the project as a 
whole from some participants to others (e.g., from copyright holders of the 
contributions to the copyright holder of the whole project). Actually, one of 
the purposes and benefits of organizing the communities under umbrella 
organizations is that a “corporate veil” is put between copyright holders, 
developers, and distributors on the one hand, and users on the other hand. 
This has a more direct legal effect on liability. It supports the hacker immunity 
in removing the liability demotivator from many actors.
But the umbrella organizations usually use liability limitations and war-
ranty waivers and extend the hacker immunity on themselves. So, users gener-
ally end up in the same situation as they are towards other actors under the 
hacker immunity. However, the organizations can be established for the pur-
pose of delivering well-maintained programs. In such a case community 
participants would draft their by-laws accordingly. They would also elect 
representatives whose task would be, in particular, to perform a quality 
audit of the software. Obviously, the representatives would at the same time 
be project owners. As a result, the authority of project owners would be 
intertwined with legally enforceable responsibilities. They could also be giv-
en certain legally enforceable rights towards some community participants. 
All this could contribute towards better quality software being included in 
the official versions.
It follows that a purpose of a properly organized software community 
can be to deliver well-maintained programs to users. This is possible if proj-
ect owners are directed to evaluate the quality of the contributions and if 
they are directed to require that contributors meet certain quality standards 
in order to have their contributions included in the official versions.247 Natu-
rally, projects that are maintained under well-designed quality control rules 
may still have bugs, lack features, or pose interoperability problems, as is the 
246 This constitutes a collective exercise of the right to fork.
247 A simplifi ed view on such a quality audit is expressed in the “Linus’s law” formulated by 
Raymond: given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow (Eric S. Raymond, The Cathedral and the 
Bazaar, at: www.catb.org/~esr/writings/cathedral-bazaar/).
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case with any other software. However, a properly organized community 
can be used to remedy such defects effectively. Also, if such a community 
exists and it manages to deliver good quality software, then more distribu-
tors are willing to offer warranties as well as additional services to users. As 
a result, the issue of liability for software is minimized, at least as far as the 
technical defects are concerned. Namely, instead of attempting to claim dam-
ages, in many cases users can rely on the community, or on the market for 
warranties and services, of which the existence is stimulated by the commu-
nity, for having a defect removed. Owing to a properly organized commu-
nity, users have also easier access to the market of warranties and services 
for Free Software.
4.2.7 Non-legal regulators
The existence of software communities does not as such affect the non-legal 
limitations and restrictions of user freedoms. Definitely, distributors are still 
able to restrict the freedoms using the architecture, as much as they are 
allowed to impose restrictive contracts on users. Also, communities do not 
result in average users having more skills and resources on their own, so that 
they can effectively exercise their freedoms individually. Additionally, in 
spite of the community copyleft stimulation described above, the mere fact 
that there are numerous contributors to the project does not by itself result in 
an increased quality of these contributions, or of the project as a whole. This 
in turn means that the maintenance of such a project might actually be hard-
er than trying to exercise the freedoms in one Free Software program indi-
vidually, since all these diverse contributions have to be properly combined 
and integrated with the project. So, we find that the communities have to 
deal with additional maintenance issues as compared to the individual exer-
cise of the freedoms.
However, the communities have proven capable of resolving the issues 
related to non-legal regulators. First, software communities usually consti-
tute a source of Free Software programs without architectural restrictions. 
Distributors can certainly impose such restrictions on their own, but as long 
as the community is a substitute source of the program, user freedoms may 
remain unaffected.248 This is certainly the case when a community can repli-
cate a service or device that is offered together with the program by a dis-
tributor and that constitute the crux of the architectural restriction. But only 
properly organized communities that hold sufficient resources are able to do 
so. Still, some services and devices cannot be replicated effectively at all. Sec-
ond, many communities are able to maintain the programs effectively, 
including the maintenance for average users. As a result, even though such 
248 This depends on actual circumstances. See: Andrew M. St. Laurent, Understanding 
Open Source and Free Software Licensing (O’Reilly, 2004), 32 (describing the “emb-
race and extend” strategy Microsoft used towards the Kerberos protocol).
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users do not have the necessary skills and resources, they are able to “out-
source” the maintenance to the community. Third, properly organized main-
tenance involves in particular a quality audit and a procedure for integration 
of contributions. These lead to properly working programs delivered in the 
official versions of the project.249 So, provided the communities organize 
themselves to perform such an audit and implement these procedures, they 
are able to overcome transaction costs that an individual user might never be 
able to cover.
4.2.8 Closed standards
There is no direct relation between the fact that many different participants 
contribute to a Free Software project and the fact that the project is restricted 
from using closed standards. Obviously, the bigger the community, the more 
resources it has to reverse-engineer the standard, to participate in SSOs, or to 
support an essential facilities case. But the existence of a community as such 
does not result in such resources being used in order to avoid restrictions on 
closed standards. The communities do not prevent the rules that lead to 
closed standards from operation.
However, if a community is a source of a well-maintained Free Software 
project that interoperates with other programs, designers of standards may 
have fewer incentives to make closed standards and maintain the respective 
software on their own, as compared to a situation where there is no such a 
community. This is a result of the mechanism already described above, the 
same that stimulates some patent holders not to enforce their patents against 
the communities or to contribute their improvements to Free Software proj-
ects.
Certainly, there remain designers of standards who still find more value 
in making their standards closed. Provided the community that rejects using 
such a standard is big and robust enough, it may prevent the standard from 
becoming popular. If so, the designer might not be able to lock users in a 
closed standard. But the existence of a community does not guarantee that 
such a lock-in will not take place. If the users of the project wanted to inter-
operate with users locked in to a closed standard, their freedoms could be 
restricted. This means that the communities are not able to remove closed 
standards from the framework.
4.2.9 Regulatory environment
Above, we often conditioned our findings on what the applicable law exact-
ly provides. Indeed, when numerous participants (from all over the world) 
contribute to a Free Software project, the issues caused by conflicts of laws 
249 See: Andrew M. St. Laurent, Understanding Open Source and Free Software 
Licensing (O’Reilly, 2004), 7.
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may affect the freedoms even more than when the freedoms are exercised 
individually. The number and complexity of legal relations increases, in 
comparison to a situation when a user attempted to exercise the freedoms 
individually. This means that the communities have to verify the impact of 
project maintenance in many jurisdictions and the verification might involve 
more resources than if the freedoms were exercised individually.
It remains to be estimated whether the differences between national laws 
are of practical importance, such that they could materially affect the opera-
tion of the communities. Currently (2009) there are numerous communities 
that gather participants from all over the world and we are not aware of any 
issues related to the differences between national laws that hinder their 
operation materially. This may be because community participants do not 
have to invoke much legal rules during their collaboration. It seems that 
much of this collaboration is regulated either by specifically tailored by-laws, 
or by norms, and there is no need to resort to legal rules. Obviously, such a 
situation can take place as long as all participants agree. In case of a disagree-
ment, legal rules would be invoked, and the differences between various 
applicable national laws would be definitely explored. The question remains, 
whether any disagreement in a community would have to be adjudicated, 
given the right to fork and the fact that any dissidents can establish their own, 
competing community.
4.2.10 Conclusion on the freedoms in software communities
The communities are able to address many of the limitations and restrictions 
in the individual exercise of the freedoms. The authority of project owners is 
instrumental for the operation of the communities as described above. By 
accepting or rejecting contributions in the official versions of the project, 
project owners are able to stimulate contributors to prepare the contributions 
according to various criteria. Contributors are willing to meet these criteria, 
in particular because of the benefits of community maintenance as compared 
to the individual maintenance that they would have to perform when contri-
butions were not integrated in the official version.
However, project ownership is not a legal rule and it leads to an indirect 
stimulation of community participants only. Also, project ownership is not a 
magical solution. Its exercise has to be organized in order to stimulate con-
tributors in the right direction. It follows that the communities have to be 
properly organized. Incorporation of umbrella organizations is an important 
means to this end. But even properly organized communities are not able to 
remove all the limitations and restrictions of user freedoms effectively. Rath-
er, such communities are only capable of enabling users to exercise their free-
doms by materially minimizing the limitations and restrictions. In other 
words, communities (as much as individual users) can exercise their free-
doms as long as they possess sufficient skills and resources. After our analy-
sis we may conclude that properly organized communities are able to gather 
and manage these skills and resources better than any individual user alone.
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4.3 Chapter conclusions
Under the framework, users cannot exercise their freedoms in an undis-
turbed manner. In particular, they are not able to maintain Free Software 
individually unless they possess special skills and gather substantial resourc-
es. This is definitely the case of an average user, who usually has to rely on 
others to have the software maintained effectively. Software communities 
are able to provide for maintenance of Free Software despite many limita-
tions and restrictions of user freedoms. As a result of the inclusion of Free 
Software programs in community projects users are able to benefit from 
properly working programs. This does not mean that the maintenance of 
programs in community projects does not require any skills and resources. 
Software communities still have to face the same limitations and restrictions 
that prevent individual users from exercising their freedoms. However, 
properly organized communities are able to gather and manage the skills 
and resources necessary to minimize these limitations and restrictions mate-
rially. Such communities are able to provide for effective maintenance of Free 
Software programs.
This means that the threats to the freedoms identified in Chapter 3 still 
exist in a world of software communities. Only some of them are minimized, 
but they are not eliminated as a result of the community maintenance of Free 
Software programs. More importantly, they are materially minimized only if 
the communities are properly organized.
We are now ready to answer RQ1, which is: “In what way do software com-
munities affect the current regulatory framework in the protection of user freedoms, 
as articulated by Stallman?” We provide the answer in nine concluding state-
ments.
(1) License proliferation and incompatibilities. Properly organized 
communities are able to perform the legal audit necessary to over-
come license proliferation and incompatibilities between Free Soft-
ware licenses. Licensing policies of signifi cant community projects 
may even indirectly lead (a) to a decrease of the number of the li-
censes and (b) to an increased compatibility between them, thus 
supporting the already identifi ed tendencies.
(2) License revocability. Some communities create a “wickerwork” re-
lation between all participants, which can effectively prevent li-
cense revocability. More importantly, the fact that a program is 
properly maintained by a community may simply make licensors 
unwilling to revoke licenses because of the benefi ts of community 
maintenance.
(3) Inter partes nature of licenses. Properly organized communities 
are able to provide for the community copyleft stimulation. It makes 
some contributors support the project regardless of the legal rule of 
copyleft. This minimizes the limitation that follows from the inter 
partes nature of the licenses.
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(4) Software-related patents. Some properly organized communities 
stimulate a number of patent holders not to enforce their patents. 
However, the communities are not able to prevent such an enforce-
ment completely. In summary, software-related patents remain an 
important threat in the world of software communities.
(5) Contracts with distributors. Properly organized communities pre-
vent distributors to impose too restrictive contracts on users. Alter-
natively, such communities constitute a substitute source of soft-
ware available without contractual restrictions.
(6) Liability rules. By using umbrella organizations the communities 
may effectively insulate the actors from liability. At the same time 
the communities make project owners legally responsible for the 
quality of software. More importantly, properly organized commu-
nities provide for an effective maintenance which leads in particular 
to a reduction of the number of defects in programs. This minimizes 
the negative effect that liability rules may have on user freedoms.
(7) Non-legal regulators. Properly organized communities perform a 
quality audit or otherwise control the development of Free Software, 
so that the software is maintained on an ongoing basis. Such com-
munities may also serve as a source of a given program without ar-
chitectural restrictions. As a result, communities minimize the nega-
tive effect that many non-legal regulators can have on user freedoms.
(8) Closed standards. Properly organized communities may contrib-
ute to a slowdown in adoption of closed standards. Some commu-
nities may even decrease incentives for the designers to make 
closed standards. However, the communities are not able to remove 
closed standards from the framework.
(9) Regulatory environment.  As any other entities, communities op-
erate in a regulatory environment where many national laws have 
to be taken into consideration. But there are many communities 
that gather participants from all over the world and there are no 
signs that any differences between national laws hinder their oper-
ation. This means that the exercise of the freedoms in the communi-
ties is regulated by customs and trade practices to a material extent. 
Nevertheless, the regulatory environment remains in the frame-
work despite the communities.
Therefore, we provide the following resolution of PS1, which is “What are the 
relations between user freedoms and software communities?”
Properly organized software communities materially minimize the limi-
tations and restrictions of user freedoms, which in turn allows for an effec-
tive exercise of the freedoms in practice. However, even if a properly orga-
nized community maintains a given Free Software program, there remain 
many limitations and restrictions of the freedoms. Particularly, (1) software-
related patents, (2) closed standards, and (3) the regulatory environment, 
remain important limitations and restrictions of the freedoms.
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We start the analysis of the impact of eGovernments on user freedoms by a 
telling example of Polish origin. The Polish Social Insurance Office (ZUS) is a 
government agency responsible for gathering contributions towards future 
pensions and towards other social insurance benefits.250 In the late 1990s 
ZUS began to organize its internal IT system for processing information 
related to its tasks. The law obliges certain firms to install and use software 
made available by ZUS in order to submit regular reports about how they 
fulfil their social insurance obligations. ZUS has made available a program 
called Płatnik.251 Since the first release Płatnik has been a proprietary pro-
gram and has worked under proprietary operating systems only (Micro-
soft Windows). However, in 2001 a group of hackers led by Sergiusz 
Pawłowicz started to develop a Free Software substitute for Płatnik. This 
project, called Janosik,252 has neither been sponsored by ZUS, nor has it 
been accepted officially as an equivalent of Płatnik.
Additionally, a major obstacle in the development of Janosik has been 
the fact that the protocol used by Płatnik to transmit data from users to ZUS 
was secret (i.e., a closed standard made using the scrambling of interoperabil-
ity information as discussed in Chapter 4). Without a complete specification 
of that protocol, it has not been possible for Janosik to operate properly and 
constitute a real substitute of Płatnik. Naturally, already in 2002 Pawłowicz 
approached ZUS with a request to reveal the specification of the protocol. 
The request invoked the right to access public information.253 ZUS refused 
to reveal the specification and Pawłowicz appealed first to administrative 
courts254 and subsequently to a common court. The common court ordered 
ZUS to reveal the specification, but ZUS appealed. In April 2007 the 1st 
instance decision was affirmed by the appellate court.255 After a slight delay, 
250 See: ZUS, at: http://zus.pl.
251 “Płatnik” is a Polish word that stands for “payer”.
252 “Janosik” is a name of a legendary Polish (or Slovak) highlander and a robber (Wikipedia, 
Juraj Janosik, at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Juraj_J%C3%A1no%C5%A1%C3%ADk). 
He was believed to take from the rich and give to the poor. Naming the project “Janosik” 
can probably be compared to naming a project “Robin Hood”.
253 The right is codifi ed in the Polish Constitution and in the Polish Public Information Act, 
which is the Polish implementation of the Public Sector Information Directive.
254 NSA decision dated 16 September 2004 (OSK 600/04) a copy on fi le with the author. At 
that time ZUS’s line of defence was that the protocol contains trade secrets. The court 
found that when trade secrets are invoked, only the common court can order the publica-
tion, so the case was referred to a common court.
255 See: Piotr Waglowski, Sąd Okręgowy oddalił apelację ZUS w sprawie protokołu KSI-MAIL. 
Koniec, at: http://prawo.vagla.pl/node/7222 (in Polish).
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in October 2007 ZUS published the specification on its web page.256 So, after 
5 years from the request it is now technically possible to write an alternative 
implementation of the protocol (i.e., a Free Software substitute to Płatnik).257
However, this does not mean that such a substitute can be legally used. 
Pawłowicz’s request concerned the availability of the specification only. He 
did not ask ZUS to authorize the use of Janosik officially. As a matter of fact, 
ZUS has not authorized the use of any software other than the proprietary 
Płatnik, even though it has finally made the specification available, and 
even though currently there exists explicit legal regulation obliging ZUS not 
to discriminate users of any software.258 So, the use of Janosik, or any other 
Free Software alternative to Płatnik is still legally impossible, or at least 
legally questionable.259
The situation described above is an example of an eGovernment that 
restricts user freedoms. First, ZUS procured an IT system designed according 
to a closed standard and able to interoperate with proprietary software only. 
Second, ZUS has not authorized the use of any software other than the pro-
prietary Płatnik for the communications. Third, ZUS had refused to make 
the specification available for 5 years. Fourth, to the best of our knowledge 
ZUS has not offered any support to the Janosik community.260 As a result, the 
exercise of the freedoms in communications with ZUS was made impossible 
and any attempts to change this without ZUS’s approval are at least legally 
questionable, if not straightforwardly illegal. Thus, basing on this particular 
case we may provide a specific answer the Research Question 2, which was:
RQ 2: In what way do eGovernments affect the current regulatory framework 
in the protection of user freedoms, as articulated by Stallman?
256 The specifi cation is available at: ZUS, at: http://www.zus.pl/bip/default.asp?id=180.
257 As a matter of fact the protocol was reverse engineered long before the case was decided. 
An example implementation of the protocol made after reverse engineering Płatnik has 
been made public already in 2003 at: http://www.ibiblio.org/ser/SP-versus-RP/
zus/#specyfi kacja.
258 Polish Informatization Act, Art. 59.
259 Actually, it is not clear what are the legal consequences of using software unauthorized 
by ZUS in communications with this agency. Theoretically, since there are procedures for 
authorization laid down in the Polish Informatization Act, one could argue that the use of 
unauthorized software is not allowed. We are not aware, however, of any direct sanctions 
that a user of Janosik could face. Prima facie, it also seems that the copyright holders of 
Płatnik  could not claim copyright infringement. However, if ZUS proves that reports 
were sent without the use of the program authorized by ZUS, ZUS might be able to claim 
that the obligation to submit the reports was not performed, or performed improperly. 
This might lead to an indirect liability for the use of Janosik.
260 This is not to say that ZUS was not allowed to perform all these activities. We do not need 
to decide the legality of ZUS’s conduct in this thesis. It suffi ces to say that the conduct 
restricted user freedoms. Nevertheless, in the Płatnik case the right to access public sec-
tor information provided for in the Polish Public Information Act was breached (the spe-
cifi cation of the protocol was held by the court to constitute public sector information). 
Under the Public Sector Information Directive discrimination of prospective re-users of 
public information or treating them unfairly is prohibited as well.
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In the above context we provide the following specific answer to RQ2. The 
eGovernment as introduced by ZUS has led to a complete inability of the 
framework to protect the freedoms of users communicating with ZUS. In 
particular, users obliged to communicate with ZUS have been directed to 
use certain proprietary software which means that the freedoms of these 
users while using that software do not exist at all. These users could theo-
retically exercise their freedoms outside of the communications with ZUS. 
However, Płatnik requires Microsoft Windows, a proprietary operating 
system to operate.261 Generally, one computer can work under the control of 
only one operating system at a time and one operating system allows to 
operate many other applications, not just one dedicated program. So, using a 
Free Software operating system would not be practical for many users who 
were stimulated to use Microsoft Windows by the fact that Płatnik does 
not operate on another operating system.262
Precisely speaking, the eGovernment as introduced by ZUS affected at 
least four rules in the framework: (1) the grant of freedoms, (2) liability rules, 
(3) non-legal regulators, and (4) closed standards.
(1) The grant of freedoms. The eGovernment as introduced by ZUS did 
not stimulate copyright holders of Płatnik to grant users their free-
doms; it has remained a proprietary program. Also, the eGovern-
ment has made it legally questionable or at least impractical for 
users to exercise the freedoms granted to Janosik, in communica-
tions with ZUS. This effect permeated to the operating system soft-
ware used by users.
(2) Liability rules. Since the use of Janosik has not been authorized by 
ZUS, its use may lead to at least indirect liability.263
(3) Non-legal regulators. The design of Płatnik requires it to be oper-
ated on a whole proprietary operating system. This is a restriction 
of the freedoms using the architecture. Additionally, it has made it 
more costly for users to exercise the freedoms (i.e., to switch to a 
Free Software operating system and applications). This stimulated 
users not to exercise the freedoms as a result of the market regula-
tion.
261 There have been, reportedly successful, attempts to operate Płatnik on a GNU/Linux 
operating system using Wine (http://winehq.org), but even in such a case Płatnik itself 
remains a proprietary program based on a closed standard.
262 In order to switch between operating systems users would have to reboot their comput-
ers, use another computer, or – nowadays – invest in virtualization technologies, none of 
which is (yet) a practical method. Naturally, it can be argued that most users obliged to 
use Płatnik used Microsoft Windows already before. However, this does not have to 
be the case of all users (at the time Płatnik was introduced, DOS was still popular as an 
operating system to host various accounting software). But, even if this were the case, 
such users could not abandon proprietary software completely and switch to Free Soft-
ware after they were obliged to use Płatnik.
263 See FN 259.
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(4) Closed standards. eGovernment as introduced by ZUS has resulted 
in a lock-in to a closed standard in communications with ZUS. Re-
markably, as a result of the 5-year suit only the scrambling of in-
teroperability information was fi nally prevented, but the protocol 
has not become an open standard.264 Since there is still no open 
standard authorized for communications, users of Płatnik contin-
ue to be locked in to its closed standard, and to proprietary soft-
ware.265
The above answer allows us to provide a partial answer to the Problem State-
ment 2, which was:
PS 2: What are the relations between user freedoms and eGovernments?
In the above context we provide the following partial answer to the PS2. The 
eGovernment as introduced by ZUS has restricted user freedoms effectively. 
No rule in the model of the framework that we reconstructed in Chapter 3 
has prevented the restriction. It is particularly noteworthy that even the 
Janosik community has not succeeded in removing restrictions imposed by 
ZUS completely. We remark that the eGovernment as introduced by ZUS is 
an example of a Closed eGovernment (i.e., an eGovernment based on a 
closed standard). So, the following question arise: Is the total restriction of 
the freedoms a necessary effect of all eGovernments? More precisely speak-
ing, can eGovernments be introduced in a way that does not affect user free-
doms, or maybe even in a way that reinforces them? An important part of 
the answer to this question can be given by answering yet another question. 
Namely, can user freedoms exist and be sufficiently protected under an Open 
eGovernment? All these questions are worth answering, they rephrase in 
some sense RQ2, and they are included in the PS2.
Below we analyse the relation between eGovernments and user free-
doms in more detail. We start with a brief analysis of the protection of user 
freedoms in a theoretical situation where there is no government interfer-
ence through eGovernment (Section 5.1). Then, we expand our analysis of 
the relation between user freedoms and Closed eGovernments (Section 5.2). 
Thereafter, we analyse the relation between user freedoms and Open eGov-
ernments (Section 5.3). Finally, we conclude the chapter by presenting a com-
plete answer to Research Question 2 and a general resolution of the Problem 
Statement 2 (Section 5.4).
264 See Section 2.3 where we presented the defi nition of open standards for the purpose of 
the thesis (the EIF v. 1.0 defi nition). One of the prerequisites for an open standard is that it 
is maintained by an independent organization in an open decision-making process.
265 Given the fact that the specifi cation has been published, it is now possible to write a Free 
Software substitute for Płatnik. So, the lock-in can be broken provided at least that ZUS 
authorizes the use of such a substitute and will publish updates to the specifi cation, if 
any.
Towards_an_Improved_def.indd   152 23-02-2010   10:49:30
153User freedoms in egovernments
5.1 User freedoms in a world without eGovernments
In a theoretical world without eGovernments no-one is required or allowed to 
use information technologies to communicate with the government. In par-
ticular, the government does not use any software for communications. As 
follows from Chapters 3 and 4, even though Free Software could exist in such 
a situation, users might be limited or restricted in the exercise of the freedoms. 
This is definitely the case if they attempted to exercise the freedoms individu-
ally. Some or even all limitations and restrictions in the exercise of the free-
doms with regard to some Free Software programs or combinations of them 
could be overcome if properly organized communities maintained projects 
that included these programs. Nevertheless, even the best software communi-
ties are unable to overcome all limitations and restrictions fully.
In Chapter 4 we found in particular that software-related patents, closed 
standards, and the regulatory environment are the three limitations and 
restrictions which are the least affected by the communities. Here, we focus 
on closed standards. Certainly, in a world without any government interfer-
ence some communities are able to stimulate designers of standards to make 
open standards. Provided that these standards become popular, user free-
doms may be unaffected. But communities are not omnipotent and there 
remain many designers who find more value in making their standards 
closed than in having implementations of the standards maintained by a 
community. Then, whenever a user wanted to interoperate with a closed-
standards-based program, user freedoms would be restricted. Unrestricted 
access to interoperable software is possible if only the programs in question 
used open standards.
The adoption of open standards comes with an effort. In Chapter 3 we 
found that open standards can be obtained using reverse engineering, stan-
dard setting, or the essential facilities doctrine. However, after a closer analy-
sis, we concluded that only the standard setting is an efficient mechanism for 
the adoption of open standards, provided additionally that the procedure of 
SSOs is properly organized, the resulting open standards are actually imple-
mented in software, and the software becomes popular among users. Wheth-
er all these necessary conditions are satisfied depends on various circum-
stances.266
Here, we may conclude that in a world without eGovernments user free-
doms are sufficiently protected if only all limitations and restrictions of the 
freedoms are successfully minimized or even eliminated. This requires in 
particular the design, implementation, and popularity of open standards, all 
of which depend on various circumstances. So, one cannot take it for granted 
that the freedoms are sufficiently protected in every world without eGovern-
ments.
266 See: WIPO (Standing Committee on the Law of Patents), Standard and Patents, (18 February 
2009, SCP/13/2), at: http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/scp/en/scp_13/scp_13_2.pdf.
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5.2 User freedoms in Closed eGovernments
The introduction of a Closed eGovernment means that at least some tech-
nologies267 used in eGovernment are based on closed standards. This might 
be a result of a deliberate choice of closed standards by the government, or 
an indirect effect of the government procuring software without specifying 
that it should be designed according to open standards. Obviously, the users 
of eGovernment services are required to use interoperable software. In eco-
nomic terms this means that by selecting (either deliberately or inadvertent-
ly) a particular standard, the government increases the network effects of soft-
ware designed according to that standard.268
There is no apparent reason why designers of closed standards should 
wish to allow for unrestricted development, distribution, and use of Free 
Software interoperable with their standards. Actually, we may assume that 
the mere existence of a closed standard implies that its designer does not 
want to allow users to exercise the freedoms in software using this standard, 
but rather wishes to capitalize through restrictions on the use of such soft-
ware.269 Otherwise, the designer would make that standard an open stan-
dard from the very beginning. Remarkably, the choice of a closed standard 
by the government and the resulting network effects significantly help the 
designer to make users use software subject to restrictions, at least when 
they would engage in government communications.270 Straightforwardly 
267 The term “technologies used in eGovernment” is used here to encompass the software of 
the public administration as well as of the users of government services.
268 See Subsection 3.2.1, and in particular the discussion about lock-ins and the literature 
referenced thereto.
269 A rational business strategy would be to capitalize on the government choice of the 
designer’s closed standard as a way for an effective insulation against all competition 
(both Free Software and proprietary software), or at least for controlling the competition 
(e.g., by licensing the designer’s patents material to the standard to the highest bidder). 
Other strategies come to mind as well, but they all involve restrictions on the develop-
ment, distribution, or use of interoperable software. So, they all restrict user freedoms.
270 This may constitute a breach of law by the government. For example, it has been held a vio-
lation of the EC Treaty obligations by a member state to grant to an undertaking the power 
to lay down standards and to check that these standards are met, when the undertaking 
is itself competing with the companies required to implement the standards (C-18/88, 
RTT v. GB-Inno-BM SA, 11.01.1988, 1991 E.C.R. I-05941). A likewise violation was found 
in requiring or favoring by a member state the adoption of agreements, decisions or con-
certed practices or reinforce their effects (66/86, „Ahmed Saeed Case”, 11.04.1989, 1989 E.C.R. 
00803; See also C-35/96, Commission v. Italy, 18.06.1998, 1998 E.C.R. I-03851; C-198/01, „CIF 
Case”, 9.9.2003, 2003 OJ C 264 P. 9). Similarly, member states violate their EC Treaty obli-
gations when they impose a fi xed price on certain products, namely the price which has 
been freely chosen by one manufacturer or importer (13/77, SA G.B.-Inno-B.M. v. ATAB, 
16.11.1977, 1977 E.C.R. 02115). Also, under the Electronic Markets Competition Directive 
Art. 2.2, member states have an obligation to ensure that any undertaking is entitled to 
provide electronic communications services or to establish, extend or provide electronic 
communications network. Additionally, the provisions of the Standards Directive concer-
ning technical regulations have to be complied with when compliance with a standard is 
required by the government. The directive allows to use technical regulations in the cre-
ation of barriers to trade only to the extent necessary in order to realize public interest.
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speaking, it practically guarantees that users will have to accept the restric-
tions then.271 Having to accept restrictions on the development, distribution, 
or use of software is in conflict with user freedoms.
It follows that it is highly likely that after the introduction of a Closed 
eGovernment the developers of Free Software will not be able to reach suffi-
cient interoperability, or that the distribution or use of such programs will be 
legally questionable. As a result, Free Software will not match the network 
effects of proprietary software, and users will be stimulated not to exercise 
their freedoms, despite any benefits resulting from the freedoms. Only par-
ticular proprietary software will properly and legally interoperate using a 
given closed standard (i.e., only such software that was developed with an 
authorization of the designer of the standard), and users will be stimulated 
to turn into a passive audience, which consumes such proprietary software.
We distinguish three types of a Closed eGovernment. First, there is a 
Closed eGovernment where the use of closed standards in government com-
munications has a spill-over effect on software used by users for other pur-
poses (henceforth “Closed eGovernment (A)”). Second, there is a Closed 
eGovernment that results in closed standards being used in government 
communications only, and other software is not affected (henceforth “Closed 
eGovernment (B)”). Third, there is a Closed eGovernment that attempts to 
enable users of government services to interoperate with government soft-
ware using open standards despite the fact that the government software is 
based on closed standards (henceforth “Semi-Closed eGovernment”).
Below, we analyse how each of these three types of a Closed eGovern-
ment affect the framework in the protection of user freedoms. We start with 
the Closed eGovernment (A) (Subsection 5.2.1). Then, we analyse the Closed 
eGovernment (B) (Subsection 5.2.2). Thereafter, we analyse the Semi-Closed 
eGovernment (Subsection 5.2.3). Finally, we summarize and briefly evaluate 
user freedoms in Closed eGovernments (Subsection 5.2.4).
5.2.1 Closed eGovernment (A)
The fact that users have to use closed-standards-based software in govern-
ment communications does not as such prevent them from developing, dis-
tributing, and using Free Software for other purposes. However, it may make 
many users unable to exercise their freedoms effectively, even though Free 
Software remained available for use outside of government communica-
tions. This finding is supported by the Płatnik case, described at the begin-
ning of this chapter. In that case certain users were directed to use a whole 
proprietary operating system (Płatnik required Microsoft Windows). 
271 A choice of a closed standard by the government is generally suffi cient to conclude that 
there is such a guarantee. However, the government could aid the designer even more by 
mandating the use of a particular closed-standards-based program, as was the case with 
Płatnik.
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Theoretically, they could use, and even develop and distribute another operat-
ing system, such as a GNU/Linux when not communicating with the govern-
ment. But since using two operating systems is impractical, for many users the 
costs of exercising the freedoms outweighed the benefits. As a result, the gov-
ernmental stimulation had a spill-over effect. Namely, not only the govern-
ment’s choice of closed standards prevented the exercise of the freedoms in 
government communications, but it also affected them while users attempt to 
exercise them in communications with non-government parties.
Here, we may conclude that the Closed eGovernment (A) affects the grant 
of freedoms, liability rules, non-legal regulators, and closed standards in a way 
already described above, when discussing the Płatnik case. Given the spill-
over effect, the freedoms are affected both when users communicate with the 
government and when they use other software, for other purposes. The extent 
of the spill-over effect may vary depending on actual circumstances.
5.2.2 Closed eGovernment (B)
The spill-over effect that leads to a Closed eGovernment (A) is likely to hap-
pen in many situations when the government chooses a closed standard for 
communications. The support given to the designer of such a standard by 
the government is often too big to avoid the spill-over, both because of the 
demand generated by the government itself and also because of the addi-
tional demand of users resulting from the network effects caused by the gov-
ernment. Actually, the introduction of a Closed eGovernment (B), which 
does not involve such a spill-over is possible only if at least the following 
extraordinary conditions are met together. First, if software used for govern-
ment communications is highly customized, so it cannot be used for other 
purposes. Second, if the use of the software does not involve the use of other 
closed-standards-based software, such as a particular operating system.272 
Third, if only a very limited number of users is directed to use the software. 
Only in such situations the stimulation which is an effect of a Closed eGov-
ernment would fail to prevent users from using Free Software outside of 
government communications.
Assuming that a Closed eGovernment (B) is introduced in practice, users 
are not prevented from exercising the freedoms outside of government com-
munications, but they are also exposed to the already identified limitations 
and restrictions of the freedoms. In such a case, properly organized software 
communities might be able to minimize some or all of these limitations and 
restrictions, with regard to software used outside of government communi-
cations.273 However, it is unlikely that the communities manage to enable 
272 Given the increasingly popular shift from delivering software as a product to delivering 
software services, this condition may have to be rephrased in the nearest future in order 
to account for the “software as a service” model. See FN 143.
273 See Chapter 4.
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users to exercise their freedoms when communicating with the government. 
For example, Free Software developers gathered in a community such as the 
Janosik community might succeed in reverse engineering the closed stan-
dard in question and implement it in a Free Software program. But the use of 
such a program will still be subject to restrictions related to closed standards 
(e.g., patents material to the standard274), or its use might constitute a breach 
of the user’s obligation towards the government (e.g., if the government did 
not authorize such a Free Software program275).
Here, we may conclude that it is not likely that the Closed eGovernment 
(B) can be introduced in practice. Using closed standards in eGovernment 
will most probably result in the spill-over effect that leads to a Closed Gov-
ernment (A). However, assuming that the Closed eGovernment (B) is intro-
duced, it affects the same rules as the Closed eGovernment (A) (i.e., the grant 
of freedoms, liability rules, non-legal regulators, and closed standards), but 
only to the extent the users engage in government communications. Outside 
of these communications users experience the normal exposure to the limita-
tions and restrictions included in the framework.
5.2.3 Semi-Closed eGovernment
A Semi-Closed eGovernment attempts to enable users to use open-stan-
dards-based software despite the fact that some or all government software 
is based on closed standards. For example, the back-office software of such 
an eGovernment could use closed standards but a translation of the commu-
nications to an open standard would be provided at the front-office, or at 
any other point where the interconnection with users takes place.276 Whether 
such a translation facility would work seamlessly in practice is questionable, 
since translation between standards usually results in information loss or 
other problems. But depending on the actual technical and legal circum-
stances of the closed standard subject to translation, such a facility might 
allow to develop, distribute, and use Free Software capable to interoperate 
with the Semi-Closed eGovernment sufficiently. Nevertheless, it should not 
be expected that such an eGovernment would have the same effect on user 
freedoms as an Open eGovernment (see Section 5.3 below).
Provided that the translation facility works properly, such an eGovern-
ment would not result in a strong lock-in to closed standards or the spill-
over effect discussed above. Not only the users, but also the government 
274 To the best of our knowledge there are no patents involved in the Płatnik case. Given the 
publication of the specifi cation made by ZUS as a result of the court order, the trade secret 
protection should also not apply to the published specifi cation. However, the designer of 
the protocol retains the control over the standard as a result of the lock in preserved by 
the government.
275 See FN 259.
276 Another option would be to use an open standard in parallel to any closed standard and 
to gradually phase out the use of the latter.
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might be able to operate the translation facility to switch between closed-
standards-based technologies and software based on open standards. Even-
tually, they may even be able to replace the former with the latter. Depend-
ing on actual circumstances, a Semi-Closed eGovernment might minimize 
the effect of other rules that lead to closed standards as well. For example, if 
the closed standard in question is restricted using trade secrets or patents, 
in order to introduce the Semi-Closed eGovernment the government might 
negotiate a sufficiently broad license that would allow users for unencum-
bered interoperation with eGovernment using the translation facility. The 
negotiations would involve indemnity for users of government services 
against a breach of trade secrets or patents. Additionally, the development 
of the translation facility by the government (i.e., the contracting for such 
development) would most probably minimize the effectiveness of the 
scrambling of interoperability information related to the closed standard in 
question.
However, the actual impact on the rules that lead to closed standards 
largely depends on the government’s awareness, negotiating power, and 
the final agreement concluded with the designer of the closed standard.277 
This means that the introduction of a Semi-Closed eGovernment is unlikely 
unless it is performed diligently. Nevertheless, such an eGovernment might 
be the only choice (albeit for a transitional period) if the government wishes 
to transform an already existing Closed eGovernment into an Open eGov-
ernment (we will discuss such a transformation in Chapter 6). In any case we 
remark that even a properly introduced Semi-Closed eGovernment would 
not change the closed standard subject to translation into an open one. So, at 
least some limitations or restrictions of user freedoms will remain in such an 
eGovernment.
Here, we may conclude that the Semi-Closed eGovernment, if properly 
introduced, may minimize the restrictions on user freedoms that result from 
closed standards. It may also avoid affecting the grant of freedoms, liability 
rules, and non-legal regulators to a detriment of user freedoms as other 
Closed eGovernments do. However, it depends to a large extent on the con-
ditions for the use of the closed standard to provide the translation facility 
that the government obtains for itself and for the users. Most probably, in 
order to negotiate proper conditions and maintain the translation facility, 
277 Here, we assume that the government does not use its imperium or the legislative and judi-
ciary branches in order to dispose the designer of the closed standard of the control over 
the standard. For example, the government might attempt to grant a compulsory license on 
such a patent. First, we fi nd such activities not necessarily effective (e.g., under Polish 
Industrial Property Act a compulsory license can be granted in extraordinary circumstanc-
es, which do not include most situations related to eGovernment). Second, when present-
ing the notion of eGovernment in Section 2.5 we decided to focus on how the government 
uses its dominum, that is how it performs procurement and other contracts-related means. 
We will discuss how the government may engage imperium and the legislative or the judici-
ary in Chapter 6, while discussing the necessary improvements to the framework.
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the government would have to employ significant resources. Even if the 
government succeeds in introducing a Semi-Closed eGovernment, given the 
fact that the closed standard subject to translation would still have remained 
under the control of its designer, the Semi-Closed eGovernment would 
require an ongoing supervision. Otherwise, user freedoms would still be 
affected in the long run as it is the case in other Closed eGovernments.
5.2.4 Evaluation of user freedoms in Closed eGovernments
Generally, Closed eGovernments affect the framework in the way already 
described when discussing the Płatnik case. In particular, Closed eGovern-
ments clearly reinforce rules that lead to closed standards, by locking users in 
to the closed standards used in government software. Because of the spill-
over effect, Closed eGovernments (A) affect the freedoms with regard to 
other software as well, even if it is not used in government communications. 
The impact of Closed eGovernments (B) is limited to government communi-
cations only, but whether such an eGovernment can actually be introduced 
in practice is rather unlikely.
Certainly, Closed eGovernments as such do not make it impossible to 
introduce open standards, since they do not prevent reverse engineering, 
open standard setting, or the application of the essential facilities doctrine. 
However, even if open standards are designed, Closed eGovernments pre-
vent them from becoming popular and this effect usually permeates to gov-
ernment communications as well as to other communications. So, Closed 
eGovernments definitely minimize efficiency of rules that lead to open stan-
dards, in particular the capability of an open standard to become more pop-
ular than the closed standard chosen by the government. By doing so, they 
prevent users from exercising their freedoms.
Users of software affected by a Closed eGovernment cannot exercise 
their freedoms without limitations or restrictions. Such limitations and 
restrictions cannot be effectively overcome by any software community, 
unless the government steps in, for example by introducing a Semi-Closed 
eGovernment. If this is properly performed, the Semi-Closed eGovernment 
allows users to interoperate with government software using open standards 
even though the government software uses closed standards. This allows to 
develop, distribute, and use Free Software. However, a Semi-Closed eGov-
ernment cannot remove all limitations and restrictions on user freedoms. 
Moreover, its introduction and sustainability requires due diligence. So, 
whether it would positively affect user freedoms in the long run is not guar-
anteed. Nevertheless, a Semi-Closed eGovernment should be taken into con-
sideration when discussing a transformation from a Closed eGovernment to 
an Open eGovernment.
Below, we identify how each of the affected rules is affected by Closed 
eGovernments in more detail.
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(1) The grant of freedoms.  By choosing (deliberately or inadvertently) 
a closed standard for eGovernment, the government tips the de-
signer of the closed standard. This results in making the develop-
ment, distribution, or use of Free Software impractical or legally 
questionable. As a result, the government either directly stimulates 
users to use proprietary software, or indirectly stimulates copyright 
holders not to grant users the freedoms. In either case the govern-
ment stimulates users not to exercise their freedoms.
(2) Liability rules.  Given the restrictions involved in the use of closed 
standards, the development, distribution, or use of Free Software that 
attempt to interoperate with such a standard may lead to liability.
(3) Non-legal regulators. Using a closed standard for eGovernment 
usually makes it technically impracticable to exercise the freedoms 
or simply increases the costs of the freedoms. It is a mix of architec-
ture and market regulation. The regulation directly affects software 
used for government communications, but given the probable spill-
over effect, it usually affects other software as well.
(4) Closed standards.  Using a closed standard for eGovernment helps 
the designer of such a standard to establish and maintain a lock-in 
on the government and users. This stimulation may effectively pre-
vent making the standard (or other standards) open even if all other 
rules that lead to open standards were formally unaffected.
5.3 User freedoms in Open eGovernments
The introduction of an Open eGovernment means that all technologies278 
used in government communications use open standards.279 As is the case 
with any eGovernment, users have to use software interoperable with eGov-
ernment software. Certainly, the choice of an open standard by the govern-
ment increases the network effects of software which uses that standard. But 
interoperability with open standards can be provided by anyone – by Free 
Software developers and by proprietary software developers. So, no specific 
software is preferred as a result. In particular, users are not prevented from 
using Free Software in government communications as well as outside of the 
278 See FN 267.
279 For different views on Open eGovernments see: Open Forum Europe, How Open Can 
Europe Get, at: http://www.openforumeurope.org/index.php?option=com_
docman&task=doc_download&gid=89&Itemid=102, but see: Initiative for Software 
Choice, New EU Public Procurement Directives – Maintaining Neutrality in Software Procure-
ment, September 2004, at: http://www.softwarechoice.org/download_fi les/ISC_Legal-
Note.pdf. See also: Business Software Alliance, BSA Statement on Technology Standards, 
February 2005, at: http://www.etsi.org/sos_interoperability/Background_papers/
BSA_Statement_on_Technology_Standards.pdf.
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communications.280 The choice of open standards as such does not allow 
anyone to make users accept restrictions on software that may be easily 
imposed when the government chooses a closed standard.
We distinguish three types of Open eGovernments. First, there is an 
Open eGovernment that is introduced by using an already existing open 
standard in government communications (henceforth “Open eGovernment 
(A)”). Second, there is an Open eGovernment, the introduction of which is 
possible only after an open standard relevant for government communica-
tions is designed (henceforth “Open eGovernment (B)”). Third, there is an 
Open eGovernment where the government is actively involved in the devel-
opment, distribution, or use of Free Software, and not just uses software 
designed according to open standards (henceforth “Supra-Open eGovern-
ment”).
Below, we analyse how each of these three Open eGovernments affect 
the framework in the protection of user freedoms. We start with the Open 
eGovernment (A) (Subsection 5.3.1). Then we analyse the Open eGovern-
ment (B) (Subsection 5.3.2). Thereafter we analyse the Supra-Open eGovern-
ment (Subsection 5.3.3). Finally, we summarize and briefly evaluate user 
freedoms in Open eGovernments (Subsection 5.3.4).
5.3.1 Open eGovernment (A)
The introduction of an Open eGovernment (A) comprises the use of an exist-
ing open standard in government communications. The government may 
provide for the use in two ways: (1) by using the architecture and the market 
regulation, or (2) by using the law. Using the architecture and the market 
means simply procuring software designed according to an open stan-
280 Here, we assume that the government does not mandate the use of any particular open-
standards-based software, but only requires that the communications complies with 
open standards. However, it may be possible that although the government chooses an 
open standard, only communications using a certain program is accepted. For example, 
the Polish Informatization Act provides for software certifi cation procedure which could 
be used to control which programs are used in government communications in much the 
same way as project owners control the offi cial versions of Free Software projects. But 
such a certifi cation by itself does not restrict user freedoms unless a Free Software pro-
gram that meets a set of objective criteria is refused a certifi cate.
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dard.281 In such a way, the government contributes towards making the open 
standard a de facto standard. Using the law means that the government man-
dates the use of an open standard in government communications, and not 
only procures systems designed accordingly.282 In such a way, the govern-
ment contributes towards making the chosen open standard a de iure stan-
dard.283 Remarkably, the government can make open standards de facto stan-
dards using dominium. Conversely, making them de iure standards requires 
that the government uses imperium (by explicitly obliging certain parties to 
use open-standards-based software) or even that the legislative branch is 
involved (in order to provide for a compliance obligation in the law).
Below, we explain how the introduction of an Open eGovernment (A) 
affects the rules in the framework. For the sake of simplicity, we assign the 
rules to the following six classes: (1) rules directly related to Free Software 
licenses, (2) third-party restrictions, (3) liability rules, (4) non-legal regula-
tors, (5) closed standards and open standards, and (6) regulatory environ-
ment. After explaining and discussing each of these classes, we present (7) 
our evaluation of the Open eGovernment (A).
281 Government procurement is usually regulated. Under the Public Procurement Directive, 
which is based on the principles of equal treatment, non-discrimination, proportionality, 
and transparency, the procurement of technologies based on open standards is not gene-
rally prohibited, while procurement of closed-standard-based technologies is questiona-
ble. The use of technical specifi cations (defi ned in Annex VI to encompass standards as 
understood in this thesis) in public procurement has to allow „to submit tenders which 
refl ect the diversity of technical solutions” (Recital 29). This relates not only to their impact 
on the competition, but also on the users and other governmental bodies. The directive 
obliges to take into account the design for all users whenever possible when formulating 
specifi cations (Id.). It also requires that the means and technology chosen should be com-
patible with the technologies used in other member states (Recital 35). Given our defi niti-
on of open standards they defi nitely make possible diversity in technical solutions, allow 
for design for all users, and provide for wide compatibility (through interoperability). 
Thus, the choice of open standard-compatible technologies in procurement does not 
infringe these provisions. See also: NOiV (OSSOS), The acquisition of (open-source) software, 
A guide for ICT buyers in the public and semi-public sectors, at: http://ososs.nl/fi les/acquisi-
tion_of_open-source_software_-_text.pdf. Suitability of public procurement for the 
encouragement of „wider acceptance of open systems interconnection information and 
data exchange standards through reference to them in purchasing” has been recognized in 
the EU since at least 1986. See: Decision 87/95 of 22.12.1986 on standardization in the fi eld 
of information technology and telecommunications (OJ L 36, 7.2.1987, P.31).
282 At the time of this writing (2009) the amendment of the Polish Informatization Act is 
being processed by the Polish Parliament. The current version of the Act does not expli-
citly mandate the use of open standards, and the executive order to the Act specifi es vari-
ous standards that can be used in eGovernment, including both open standards and clo-
sed standards. Many governments all over the world adopt various instruments, policies, 
and even laws that mandate the use of open standards or otherwise promote their use.
283 The above understanding of de facto and de iure standards is not the only one. For exam-
ple, WIPO understands a de facto standard as a standard adopted as a result of the mar-
ket, while a de iure standard as a standard adopted by a SSO See: WIPO (Standing Com-
mittee on the Law of Patents), Standard and Patents, (18 February 2009, SCP/13/2), at: 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/scp/en/scp_13/scp_13_2.pdf.
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(1) Rules directly related to Free Software licenses
Here, we explain how the introduction of an Open eGovernment (A) affects 
the following rules, which are directly related to the licenses: (a) the grant of 
freedoms, (b) the right to fork, (c) copyleft, (d) the hacker immunity, (e) license 
proliferation and incompatibilities, (f) license revocability, and (g) inter partes 
nature of the licenses.
The software that is used in an Open eGovernment (A) can be Free Soft-
ware. But because of the mere fact that open standards are used in govern-
ment communications de facto or de iure, users (and the government itself) 
are not directed to use Free Software, they are only not prevented from using 
it. As a result users are not prevented from exercising the freedoms, and 
copyright holders are not prevented from granting the freedoms. But the 
choice of open standards as such does not stimulate the copyright holders to 
grant the freedoms to users, or the users to exercise the freedoms.
So, an Open eGovernment (A) does not affect the grant of freedoms, as well 
as other rules directly related to Free Software licenses (i.e., the right to fork, 
copyleft, and the hacker immunity). It is neutral towards these rules. Conse-
quently, it does not affect limitations and restrictions of the freedoms that are 
closely related to the licenses, that is license proliferation and incompatibili-
ties, license revocability, and inter partes nature of the licenses.
(2) Third-party restrictions
Here, we explain how the introduction of an Open eGovernment (A) affects 
the following rules, which constitute third-party restrictions: (a) software-
related patents and (b) contracts with distributors.
The introduction of an Open eGovernment (A) merely means that the 
government chooses an existing open standard for government communica-
tions. Such a choice, especially if it is made by exercising the dominium only, 
that is by procuring open-standards-based software, does not affect such 
limitations and restrictions as software-related patents or contracts with dis-
tributors.
The government’s choice of open standards does not by itself remove the 
threat of patents related to software. A program that uses a certain patent-
free standard may still be found to infringe on patents not material to the 
standard, but related to the software itself. This, however, depends on the 
patentability of software- and standards-related inventions in the particular 
jurisdiction involved.
Also, by choosing an open standard for government communications 
the government does not materially affect distributors who offer Free Soft-
ware under contracts that restrict user freedoms. Indeed, no-one is prevent-
ed from delivering Free Software for government communications under the 
terms of their choice (as long as they satisfy public procurement rules or the 
demand of private users of such software).
So, an Open eGovernment (A) is neutral towards software-related pat-
ents and towards contracts with distributors.
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(3) Liability rules
Here, we explain how the introduction of an Open eGovernment (A) affects 
liability rules.
By definition, open standards can be used without risking liability for an 
infringement of rights related to the standards. So, by choosing open stan-
dards for eGovernment, the government makes it possible for anyone to 
interoperate with government software without risking standards-related 
liability.
Definitely, an Open eGovernment (A) does not induce users to use closed 
standards that may be subject to liability. But the liability rules remain in the 
framework and the development, distribution, and the use of Free Software 
is still subject to them, for reasons unrelated to standards. So, concluding 
that an Open eGovernment (A) leads to a relation between such an eGovern-
ment and liability rules would be an exaggeration. The Open eGovernment 
(A) is neutral towards liability rules.
(4) Non-legal regulators
Here,  we explain how the introduction of an Open eGovernment (A) affects 
non-legal regulators.
The choice of open standards as such does not prevent anyone from 
restricting user freedoms with the architecture, the market, or the norms. It 
only affects such restrictions if they are made in relation to closed standards 
(e.g., the scrambling of interoperability information or the lock-in).
So, an Open eGovernment (A) does not affect most of the existing non-
legal limitations and restrictions.
(5) Closed standards and open standards
Here, we explain how the introduction of an Open eGovernment (A) affects 
(a) closed standards and (b) open standards.
If the government uses an open standard, some parties may find less 
value in designing their standards as closed, especially if the open standard 
chosen by the government can also serve other purposes than government 
communications. This may stimulate designers of standards, in particular 
SSOs, to make open standards rather than closed standards, e.g., by scruti-
nizing patents material to standards more diligently in order to satisfy gov-
ernment demand for open standards.
Also, the government’s choice of a multi-purpose open standard may 
make users less willing to use software designed according to other stan-
dards. But the developers of such software (1) are not at all prevented to 
adjust it to the open standard used by the government, and they (2) can con-
tinue to design the software according to a closed standard (provided that 
they obtain an authorization of the designer of the standard and license to 
any third party rights).
Open standards allow users to choose among many different programs 
(both Free Software and proprietary software), because any software devel-
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oper is able to implement them, and standards-related restrictions cannot be 
imposed on the software distribution and use. So, an Open eGovernment 
(A) does not have a spill-over effect similar to a Closed eGovernment (A), it 
does not favour any particular vendor more than others and it does not lock 
anyone in to any particular software.
So, an Open eGovernment (A) promotes open standards as compared to 
closed standards, but it does not remove the closed standards from the 
framework.
(6) Regulatory environment
Here, we explain how the introduction of an Open eGovernment (A) affects 
the regulatory environment.
Restrictions and limitations of user freedoms that result from the regula-
tory environment exist because of differences between national laws. By 
choosing an open standard for government communications the govern-
ment cannot affect these differences in any way. Actually, each government 
has to evaluate a particular standard and software which uses that standard 
in the light of the applicable law (which does not even have to be its own 
national law). Some limitations and restrictions that exist under a particular 
law may not exist under another law, which means that if one government 
chooses a certain standard then other governments cannot blindly follow 
without performing at least a rudimentary legal audit.
So, an Open eGovernment (A) does not affect the regulatory environ-
ment.
(7) Evaluation of Open eGovernment (A)
Our evaluation is that the Open eGovernment (A) is neutral towards most of 
the rules in the framework. It materially affects only (1) closed standards and 
(2) open standards. But it is an indirect relationship, since such an eGovern-
ment does not remove closed standards from the framework. It merely con-
tributes towards the popularity of chosen open standards, which may lead 
to a decrease in popularity of certain closed standards.
5.3.2 Open eGovernment (B)
In order to introduce an Open eGovernment in a situation where there is no 
open standard that can be used for government communications, the gov-
ernment has to stimulate the design of such a standard in the first place. One 
option could be that the government (1) designs the necessary protocol, 
interface, or a data format (or procures its design), (2) makes sure that there 
are no restrictions, such as patents material to the standard, and (3) publishes 
the complete specification with no additional restrictions. But this would not 
automatically result in the standard becoming an open standard, unless the 
government had it developed and then maintained in an open decision-
Towards_an_Improved_def.indd   165 23-02-2010   10:49:32
166 Chapter 5
making procedure. So, the government would also have to open the whole 
procedure to all interested parties.284
We do not find the above procedure impossible. We are in particular not 
aware of any laws that would forbid the government to engage in the mak-
ing of open standards in such a way, by using its dominium only, without 
having to involve the imperium or other government branches. But the pur-
pose of the government as such is not to design or maintain standards. 
Indeed, SSOs are specifically established for that purpose. So, it seems more 
reasonable for the government to stimulate the SSOs in the design of the nec-
essary open standard. In particular, the government should diligently par-
ticipate in SSOs so that they adopt standards of good technical quality. Also, 
the government should make sure that the SSOs identify and remove (or 
work around) all restrictions such as patents, as well as that they make com-
plete and comprehensive specifications available without restrictions.285 
This requires extreme diligence, since the fact that a given standard is pre-
pared for the use in eGovernment may increase incentives of other partici-
pants to corrupt the procedure so that it leads to making an actually closed 
standard.286 Certainly, the government should carefully select in which SSOs 
to participate in the first place, because not all of them are open to all inter-
ested parties and follow appropriate policies, while an open decision-mak-
ing procedure and such policies are necessary for making open standards.
After the necessary open standard is designed in one way or another, the 
situation changes into a situation where the government can proceed to 
introduce an Open eGovernment (A), described in the preceding subsec-
tion.
284 Alternatively, the government could stimulate a removal of restrictions on an existing 
closed standard, a publication of its specifi cations, and submitting it for review and main-
tenance to an SSO. The government could use the essential facilities doctrine to directly 
oblige the designers not to place restrictions on standards that limit their openness. But 
the doctrine has its limitations, already discussed in Subsection 3.2.2.
285 Government involvement in SSOs is legally possible. For example, the European Com-
mission declares such intervention to the extent necessary to maintain standard-setting 
organizations as open, transparent, and accountable (Evangelos Vardakas, The role of gov-
ernment in standards setting: a European View, 5, in: Vademecum on European Standardi-
zation, Part II, Chapter 1, at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/standards_poli-
cy/vademecum/doc/standards_setting_governance_ev.pdf). Also, open standards are 
actually in-line with basic principles of standardization. The Standards Directive formu-
lates the principle of openness in recital 24, which refers to the organization of standard 
development procedure, as well as the principles of coherence, transparency, consensus, 
and independence of special interests.
286 This does not have to involve any corruption in the sense of bribery. It suffi ces for a parti-
cipant or a third party to secretly apply for a patent material to a given protocol, interface, 
or data format before it is adopted as a standard and wait until it is adopted. See: Wikipe-
dia, Patent ambush, at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patent_ambush. See also: WIPO 
(Standing Committee on the Law of Patents), Standard and Patents, (18 February 2009, 
SCP/13/2), at: http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/scp/en/scp_13/scp_13_2.pdf.
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Here, we may conclude that the Open eGovernment (B) affects user free-
doms in the way already described when discussing the Open eGovernment 
(A). Additionally, such an eGovernment affects closed standards and open 
standards in a more direct way. Namely, by stimulating the design of open 
standards the government may affect designers of other standards to partici-
pate in the open standard setting procedure instead of attempting to design 
closed standards on their own. Actually,  this may as much induce them to 
corrupt such a procedure and prevent making the standard open, e.g., by 
applying for a related patent. The exact outcome, however, much depends 
(1) on whether and how diligently the government participates in the design 
of the standard as well as (2) on whether the standard may also be used out-
side the government communications. Otherwise, such a stimulation may 
have only a limited effect on other designers.
5.3.3 Supra-Open eGovernment
Government stimulation in an Open eGovernment could go beyond the 
stimulation already discussed. Assume that apart from using an open stan-
dard in government communications, the government stimulates the devel-
opment, distribution, or use of Free Software in a more direct manner.287 
There are many possibilities for the government to become involved by 
using dominium, without engaging the imperium or other government 
branches (the legislative and the judiciary).
For example, the government might simply procure Free Software.288 
Precisely speaking, the government would either download and use existing 
Free Software programs, or contract with a distributor for their delivery, pos-
sibly together with some additional services.289 The government could also 
purchase copyrights to proprietary software and release it as Free Soft-
ware.290 Alternatively, the government could procure improvements to an 
already existing Free Software program and contribute them to the commu-
287 There are many governments that use Free Software already. See: Lucie Guibault, Ot 
van Daalen, Unraveling the Myth around Open Source Licenses. An Analysis 
from A Dutch and European Law Perspective (TMC Asser Press 2006) 39.
288 Procurement of Free Software is possible under the Public Procurement Directive. See FN 
281. See also: NOiV (OSSOS), The acquisition of (open-source) software, A guide for ICT buyers 
in the public and semi-public sectors, at: http://ososs.nl/fi les/acquisition_of_open-source_
software_-_text.pdf. Nevertheless, contracting authorities should defi nitely not rely on 
the reference to certain labels (See: C 359/93, Commission v. the Netherlands, 24.1.1995, ECR 
1995, I, 168).
289 Public tendering would most probably not be necessary if the government uses software 
available publicly and free of charge. See: NOiV (OSSOS), The acquisition of (open-source) 
software, A guide for ICT buyers in the public and semi-public sectors, at: http://ososs.nl/
fi les/acquisition_of_open-source_software_-_text.pdf.
290 The European Union has even designed a whole new model license to be used for releas-
ing government software. See: IDABC, European Public License, at: http://europa.eu.int/
idabc/en/document/2623/5585#eupl.
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nity.291 The government could also participate in the community in some 
other way or even become a project owner of projects related to eGovern-
ment themselves.292
Given that there are many possibilities for the introduction of a Supra-
Open eGovernment in practice, it is hard to determine how it would affect 
the framework exactly. Below, we discuss some example impacts of a Supra-
Open eGovernment on the rules as grouped in the following six classes: (1) 
rules directly related to Free Software licenses, (2) third-party restrictions, (3) 
liability rules, (4) non-legal regulators, (5) closed standards and open stan-
dards, and (6) regulatory environment. After explaining and discussing each 
of these classes, we present (7) conclusion on the Supra-Open eGovern-
ment.
(1) Rules directly related to Free Software licenses
Here, we discuss an example impact of the introduction of a Supra-Open 
eGovernment on the following rules, which are directly related to Free Soft-
ware licenses: (a) the grant of freedoms, (b) the right to fork, (c) copyleft, and (d) 
the hacker immunity, (e) license proliferation and incompatibilities, (f) license 
revocability, and (g) inter partes nature of the licenses.
The exact impact of a Supra-Open eGovernment on these rules depends 
on how the government approaches Free Software exactly. Straightforward 
use of Free Software in eGovernment should not be expected to affect them 
materially, although the government’s demand may stimulate some copy-
right holders to grant users their freedoms more eagerly. However, if the 
government actively engages in the development and distribution of Free 
Software this might have a more direct impact on these rules with regard to 
the Free Software projects that would be used in eGovernment. Most proba-
bly, it will not prevent the operation of the rules that grant or protect user 
freedoms. Nevertheless, the answer to the question whether it will actually 
result in any additional protection of user freedoms depends to a large extent 
on the specific circumstances. Given that there is no single effect that should 
be expected in every situation, we will return to this issue in Chapter 6, 
291 For example, the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration has procured a 
program for editing legal acts and made it available for use by government agencies in 
order to help them fulfi l obligations to prepare electronic versions of various legislation 
(see: Wojciech Wiewiórowski, Komunikat dotyczący Edytora Aktów Prawnych [Communica-
tion on the Editor of Legal Acts], at: http://bip.mswia.gov.pl/portal/bip/21/17881/, in 
Polish). The program is called EDAP and based on many Free Software components, 
such as the FCKeditor (http://www.fckeditor.net). EDAP, however, has not been released 
as Free Software and at the time of this writing it is not clear whether the Ministry would 
like to animate an EDAP community to maintain it.
292 See: Rishab Aiyer Ghosh, Ruediger Glott, Gregorio Robles, Patrice-Emmanuel 
Schmitz, Guideline for Public Administrations on Partnering with Free Soft-
ware Developers (European Commission, Enterprise DG, IDA/GPOSS, 2004), at: 
http://europa.eu.int/idabc/servlets/Doc?id=19295.
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where we propose more specific steps that should be undertaken by govern-
ments.
In any case, a Supra-Open eGovernment is capable of indirectly affecting 
license proliferation and incompatibilities. At the very minimum, when pro-
curing Free Software or contributing to Free Software projects, the govern-
ment may perform a legal audit of licenses and publish the results of such an 
audit, thus minimizing the costs of the audit for all users of such software. 
The government may also stimulate a reduction of the number of licenses 
and the use of more compatible licenses by contributing to selected Free Soft-
ware projects. In such a case, the government would support the already 
identified tendencies that lead to the same effect, and which are supported 
by many communities as well. However, the government may also cause an 
increase of the number of licenses, with the European Public License being 
probably the most important example of such a contribution.293 How the 
incompatibilities are affected in such a case depends again on the govern-
ment’s awareness in drafting new licenses.
A Supra Open eGovernment is capable of indirectly affecting license 
revocability. While procuring rights to software and releasing them under 
Free Software licenses, the government may guarantee that such licenses 
will not be revoked (or even straightforwardly donate the software to the 
public domain294). If this is not the case, mere involvement of the govern-
ment in Free Software projects can serve as an important guarantee that the 
project will be continued, and stimulate other contributors not to revoke 
their licenses. But such an effect is not deemed to occur in every Supra-Open 
eGovernment. Certainly, mere involvement of the government in the devel-
opment, distribution, or use of Free Software will not make Free Software 
licenses legally irrevocable.
When such a political choice is made the government may contribute to 
Free Software projects even if there is no such obligation (i.e., a project is not 
under a copyleft license). This may serve as a stimulus for other contributors 
to contribute their improvements instead of keeping them private, but it may 
also cause a free-rider effect by making everyone waiting for the government 
to contribute, instead of attempting to improve the project themselves. So, 
government involvement in Free Software projects may have a similar effect 
293 See FN 290. Notably, the EUPL includes “compatibility clause” which is intended to mini-
mize the negative consequences of a new model license. Under this clause, the EUPL is 
expressly compatible with, e.g., GPLv2, but there is no mention about compatibility with 
GPLv3. So, EUPL and GPLv3 remain incompatible and this will negatively affect user 
freedoms in case someone attempts to combine software under these licenses.
294 Whether a copyright holder may grant copyrights to the public domain is differently 
regulated under various laws. Under Polish law its seems not possible for private copy-
right holders to dedicate their works to public domain, since copyrights attach automati-
cally for a specifi ed period of time. However, Polish Copyright Act does not extend, inter 
alia, to “government documents”. Arguably, by procuring copyrights to certain software 
and declaring it a government document, the government might be able to dedicate it to 
the public domain.
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as the community copyleft, but such an effect is not deemed to happen in all 
Supra-Open eGovernments. Certainly, as such, it will not change the inter 
partes nature of the licenses.
(2) Third-party restrictions
Here, we discuss an example impact of the introduction of a Supra-Open 
eGovernment on (a) software related patents and (b) contracts with distribu-
tors.
The government may contribute to Free Software projects programs or 
improvements thereof that work around identified patents. Moreover, the 
fact that a certain Free Software project is used in eGovernment may stimu-
late patent holders not to enforce their patents, since this alone may lead to 
an increase of their market in one way or another. But such an effect is not 
guaranteed, and some patent holders may even find their patents easier to 
enforce against the government than against individuals or firms. So, there 
is no direct relation between Supra-Open eGovernments and patents. They 
remain a threat to user freedoms.
Similarly, a Supra-Open eGovernment does not as such prevent distribu-
tors from offering restrictive contracts for the delivery of Free Software or for 
any related services. In fact, by accepting such a contract the government 
may even increase the distributor’s market power and the ability to impose 
similar contracts on users. Conversely, when the government starts to offer 
Free Software programs to users of government services, and regulates the 
terms of such distribution in a liberal way, this may stimulate other distribu-
tors not to use any more restrictive terms. So, whether Supra-Open eGovern-
ments affect contracts with distributors depends on the particular circum-
stances.
(3) Liability rules
Here, we discuss an example impact of the introduction of a Supra-Open 
eGovernment on liability rules.
Government involvement in Free Software projects by itself does not 
affect liability rules. Indeed, the government may regulate the liability for 
software it procures by requiring additional guarantees, etc. Conversely, 
when the government contributes to a Free Software project it may lead to 
shifting liability from other participants in the project to the government, or 
in the sharing of such a liability. However, in any case the government can-
not change liability rules that follow from the applicable law, by the mere 
use, development, or distribution of Free Software.
So, Supra-Open eGovernments do not affect liability rules materially.
(4) Non-legal regulators
Here, we discuss an example impact of the introduction of a Supra-Open 
eGovernment on non-legal regulators.
The government may require that Free Software projects to be used in 
eGovernment are free of any or of most of non-legal restrictions. This could 
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allow users to exercise their freedoms even if other distributors were able to 
impose non-legal restrictions. Also, the government may cover much of the 
integration costs necessary for a proper maintenance of a Free Software proj-
ect, if there is no community that handles the maintenance. As a result, users 
(especially average users) could benefit from properly working programs 
even though they themselves lacked the skills and resources necessary to 
maintain them on their own.
In such a way the government may even substitute or at least signifi-
cantly aid software communities in the maintenance of Free Software. But 
whether it affects the freedoms positively or otherwise depends on many 
circumstances. Obviously, the government is unable to copy all features of 
software communities, and government involvement may actually lead to a 
destruction of an existing community. Naturally, the purpose of the govern-
ment is not to maintain software, while the communities are established spe-
cifically for this purpose.
So, whether and how Supra-Open eGovernments affect non-legal regu-
lators depends on how the eGovernment is introduced exactly.
(5) Closed standards and open standards
Here, we mention an example impact of the introduction of a Supra-Open 
eGovernment on (a) closed standards and (b) open standards.
A Supra-Open eGovernment would incorporate activities related to 
standards that are undertaken in other types of Open eGovernments. So, it 
would promote open standards as compared to closed standards, but it 
would not remove the closed standards from the framework.
(6) Regulatory environment
Here, we mention an example impact of the introduction of a Supra-Open 
eGovernment on the regulatory environment.
A Supra-Open eGovernment would not affect the regulatory environ-
ment for the same reasons as already presented with regard to other eGov-
ernments. It would also face the same limitations and restrictions that are the 
result of the differences between national laws.
(7) Conclusion on Supra-Open eGovernment
Here, we may conclude that a Supra-Open eGovernment is capable of affect-
ing many rules in the framework. How the rules are going to be affected 
depends much on how this eGovernment is introduced exactly. We note that 
the government can contribute to the protection of user freedoms using 
dominium, without resorting to imperium, or other government branches, 
such as the legislative or the judiciary. However, there are limitations and 
restrictions of user freedoms that every Supra-Open eGovernment is unable 
to address using the dominium only. These are: license revocability, inter partes 
nature of the licenses, software-related patents, liability rules, closed stan-
dards, and the regulatory environment.
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5.3.4 Evaluation of user freedoms in Open eGovernments
All Open eGovernments prevent the operation of at least some rules that 
limit or restrict user freedoms, while at the same time they reinforce some 
rules that protect the freedoms. In particular, by stimulating the design, 
implementation, and the increase of the popularity of open standards Open 
eGovernments reinforce rules that lead to open standards and prevent the 
operation of at least some of the rules that lead to closed standards. If the 
government does not limit itself to requiring the use of open standards in 
government communications, but actively engages in the development, dis-
tribution, or use of Free Software, it can introduce a Supra-Open eGovern-
ment and affect the framework to an even greater extent.
5.4 Chapter conclusions
In a world without eGovernments user freedoms are subject to the identified 
limitations and restrictions. Some of them can be overcome by software com-
munities. But whether the freedoms are protected, and in particular whether 
open standards are designed, implemented, and become popular depends 
on many circumstances. The government affects these circumstances by 
introducing an eGovernment.
Generally, Closed eGovernments affect many rules in the framework to a 
certain detriment of user freedoms. Conversely, Open eGovernments are 
neutral towards most of the rules, but they affect some of them to a benefit of 
user freedoms. In order to identify the relations between eGovernments and 
user freedoms more precisely we distinguished three types of Closed eGov-
ernments: (1) Closed eGovernment (A), (2) Closed eGovernment (B), and (3) 
Semi-Closed eGovernment. Similarly, we distinguished three types of Open 
eGovernments: (1) Open eGovernment (A), (2) Open eGovernment (B), and 
(3) Supra-Open eGovernment.
Each of these six types of eGovernments is in a different relation with 
user freedoms. Each of them differently affects various rules in the regulato-
ry framework. The differences can be minor (as for example between a 
Closed eGovernment (A) and Closed eGovernment (B)), but they may also 
be vast (as for example between a Closed eGovernment (A) and the Supra-
Open eGovernment). Nevertheless, we found that neither of the eGovern-
ments (even including the Open eGovernments) affects all limitations and 
restrictions to user freedoms. Many limitations and restrictions remain out 
of reach even for the Supra-Open eGovernment. Also, whether some of the 
limitations and restrictions are affected depends on how such an eGovern-
ment is introduced exactly. Here, we note that in this chapter we focussed on 
the government acting through the dominium. However, in passing we often 
noted that some of the limitations or restrictions could be addressed only 
using the imperium, or by employing other government branches, such as the 
legislative or the judiciary.
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So, we are now ready to answer RQ2, which is: “In what way do eGovern-
ments affect the current regulatory framework in the protection of user freedoms, as 
articulated by Stallman?” We present the answer in four concluding statements.
(1) Closed eGovernments. Closed eGovernments affect the frame-
work negatively from the point of view of user freedoms. Precisely 
speaking, they affect the grant of freedoms, liability rules, non-legal 
regulators, and closed standards. Given the likelihood of the spill-
over effect, these rules are affected with regard to software used in 
government communications, as well as to other software.
(2) Semi-Closed eGovernments. If the government proceeds diligent-
ly, it may succeed in the introduction of a Semi-Closed eGovern-
ment. Such an eGovernment enables users to exercise user free-
doms despite the fact that closed standards are used in government 
technologies. But given its limitations it should be taken under con-
sideration only as a transitional eGovernment from a Closed eGov-
ernment to an Open eGovernment.
(3) Open eGovernments. Open eGovernments are capable of avoiding 
the negative effects on the framework that are a result of Closed 
eGovernment. Still, they do not affect most of the rules, they are 
merely neutral towards them. Open eGovernments only promote 
open standards as compared to closed standards, and they do not 
remove closed standards from the framework.
(4) Supra-Open eGovernments. The government is capable of affect-
ing the framework to a greater extent by introducing a Supra-Open 
eGovernment. However, the exact outcome of such an eGovern-
ment depends much on how it is introduced precisely. Also, even 
Supra-Open eGovernments are not able to overcome such limita-
tions and restrictions as license revocability, inter partes nature of 
the licenses, software-related patents, liability rules, closed stan-
dards, and the regulatory environment. Affecting these limitations 
and restrictions is possible if only apart from the dominium, the gov-
ernment additionally employs the imperium or other branches (the 
legislative and the judiciary).
The above four statements enable us to present the following answer to PS2, 
which is: “What are the relations between user freedoms and eGovernments?” Our 
answer consists of three statements.
(1) Closed eGovernments are capable of restricting user freedoms ef-
fectively, despite the protection provided for in the framework, and 
despite the positive effect on the freedoms that properly organized 
communities may have.
(2) Semi-Closed eGovernments enable users to exercise their freedoms 
despite the fact that closed standards are used by the government. 
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 But their introduction requires much diligence. Still, such eGovern-
ments do not remove the limitations and restrictions that users are 
exposed to in the world without eGovernments.
(3) Open eGovernments are capable of avoiding the additional restric-
tion of user freedoms that is a result of Closed eGovernments. But 
they are  mostly neutral towards the framework, although they ma-
terially affect closed standards. Only Supra-Open eGovernments 
are able to minimize all existing limitations and restrictions materi-
ally. Similarly to Semi- Closed eGovernments, the introduction of 
Supra-Open eGovernments also requires much diligence. Howev-
er, any Open eGovernment is still unable to remove all existing 
limitations and restrictions of user freedoms, unless the imperium 
or the legislative and the judiciary becomes involved.
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regulatory framework
In this chapter we propose an improved regulatory framework of Free Soft-
ware. In the construction of the proposal, we use our findings on how the 
current regulatory framework protects the freedoms in the world of software 
communities and eGovernments. Below, we recall these findings and then 
we stipulate the working programme.
We found that (1) access to source codes and (2) access to specifications 
of standards are necessary conditions of user freedoms. So, we reconstructed 
a model of the framework, which includes (a) rules for both software and 
standards, and (b) relations between the rules. In particular, the model 
includes the rules that follow from Free Software licenses, in which copy-
right holders of software grant users their freedoms. The licenses provide 
also for the basic protection of the freedoms. Additionally, the model includes 
rules that lead to open standards, since only open standards enable users to 
exercise their freedoms and provide means for interoperability at the same 
time. Yet, the model includes also many rules which limit or restrict user 
freedoms either with regard to software, or with regard to standards. These 
limitations and restrictions are not sufficiently addressed by the rules that 
follow from Free Software licenses, or by the rules that lead to open stan-
dards. So, on the basis of the model, we found that the freedoms are not suf-
ficiently protected under the current framework.
Then, we analysed the operation of the model in a world of software 
communities. We started the analysis by observing that given the limitations 
and restrictions existing in the model, users are unable to exercise their free-
doms individually in an undisturbed manner. More specifically, users are 
not able to maintain Free Software individually unless they possess the nec-
essary skills and resources. However, we found that software communities 
are able to provide for effective maintenance of Free Software programs in 
projects. After the analysis of the communities we found that for an effective 
maintenance it is essential that the communities are properly organized. Yet, 
even such communities do not remove the limitations and restrictions from 
the framework. They are only able to gather and manage skills and resources 
necessary to minimize many of them materially. We found in particular that 
such rules as software-related patents, closed standards, and the regulatory 
environment continue to affect user freedoms negatively, despite the fact 
that there exist properly organized software communities. Most of other lim-
itations and restrictions are only indirectly affected by the communities.
Thereafter, we analysed the operation of the model of the framework in 
a world of eGovernments. We performed a detailed analysis of Closed and 
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Open eGovernments. We found that eGovernments are capable of materially 
affecting the circumstances that lead to the design and popularity of open 
standards. Generally, Closed eGovernments prevent the operation of open 
standards. They do so by contributing to a lock-in to a closed standard. Con-
versely, Open eGovernments promote open standards as compared to closed 
standards, but they are mostly neutral towards other limitations and restric-
tions of user freedoms. Even Supra-Open eGovernments are not able to over-
come all limitations and restrictions to user freedoms. In particular, such 
rules as license revocability, inter partes nature of the licenses, software-relat-
ed patents, liability rules, closed standards, and the regulatory environment 
are not affected by them materially.
Our analysis leads us to the conclusion that the current framework does 
not provide adequate protection of the freedoms in the world of software 
communities and eGovernments. So, in this chapter we proceed to answer
RQ 3: How to improve the regulatory framework so that it adequately protects 
user freedoms, as articulated by Stallman, in the world of software com-
munities and eGovernments?
In order to answer RQ3 we start by elaborating on the inefficiencies of the 
current framework and by discussing various possible improvements (Sec-
tion 6.1). Then, we design the most appropriate improvements in some detail 
(Section 6.2). Thereafter, we use the designed improvements to construct a 
proposal of an improved framework (Section 6.3). Finally, we present a sum-
mary of the chapter and an answer to RQ3 (Section 6.4).
6.1 Inefficiencies of the current framework and possible improvements
The proposal of an improved regulatory framework of Free Software should 
address all limitations and restrictions of the freedoms existing in the current 
framework. Where the current framework, as operating in the world of soft-
ware communities and eGovernments, promises that it can affect a limita-
tion or a restriction sufficiently without any improvements, the improved 
framework should not intervene. If this is not the case, adequate improve-
ments should be proposed. Otherwise, the framework will continue to pro-
tect the freedoms inadequately, and users will not be able to exercise their 
freedoms without limitations or restrictions.
In the world of software communities and eGovernments possible 
improvements can come either from the communities, or from the govern-
ment. The government can act using only its dominium, but it may also 
employ the imperium, as well as the other two government branches (the leg-
islative or the judiciary). So, we distinguish four kinds of possible solutions 
that can be taken under consideration in the construction of an improved 
framework: (1) do not propose any improvements, (2) propose improve-
ments that can be undertaken within the communities, (3) propose improve-
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ments that can be undertaken by the government using its dominium only, 
and (4) propose improvements that can be undertaken by the government 
using the imperium, the legislative, or the judiciary.
Below, we identify the possible improvements towards each of the iden-
tified limitations and restrictions of the freedoms (jointly: inefficiencies). We 
address all nine of them in the already introduced order. In each subsection 
we first synthesize the inefficiencies by using our findings from Chapters 3, 
4, and 5. Then, we discuss possible improvements to address each of the 
inefficiencies. We focus on issues specifically related to the purpose of this 
chapter, so the reader should return to previous chapters for more detail. 
Thereafter, we present our evaluation of the inefficiencies of the current 
framework.
6.1.1 License proliferation and incompatibilities
(1) Inefficiencies resulting from license proliferation and incompatibilities
License proliferation and incompatibilities make it necessary for a person 
who maintains a combination of Free Software programs to perform a legal 
audit of licenses of all these programs. This is the case even though there are 
visible tendencies resulting in a decrease of the number of licenses, and in an 
increase of their compatibility. Only by performing such an audit it is possi-
ble to identify all applicable obligations, and all remaining incompatibilities 
between them. The identified obligations have to be complied with. Pro-
grams subject to incompatible obligations have to be removed, or their use in 
the combination has to be adjusted in order not to trigger the incompatibili-
ties. Following such a procedure is not impossible, but it can be performed 
only by users who hold the necessary skills and resources. This leads to a 
decrease of the number of users who become actors on the Free Software 
scene, e.g., by maintaining Free Software programs. It also diverts at least 
some of the resources of the active maintainers from the maintenance to the 
legal audit. In any case, it leads to a decrease of available combinations of 
Free Software programs.
The evolution of software communities can be perceived as a natural 
result of many users attempting to cover transaction costs, such as the costs 
of the proliferation and incompatibilities described above. The communi-
ties maintain Free Software programs as projects. However, project mainte-
nance as such does not remove the proliferation and incompatibilities from 
the framework. Many, if not all, communities still have to deal with the issue. 
Properly organized communities use licensing policies and the authority of 
project owners for that purpose. By accepting (to the official version of the 
project) only the contributions that comply with the project’s licensing pol-
icies, project owners are able to create a combination of Free Software pro-
grams that can be maintained together with all applicable obligations com-
plied with at the same time. Obviously, contributions under incompatible 
licenses are not accepted, which means that the communities avoid rather 
than solve the issue. Only the communities gathered around significant proj-
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ects can indirectly stimulate copyright holders to switch to more popular 
licenses, or amend them to provide for more compatibility. Clearly, such com-
munities support the already identified tendencies that lead to the same effect.
Most types of eGovernments do not affect license proliferation and 
incompatibilities at all. They can be affected by Supra-Open eGovernments 
only, but how they are affected depends much on how such an eGovernment 
is introduced. On the one hand, the government may significantly help users 
from a given jurisdiction in the performance of the legal audit. It may also 
stimulate a decrease of the number of the licenses and an increase of their 
compatibility, in much the same way as the prominent communities do. On 
the other hand, the government may cause the opposite, e.g., if the authori-
ties design new Free Software licenses on their own, without coordinating 
this activity with already existing community efforts. Also, the actual out-
come of a Supra-Open eGovernment on license proliferation and incompat-
ibilities depends on whether the government acts only within its dominium, 
or if it also employs the imperium, as well as other branches (the legislative 
and the judiciary).
(2) Possible improvements to address license proliferation and incompatibilities
As noted earlier, we are currently (2009) in a transitional phase. Free Soft-
ware licenses have proliferated and as a result many incompatibilities 
between them have started to restrict user freedoms. But there are tenden-
cies that lead to a decrease of the number of licenses and to an increase of 
their compatibility. Given these tendencies, we do not find it necessary to 
propose any extreme improvements of the framework directed at license 
proliferation and incompatibilities. However, it is crucial that the tendencies 
are not stopped or reversed. So, we should propose improvements that sup-
port the communities in the performance of the legal audit. Namely, the 
improvements should guarantee that the communities adopt proper licens-
ing policies, and that the policies are followed. The measures could also 
allow the most prominent communities to stimulate licensors more effec-
tively and to continue to make them switch to more popular and compatible 
licenses.
From our analysis of license proliferation and incompatibilities we do 
not derive any guidelines as to which type of eGovernment should be intro-
duced. However, it is still necessary to propose improvements in the frame-
work that would prevent government interference in the identified tenden-
cies. In particular, the government should not hinder the community efforts 
that lead to a decrease of the number of licenses and to an increase of their 
compatibility. Additionally, if Supra-Open eGovernments are introduced, 
the improvements should direct the governments to perform a diligent legal 
audit of the licenses and to publish results of such an audit, or otherwise 
serve to the benefit of the users. Governments should also be required to 
coordinate their involvement in the development, distribution, and use of 
Free Software (if any) with the communities. Such a coordination is neces-
sary in particular to avoid drafting of more incompatible licenses. It would 
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also allow for a more effective stimulation of copyright holders to switch to 
more popular and compatible licenses.
Additional improvements in the framework should be taken under con-
sideration in two situations. First, in case the improvements discussed above 
should fail to resolve the issue of proliferation and incompatibilities. Second, 
when the transitional phase reaches its end and it will be possible to indicate 
but a few model Free Software licenses widely used. In both these situations 
the legislative branch could attempt to include in the law default terms relat-
ed to Free Software, or a few sets of such default rules for licensors to choose 
from. This could be performed in a manner similar to regulating popular 
contracts in civil codes. In the meantime, the transitional phase of switching 
between licenses and amending them could be supported by courts. By 
reviewing the licenses and ruling about the exact scope of rights and obliga-
tions of the parties, courts can provide guidelines for Free Software licensors 
how to amend their licenses, as well as which model licenses are better writ-
ten than the others. Should a particular license be found invalid in whole or 
in part, Free Software licensors would promptly amend them or switch to 
other, better drafted ones.
6.1.2 License revocability
(1) Inefficiencies resulting from license revocability
License revocability allows the licensor to reclaim exclusive control with 
regard to a Free Software program. The control follows from the default rule. 
After the control is reclaimed, the copyright holder can prevent users from 
the exercise of their freedoms. License revocability depends on many cir-
cumstances, such as the size of the user base, the organization of the distri-
bution of the program, or the applicable law. If these circumstances fail to 
make it impracticable to revoke the license, the revocation is subject to the 
discretion of one person only – the licensor. Certainly, it might not be possi-
ble to use license revocability in order to prevent all users from using Free 
Software in private. However, in practice, it would probably suffice that the 
license is revoked from some major developers and distributors of the pro-
gram to prevent most users from exercising the freedoms effectively. In par-
ticular, it is important that license revocability can prevent effective mainte-
nance of Free Software programs.
Evolution of software communities does not affect license revocability as 
such. If no additional measures are undertaken, it can be only affected in 
community projects that consist of multiple iterations of derivative works of 
an original subject to a copyleft license. However, properly organized com-
munities are able to offer licensors benefits that stimulate them not to revoke 
licenses, even in projects of other types. Namely, they provide for effective 
maintenance of many contributions under the authority of project owners. 
In case of licensors that do not find these benefits attractive and choose to 
revoke their licenses, such communities are still able to stimulate contribu-
tions of substitutes by other licensors. Similarly to the effect of the communi-
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ties on the license proliferation and incompatibilities, the communities 
avoid, rather than solve, the issue of license revocability.
As far as eGovernments are concerned, license revocability can be affect-
ed by Supra-Open eGovernments only. But this is an indirect relation, and it 
is not effective towards Free Software programs outside of the reach of the 
government. Namely, by getting involved in the development, distribution, 
or use of selected programs, the government may stimulate respective copy-
right holders not to revoke their licenses. If the government holds relevant 
copyrights, it may straightforwardly guarantee that the license will not be 
revoked, or even contribute them to the public domain (if this is possible in 
the jurisdiction in question). However, the government will not change revo-
cable licenses granted by other licensors into irrevocable, unless apart from 
the dominium it also employs the imperium, as well as other government 
branches (the legislative and the judiciary).
(2) Possible improvements to address license revocability
We are not aware of any license to major Free Software programs having 
been revoked. Actually, we found that many licensors make pledges to main-
tain their programs as Free Software in the future. So, we do not find it nec-
essary to propose any improvements that would legally petrify license rela-
tions or any other extreme measures. Apart from the above, it has to be borne 
in mind that licenses are granted by copyright holders, and given the basic 
principles of the copyright law, they should be free to decide whether to 
allow the use of their works or not. So, it is not advisable to prevent license 
revocation for such licensors who are determined to remove their contribu-
tions from Free Software and who can do so without infringing rights of 
other copyright holders. But at the same time it is advisable to allow licen-
sors to make their licenses irrevocable if they find such a need. If under the 
applicable law a license cannot be made irrevocable by the licensor, such a 
possibility should be provided for.
Also, we find the stimulation of properly organized communities neces-
sary for the licensors not to revoke their licenses. Precisely speaking, the bet-
ter a community maintains a program, the less incentives for licensors to 
control it exclusively. Additionally, the better a community is organized, the 
easier it can substitute a particular contribution. So, we should propose 
improvements that prevent stopping or reversing the stimulation of licen-
sors provided for by properly organized communities. Such improvements 
should guarantee proper organization of the communities.
From our analysis of license revocability we do not derive any guide-
lines as to which type of eGovernment should be introduced. However, it is 
still necessary to propose improvements in the framework that would pre-
vent government interference with the community stimulation of licensors. 
In case of Supra-Open eGovernments we should propose guidelines for gov-
ernments to support the communities in their stimulation. The guidelines 
should in particular include the rules for making available software devel-
oped or procured by the government.
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6.1.3 Inter partes nature of licenses
(1) Inefficiencies resulting from the inter partes nature of licenses
The fact that Free Software licenses create inter partes relations limits the 
enforceability of any rights and obligations from a Free Software license by 
persons other than the parties to the license. In particular, users cannot 
directly enforce copyleft obligations against infringing licensees unless the 
applicable law gives them standing. In any case, copyleft enforcement 
requires resources of an interested (and eligible) party. This is not impossible, 
but it leads to a decrease of the number of licensors and users who would 
claim their freedoms against infringing licensees and succeed. As a result, 
appropriated Free Software programs cannot be maintained by users, who 
turn into passive audience, as users of proprietary software do. Determined 
users can definitely exercise the right to fork in such a situation (they can 
develop a substitute program and release it without restrictions) but this 
requires skills and resources as well.
Software communities are able to circumvent the inter partes nature of 
the licenses by using the community copyleft mechanism. Namely, by provid-
ing for effective maintenance of projects consisting of numerous contribu-
tions under the authority of project owners, properly organized communi-
ties stimulate many parties to release their programs as Free Software 
regardless of whether the project’s license contains a copyleft clause. The com-
munity copyleft is obviously not effective towards such parties who do not 
find community maintenance attractive. However, properly organized com-
munities may then serve as a source of the substitutes to appropriated 
improvements. In any case the legal enforcement of copyleft clauses remains 
an option, and the overall Free Software community has developed initia-
tives that support licensors in enforcing it. Certainly, these initiatives are not 
able to enforce every copyleft infringement and they do not substitute licen-
sors as the main eligible party. Ultimately, if licensors do not support a case, 
interested users have to support it on their own.
The inter partes nature can be indirectly affected by the government, if a 
Supra-Open eGovernment is introduced. However, the exact result depends 
much on specific circumstances. Government involvement in the develop-
ment, distribution, or use of Free Software projects may stimulate some par-
ties to contribute to them too. Nevertheless, it may also cause a free-rider 
effect, by stimulating many parties to refrain from contributing, if the gov-
ernment takes most or all of the software maintenance burden. In any case, 
any eGovernment is unable to change the inter partes nature of the licenses 
granted by other licensors as such, unless the government employs the impe-
rium, or the legislative and judiciary branches.
(2) Possible improvements to address the inter partes nature of licenses
We find it necessary to propose improvements in the current framework that 
will make it possible for licensors and users to enforce copyleft directly 
against infringing licensees more easily and effectively. Certainly, these 
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improvements should make such enforceability legally possible without 
major limitations, if this is not the case under the applicable law. Addition-
ally, if it is unclear whether under applicable law specific performance (i.e., 
the performance of copyleft obligations) can be ordered in case of copyleft 
infringement, the improved framework should explicitly provide for such a 
remedy. A question arises, whether it is necessary to change the inter partes 
nature of the licenses further. For example, whether the enforcement of copyl-
eft should be left for private parties (licensors and users), or should copyleft 
infringements be prosecuted by the state, as it is usually the case with copy-
right infringements, which can lead to both civil and criminal liability. State 
prosecution could be advisable if the licensors and users were unable to 
counter infringements effectively, even with the help of the initiatives such 
as the Software Freedom Law Center or the GPL-violations. Definitely, such 
an extended enforceability should not lead to pushing the freedoms on such 
users who do not want them at all. But it is advisable to propose improve-
ments that would help users in a situation where licensors do not have the 
necessary resources to enforce copyleft, as well as in a situation where users 
are unable to obtain the licensor’s support of the case.
From our analysis of the inter partes nature of the licenses we do not 
derive any guidelines as to which type of eGovernment should be intro-
duced. We only find it necessary to prevent governments from interfering, to 
the extent that such an interference would stimulate actors not to contribute 
to Free Software projects.
6.1.4 Software-related patents
(1) Inefficiencies resulting from software-related patents
A patent may be used to restrict the exercise of some or all of the freedoms, 
to the extent it covers the use, development, or distribution of a Free Soft-
ware program. It is not easy to identify a patent infringement a priori, mostly 
because patent information is not readily available in the form that would 
allow for such an identification. So, no-one can guarantee that a patent is not 
infringed in the course of the development, distribution, or use of any pro-
gram, including Free Software. The risk of patent infringement cannot be 
easily avoided, not even by users who hold substantial skills and resources. 
Patent-related risk can effectively drive many of the users away from exer-
cising their freedoms. Straightforwardly speaking, it increases the costs of 
exercising of the freedoms by a factor which is hard to quantify. But these are 
not only monetary costs of eventual patent royalties or damages. Exercise of 
the freedoms in Free Software covered by a patent is subject to an authoriza-
tion of the patent holder. The patent holder can refuse such an authorization 
or require that certain conditions are met in order to obtain an authorization. 
Both the refusal and the conditions are in conflict with user freedoms.
Properly organized software communities can stimulate some patent 
holders not to restrict user freedoms. Some of the holders make even explicit 
public pledges not to enforce some or all their patents. They see more value 
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in the fact that projects covered with their patents are properly maintained 
than in the royalties that could have been collected from users. Still, other 
patent holders prefer to enforce (or threaten to enforce) their patents, even if 
the patents cover projects maintained by the communities. The fact that 
some software communities consist of a large number of participants may 
make it harder to enforce patents towards members of these communities. 
But the mere fact that a community is big, is not an adequate protection of 
user freedoms. It might suffice for the patent holder to enforce a patent 
towards most important users, such as the project owners, in order to stop 
the project effectively. However, the communities may be able to gather and 
manage skills and resources necessary to work around identified patents. As 
a result, they could stimulate the use, development, and distribution of the 
project in a way that does not infringe any related patents (i.e., to work 
around the patents). But they would not be able to use the patented technol-
ogy, unless they managed to invalidate the patents. Also, they could not 
avoid liability for eventual past infringements. So, software communities are 
largely unable to avoid the patent issue, even if they would be able to devel-
op workarounds.
eGovernments do not remove the threat of software-related patents. 
Even in case of Open eGovernments, software can still be found to infringe a 
software-related patent, if such a patent was validly granted in a given juris-
diction. Naturally, governments could participate in Free Software projects 
and support the communities in working around patents. Perhaps the gov-
ernment participation would lead to better workarounds being developed, 
but this requires a diligently introduced Supra-Open eGovernment. Still, 
even if such an eGovernment is introduced, it would not allow users to use 
the patented technology. Also, it would not remove liability for eventual pat-
ent infringements from users. In order to do so, the government would have 
to use the imperium, or the legislative and judiciary branches.
(2) Possible improvements to address software-related patents
We find it necessary to propose improvements in the framework that would 
prevent  software-related patents from being granted. This encompasses 
observing the exceptions from the patentable subject matter, which do not 
allow to patent computer programs. But there are jurisdictions that do not 
include such exceptions in their patent law, and we should not expect that all 
patent laws can be amended to include these exceptions. Also, the excep-
tions existing in other jurisdictions have often been interpreted not to pro-
hibit software-related patents. So, although we do not abandon to seek 
improvements that would prevent such patents from being granted, we also 
find it necessary to propose improvements that would prevent the use of the 
patents in order to restrict user freedoms, if they are granted.
We envisage a threefold approach for an effective prevention. First, it 
should be made easier to identify a patent infringement. Second, avoidance 
of liability for an infringement should be possible at a low cost, while the 
legitimate interest of the holder of an infringed patent should be observed. 
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In any case, the exercise of the freedoms cannot be subject to any authoriza-
tion or condition. Third, the identified community initiatives related to pat-
ents should be supported in the improved framework.
As far as eGovernments are concerned, the analysis of software-related 
patents does not lead us to any specific guidelines as to which type of eGov-
ernment should be introduced. Certainly, the government should avoid the 
use of technologies patented by persons who use patents to restrict user free-
doms. We remark that in the thesis we distinguish between software-related 
patents and patents material to standards. While the former are not affected 
by eGovernments materially, the latter are. Namely, patents material to stan-
dards are affected by Open eGovernments to a benefit of user freedoms. 
However, there is a risk that such eGovernments could create additional 
incentives for patent holders to corrupt the standard setting procedure so 
that it leads to closed standards. We will search for the necessary improve-
ments related to patents material to standards when discussing improve-
ments that would affect closed standards.
6.1.5 Contracts with distributors
(1) Inefficiencies resulting from contracts with distributors
Contracts are a flexible tool for restricting the freedoms of particular users. 
Actually, they can be used both to restrict the freedoms as well as to provide 
for an additional protection of the freedoms. There are practically no limits 
on how contracts can be used, given the autonomy of the parties principle. 
In particular, contracts allow to prevent users from maintaining software 
and to tie them to maintenance services of the contracting distributor. How-
ever, contracts affect only such users who accept them, while other users 
remain free to exercise their freedoms (ceteris paribus). Also, many laws 
already allow to interfere in contracts in order to protect the weaker party or 
the competition, such as the consumer protection laws and competition 
laws.
Software communities do not prevent distributors from offering restric-
tive contracts to users. But properly organized communities can serve as a 
substitute source of programs without any such restrictions. They are able to 
compete with many distributors effectively. At the same time they make it 
possible for other distributors to use programs maintained by the communi-
ties in constructing competitive offerings. As a result, the communities indi-
rectly affect the ability of distributors to offer restrictive contracts, because 
with any such contract a distributor has to offer additional benefits that the 
communities or other distributors cannot provide at lower price. So, the 
communities can protect the freedoms against the threat of restrictive con-
tracts with distributors if only the communities are not prevented from 
becoming competitive sources of Free Software.
eGovernments as such do not make it impossible to offer restrictive con-
tracts to users. This holds true for every type of eGovernments. Even in Open 
eGovernments software can be subject to restrictions imposed by distribu-
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tors. Such restrictions can be minimized by the government only in Supra-
Open eGovernments, which are capable of stimulating distributors if intro-
duced diligently. A diligent government is aware of the importance of the 
freedoms and of the threat of contractual restrictions. Such a government 
would not accept restrictive contracts related to Free Software procured for 
eGovernment. But if the government proceeds less diligently and accepts 
such contracts, it could actually help distributors that restrict user freedoms 
in gaining market power. The distributors would then use that power by 
imposing the restrictions on other users. In such a case, an effective protec-
tion of user freedoms would require that the government uses the imperium, 
or the legislative and the judiciary branches to regulate the distributors.
(2) Possible improvements to address contracts with distributors
By definition, contracts are concluded between independent parties. It fol-
lows that the most natural way of avoiding restrictive contracts is not to 
accept them. In cases when acceptance cannot be avoided or when negotia-
tion is not possible, competition and consumer protection laws are of partic-
ular importance. If a contract related to Free Software constitutes a breach of 
such laws users should not be prevented from invoking such laws to defend 
their freedoms. This can be performed under the current framework, so we 
do not find it necessary to propose any improvements particularly related to 
the use of competition and consumer protection laws to protect user free-
doms. The question whether to provide for any additional measures could 
be subject to deliberation in case a significant number of users should find 
their freedoms restricted using contracts, despite the existing laws. For the 
time being, since we see no such evidence, we should design improvements 
that would support the communities in sustaining their competitive advan-
tage. Namely, the communities should be supported in their stimulation of 
distributors, which causes the distributors to offer users material benefits. 
The improved framework should promote a competition in the Free Soft-
ware market. For this reason it is advisable to provide for clear guidelines for 
governments as to how eGovernments should be introduced in order not to 
help distributors in imposing restrictive contracts on users.
6.1.6 Liability rules
(1) Inefficiencies resulting from liability rules
The hacker immunity attempts to remove all liability from the actors in the 
Free Software scene. But whether such a waiver is possible, and to what 
extent it is possible, is always subject to the liability rules of the applicable 
law. We did not find that the liability rules of any major jurisdiction prohibit 
such a waiver completely. We rather found that neither shifting all liability 
towards users, nor forcing it back to the copyright holders, developers, or 
distributors, is beneficial for user freedoms. The main issue is not who would 
bear the liability, but whether a user can have any defects in Free Software 
removed promptly and effectively. If users have access to additional warran-
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ties and services related to Free Software, the question of liability and dam-
ages is less important. We found that there is a market for such warranties 
and services, and that liability rules should not materially affect user free-
doms if that market continues to operate effectively.
Communities play an important role in the market for additional war-
ranties and services related to Free Software. In particular, properly orga-
nized communities provide for a swift removal  of many defects identified 
when the software is already operated by users. As a result, they stimulate 
distributors to offer additional warranties and services in the first place, and 
more importantly, they stimulate that the distributors increase quality of 
their offerings to keep the pace of the communities. Additionally, by using 
umbrella organizations the communities are able to insulate important actors 
from liability, while at the same time they provide for legally enforceable 
responsibility of project owners concerning the quality of software included 
in the official versions. Also, by maintaining programs properly, the commu-
nities make it possible for many parties to offer warranties and services on 
top of these programs. In such a way, the communities contribute towards a 
competitive market that can stimulate production of better quality products. 
So, properly organized communities are able to address the issue of liability 
rules.
The impact of eGovernments on liability rules depends on which type of 
an eGovernment is introduced. The government may increase the risk of 
liability for Free Software by using a closed standard, that is by introducing a 
Closed eGovernment. The use of Free Software that attempted to interoper-
ate using such a standard could be subject to direct or indirect liability, either 
towards the government, or towards third parties. Conversely, Open eGov-
ernments are largely neutral towards liability rules. Using an open standard 
in government communications makes it possible for Free Software to inter-
operate without risking additional standards-related liability, but liability 
under other grounds is not affected. Even while introducing Supra-Open 
eGovernment the government does not affect liability rules directly, although 
it may stimulate an increase in the quality of software in much the same way 
as communities do. Nevertheless, if the government proceeds without due 
care, it may negatively affect the market for warranties and services related 
to Free Software, even in a Supra-Open eGovernment.
(2) Possible improvements to address liability rules
We find it necessary to propose improvements in the framework that would 
not allow to prevent the operation of the market for warranties and services 
related to Free Software. In particular, the improvements should contribute 
towards a proper organization of software communities so that they contin-
ue to be able to remove any defects in the software promptly. These improve-
ments can include government stimulation performed through diligent pro-
curement of Free Software together with the warranties and services. Given 
the fact that Closed eGovernments affect liability rules to a detriment of user 
freedoms, we find it necessary to include in the improved framework rules 
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that prevent the introduction of Closed eGovernments. In case such an eGov-
ernment is already operating, we should propose improvements that allow 
for a swift transformation from a Closed eGovernment to an Open eGovern-
ment.
6.1.7 Non-legal regulators of software
(1) Inefficiencies resulting from non-legal regulators of software
Non-legal regulators limit the freedoms and they can be used to restrict the 
freedoms in many ways. Here, we recall the most important examples dis-
cussed in this thesis. For instance, the freedoms can be restricted using the 
architecture. This happens when a Free Software program is used to provide 
a service or when it is embedded in a device. Additionally, the market causes 
integration costs (a type of transaction costs) that burden the maintenance of 
Free Software projects. Generally, both the architecture and the market limit 
the effectiveness of some of the rules in the framework, such as copyleft. In 
particular, they create barriers that prevent many users to exercise the free-
doms individually.
As we already noted, software communities evolve as a result of the 
attempts of individual users to remove various non-legal restrictions of user 
freedoms that prevent the individual exercise of the freedoms. In particular, 
the communities attempt to cover or avoid transaction costs, as well as they 
attempt to constitute a substitute source of Free Software without restric-
tions. We found that the communities do not remove the non-legal regula-
tors from the framework. But properly organized communities are able to 
provide for maintenance of Free Software despite these regulators. For that 
purpose it is crucial that the communities are organized properly. However, 
many communities are unable to avoid restrictions, even if they are properly 
organized. This is in particular the case if the restriction of the freedoms is a 
result of linking Free Software with services or embedding it in a device.
The impact of eGovernments on non-legal regulators depends on which 
type of an eGovernment is introduced. A Closed eGovernment usually 
makes it technically impracticable to exercise the freedoms or simply increas-
es the costs of the freedoms. It is a mix of architecture and market regulation, 
which often permeates to other software, not just the software used for gov-
ernment communications (the spill-over effect). Conversely, Open eGovern-
ments are to a large extent neutral towards non-legal regulators. This means 
that they do not prevent non-legal limitations and restrictions from opera-
tion. However, a diligent government may introduce a Supra-Open eGov-
ernment in such a way that limits the negative impact of the non-legal regu-
lators on user freedoms. In order to do this, the government has to pay due 
care to how the eGovernment is introduced exactly.
(2) Possible improvements to address non-legal regulators of software
Due to the existence of non-legal regulators, we find it necessary to propose 
improvements in the framework directed both (1) at software communities 
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and (2) at eGovernments. The improvements should support the communi-
ties in their efforts to deliver Free Software without restrictions. In particular, 
the communities should be able to substitute services or devices that are 
used to restrict user freedoms. This means that the improvements should 
support the communities in organizing themselves in order to maintain Free 
Software programs. Given the fact that Closed eGovernments restrict user 
freedoms by affecting non-legal regulators, we find that it is necessary to 
include in the improved framework rules that prevent the introduction of 
such eGovernments. If a Closed eGovernment is already operating, we 
should propose improvements that allow for a swift transformation from a 
Closed eGovernment to an Open eGovernment.
6.1.8 Closed standards
(1) Inefficiencies resulting from closed standards
Closed standards restrict user freedoms as far as users attempt to exercise 
the freedoms and provide means for interoperability at the same time. 
Closed standards depend on a combination of (1) trade secrets, (2) patents, 
(3) scrambling of interoperability information, and (4) lock-ins. Developers 
of Free Software may sometimes succeed in implementing a closed standard 
in a Free Software program, but the use of such a program is either impracti-
cal or legally questionable (if not straightforwardly illegal). The impact of 
closed standards on user freedoms might be overcome using reverse engi-
neering, if the interoperability information is scrambled or protected using 
trade secret. But reverse engineering is usually not a practical method, and it 
may even not be sufficient to reverse-engineer a standard if it is covered by a 
patent. The fact that patents are legal monopolies creates incentives for pat-
ent holders to direct a standard setting into adopting closed standards cov-
ered with their patents. Afterwards, they are able to control whether and 
how users exercise their freedoms when using the standard. As a non-exclu-
sive alternative to patents, designers of standards can use switching costs in 
order to lock users in to a closed standard and prevent their migration to 
open standards. Sometimes, it might be possible to open a closed standard 
using the essential facilities doctrine, but the doctrine has material limita-
tions.
Closed standards lead in particular to restrictions on maintenance of 
software. They make it illegal or impractical for individual users to maintain 
Free Software, as far as interoperability is concerned. Communities experi-
ence the burden of closed standards as well, but they are also able to mini-
mize it to some extent. Software communities affect closed standards indi-
rectly. Some of them may stimulate designers of standards to make their 
standards open, instead of seeking ways to capitalize on restrictions. Big and 
robust communities may even prevent wider adoption of closed standards 
and contribute to the popularity of open standards. However, it seems more 
likely that the communities have neutral effect on closed standards. Most 
communities can at best succeed in enabling users to use open standards in 
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their projects, but cannot prevent the use of closed standards in other soft-
ware.
eGovernments are capable of affecting closed standards both to a benefit 
of user freedoms, as well as to a detriment of user freedoms. If a Closed 
eGovernment is introduced, the government helps the designer of the given 
closed standard to establish and maintain a lock-in both on the government 
and on the users of government services. Given the likely spill-over effect of 
the Closed eGovernment on other software, this stimulation can prevent 
open standards from being designed or becoming popular. However, the 
government might attempt to use a closed standard and not restrict user 
freedoms at the same time. This can be done through a Semi-Closed eGov-
ernment, which is based on a facility that provides translation from the 
closed standard to an open standard at the point where interconnection with 
users takes place. Nevertheless, Semi-Closed eGovernments do not remove 
all restrictions related to closed standards, and they are not easy to introduce 
in practice.
Open eGovernments make the restrictions related to closed standards 
not applicable to users of government services. Such eGovernments do not 
remove the closed standards from the framework, but under certain circum-
stances they may prevent such standards from becoming popular. The gov-
ernment may even participate in SSOs and stimulate them not to design 
closed standards. This, however, requires diligence, since such a participa-
tion might create additional incentives to corrupt the procedure and direct it 
to the design of closed standards. Even Supra-Open eGovernments do not 
remove closed standards from the framework.
For an adequate protection of user freedoms closed standards have to be 
substituted with open standards. Open standards allow to exercise the free-
doms and provide means for interoperability at the same time. Only prop-
erly organized standard setting performed by SSOs can lead to open stan-
dards (as summarized above, reverse engineering and the essential facilities 
doctrine are not sufficiently effective). In order to design an open standard, 
SSOs have to (1) follow an open decision-making procedure, (2) scrutinize 
standards in search of any related restrictions, and (3) eliminate the restric-
tions. It follows that the SSOs should follow properly drafted policies. But 
even most diligent SSOs are usually unable to enforce their policies against 
third parties, not to mention problems in enforcing the policies against the 
participants of an SSO. Unless the SSOs succeed in designing open standards 
and unless such standards become popular, user freedoms are restricted.
(2) Possible improvements to address closed standards
The current framework contains rules that result in the design of open stan-
dards and that increase their popularity. But given the opposite rules that 
lead to closed standards, we find it necessary to propose improvements that 
would promote open standards better. Since we found that an open standard 
setting is the most promising mechanism for the design of open standards 
the improvements should be mostly directed at SSOs. SSOs that design open 
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standards should be promoted. The improvements should guarantee that 
SSOs adopt proper internal regulations (policies) and such regulations 
should be observed by the participants. This implies exploring measures 
that make the regulations more effective. In particular, third parties should 
be prevented from making a closed standard out of a standard designed by 
an SSO under the proper regulations. Given the fact that the regulations of 
SSOs usually do not bind third parties, additional improvements should be 
provided for, which are able to affect third parties.
However, it is not easy to propose improvements capable of reaching the 
above goals directly, that would be practicable at the same time. First, many 
entrepreneurs participate in the SSOs precisely because of the expected roy-
alties from patents material to standards. It would probably not suffice to 
remove such an incentive in order to make SSOs design only open standards. 
So, any proposed improvements should provide for an alternative incentive, 
which would still be compatible with open standards. Second, SSOs cannot 
afford regulating the conduct of the participants too far because this could 
lead to a cartel, or trigger competition regulations in another way. So, any 
improvements should not increase this risk, while at the same time effec-
tively bind the participants. These are often mutually exclusive goals. Third, 
non-participants could be affected if only extreme measures were imple-
mented. Such extreme measures would encompass (1) amending patent 
laws with exceptions from the patentable-subject matter in relation to stan-
dards, (2) extending of the essential facilities doctrine, and (3) prohibiting 
using trade secrets or scrambling of interoperability information. We are not 
convinced that even these extreme measures would reach the goal of pro-
moting open standards, not to mention that many of them would require 
reformulation of whole legal systems.
Although we do not abandon direct measures completely, we find it 
advisable to explore indirect measures as well. We find that there are many 
improvements that could be provided for by the government during the 
introduction of an Open eGovernment, which would not trigger the dilem-
mas related to direct measures. Namely, when discussing Open eGovern-
ments in Chapter 5 we noted that if the government uses an open standard it 
may stimulate designers of standards, in particular SSOs, to make open stan-
dards rather than closed standards. In other words, government demand can 
create incentives that could substitute the incentive related to enforcing pat-
ents material to standards. This can increase the popularity of open stan-
dards especially if the open standard chosen by the government can be used 
in other types of communications as well. At the same time, given the fact 
that open standards can be implemented by everyone, such a stimulation 
should not affect anyone negatively. It follows that we should propose 
improvements in the framework that lead to introduction of Open eGovern-
ments. If there is a Closed eGovernment already present, the improvements 
should lead to a swift transformation into an Open eGovernment.
Given the already existing rules that lead to open standards, which are 
promoted by software communities, our improvements should not prevent 
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the communities from operation. If possible, the government should prop-
erly introduce a Supra-Open eGovernment, in which it would cooperate 
with the communities in promoting open standards. This means that we 
should propose regulation of eGovernments that provides for the introduc-
tion of such eGovernments. Obviously, the improvements should explicitly 
prevent the introduction of Closed eGovernments, since such eGovernments 
directly contribute to lock-ins to closed standards.
6.1.9 Regulatory environment
(1) Inefficiencies resulting from the regulatory environment
Every jurisdiction follows its own law. As a result, user freedoms may vary 
throughout jurisdictions. More precisely, we can expect different impact on 
user freedoms of the identified limitations and restrictions under different 
national laws. As noted earlier, we are not aware of any law that would make 
Free Software licensing impossible at all, but the laws can result in a differ-
ent scope of the rights and obligations of various actors and the audience in 
the software scene. This does not make the exercise of the freedoms impos-
sible, but it increases their costs. In particular, it results in a decrease of the 
number of prospective maintainers of Free Software that would like to 
undertake maintenance involving interstate issues. In other words, differ-
ences between national laws serve as resistors of the worldwide flow of Free 
Software.295
Software communities operate in such a situation. They often include 
participants from all over the world. Such a multinational membership may 
even lead to an increase of the complexity of the legal issues as compared to 
a situation when users attempt to exercise the freedoms individually. Indeed, 
the communities as such do not affect the differences between national laws 
and have to take them into account as any other actor in the software scene 
operating worldwide. But at the same time the communities have developed 
customs and trade practices that are often followed by many actors regard-
less of what the applicable national law has to say.
eGovernments are usually introduced nationwide, not worldwide. So, 
the governments rarely have to take into account more than one national 
law. This, however, may be the case if a particular piece of software is subject 
to another law pursuant to a choice of law clause. But the major impact of 
the regulatory environment on eGovernments usually means only that a 
particular government has to adjust its eGovernment strategy to its own 
national law. It means that an eGovernment scheme designed for a particu-
lar jurisdiction might not work properly in another jurisdiction.
295 See: Eben Moglen, Anarchism Triumphant: Free Software and the Death of Copyright, at: 
http://emoglen.law.columbia.edu/my_pubs/anarchism.html (proposing “Moglen’s 
Metaphorical Corollary to Faraday’s Law”: “Wrap the Internet around every brain on the 
planet and spin the planet. Software fl ows in the wires. It’s an emergent property of 
human minds to create.”)
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(2) Possible improvements to address the regulatory environment
We find it necessary to propose improvements that would remove the nega-
tive impact that the differences between national laws have on the freedoms. 
This requires a harmonization of the regulatory environment. If under a par-
ticular national law there is a provision that restricts user freedoms, the 
improved framework should result in such a provision being removed or 
amended. In this thesis it is not possible to identify all such provisions in 
every national law that could apply. In the course of our analysis we identi-
fied some examples, and we will return to them when selecting improve-
ments in the next section. We also found that exercise of the freedoms is not 
materially affected by the differences between national laws in properly 
organized software communities. As already noted, it seems that much of 
collaboration within communities is regulated either by  internal regulations 
(by-laws) or by customs and trade practices, and there is no need to resort to 
external legal rules. Even in case of a disagreement between participants 
there is rarely a need to adjudicate, given the right to fork and the fact that dis-
sidents from a community can establish their own, competing community. 
The differences between these laws will become important if communities 
fail to regulate their participants using by-laws, customs, and trade practices 
only.
It follows that apart from proposing improvements that would remove 
the most extreme restrictions of the freedoms from particular national laws, 
we should explore improvements that would support the communities in 
maintaining their projects without resorting to adjudication under national 
laws too often. At the same time, when a Free-Software-related dispute is 
brought to court eventually, the court should be required to take into 
account the custom and trade practices of the communities, so that different 
national laws could be applied in a harmonized manner in relation to user 
freedoms.
6.1.10 Evaluation of the inefficiencies of the current framework
Under the current framework, user freedoms are not adequately protected 
for four reasons. First, there are limitations and restrictions present in the 
framework itself. Second, these limitations and restrictions are not removed 
from the framework by software communities, although properly organized 
communities are able to avoid or at least minimize many of them. Third, 
some of the limitations and restrictions are reinforced by Closed eGovern-
ments. Fourth, Open eGovernments are not capable of removing all limita-
tions and restrictions, unless the governments employ not only the domini-
um, but also the imperium or the legislative and the judiciary branches.
The following limitations and restrictions are the least affected: (1) soft-
ware-related patents, (2) closed standards, and (3) the regulatory environ-
ment. However, the proposal of the improved framework should contain 
improvements related to all identified inefficiencies. So, we proceed to 
design appropriate improvements to remedy all identified inefficiencies.
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6.2 Appropriate improvements in the framework
In this section we design in detail appropriate improvements that address 
the inefficiencies discussed in the previous section. We group the improve-
ments into the following six classes: (1) proper organization of communities, 
(2) regulation of eGovernments, (3) Free Software legislation, (4) restriction 
of software-related patents, (5) promotion of open standards, and (6) inter-
nationalization of the framework.
6.2.1 Proper organization of communities
Proper organization of communities is necessary for the adequate protection 
of the freedoms. It is in particular necessary to overcome such inefficiencies 
of the current framework as license proliferation and incompatibilities, 
license revocability, inter partes nature of licenses, contracts with distributors, 
liability rules, as well as the non-legal regulators. Proper organization of 
communities encompasses adoption of licensing policies that should be 
strictly followed when performing the legal audit of all programs included 
in community projects. Given the fact that many prominent communities 
have already elaborated such policies and published them, we propose that 
other communities study these policies and build upon them. As a result, 
each community should adopt their own tailored policies. The policies 
would regulate requirements for any contributions accepted to the project, 
both in terms of acceptable licenses, as well as in terms of the procedure for 
clearing copyrights required from participants in the community.296
All communities operate in a changing legal environment. So, the com-
munities should elaborate a method for amending their policies if there is 
such a need. Also, the policies should allow the legal audit to be performed 
in a continuous manner, not as a one-time activity. In case the policies are 
amended, appropriate procedures should be in place to verify decisions 
undertaken on the basis of the previous policies. A good quality policy 
would allow the community at any given moment of time to identify to 
whom the copyrights to a particular contribution belong, and to confirm 
whether the community is in compliance with all applicable obligations. In 
particular, the policy should allow the community to avoid any incompati-
bilities between licenses.
Communities should also make sure that the policies are followed in 
practice. Namely, only contributions that meet the specified criteria should 
be accepted by project owners to the official version. To this end, project 
owners should follow best community practices such as documenting the 
legal audit, communicating their decisions to the public, providing reason-
ing and review of decisions. It should be considered whether to make these 
296 See: Software Freedom Law Center, A Legal Issues Primer for Open Source and Free Software 
Projects, at: http://www.softwarefreedom.org/resources/2008/foss-primer.html.
Towards_an_Improved_def.indd   193 23-02-2010   10:49:35
194 Chapter 6
the legal obligations of project owners, for the performance of which they 
could be responsible and accountable.297 Definitely, these obligations should 
be mirrored with certain legal rights of project owners against community 
participants, if the prestige of being allowed to contribute to the official ver-
sion is not sufficient to stimulate the participants to follow the lead of project 
owners. Regulation of rights and obligations of project owners can be pro-
vided for by incorporation of umbrella organizations, with sufficiently elab-
orate by-laws. The by-laws should in particular regulate the election of proj-
ect owners,298 their term of office, control over them, and their rights and 
obligations.299
297 Customs and trade practices already existing in the communities should be taken under 
consideration. If a community is capable of properly organizing itself without resorting 
to legal rules, legal regulation might not be necessary at all. See: Karl Fogel, Producing 
Open Source Software. How to Run a Successful Free Software Project, at: http://producin-
goss.com/. See also: Lucie Guibault, Ot van Daalen, Unraveling the Myth around 
Open Source Licenses. An Analysis from A Dutch and European Law Perspective 
(TMC Asser Press 2006) 27.
298 By-laws of umbrella organizations should codify already existing methods of acquiring 
project ownership. Raymond (2000) enumerates three of them: (1) founding a project, (2) 
“passing the baton”, and (3) claiming ownership of a project (Eric S. Raymond, Home-
steading the Noosphere, at: http://www.catb.org/~esr/writings/cathedral-bazaar/home-
steading/). First, founding a project may be done by writing a program from scratch by 
one hacker or one fi rm alone. The most prominent example is probably the Linux kernel. 
Sometimes, the program is prepared by a group of individuals or fi rms who should then 
be jointly considered as project founders. For example, the Apache WWW Server, alt-
hough the basis for that project was the httpd server prepared initially by an academia 
and released as public domain later on. Actually, there are even cases when Free Software 
projects were founded by fi rms that previously developed them as proprietary software. 
For example, Netscape (released as Mozilla), OpenOffice. Second, “passing the baton” 
means transferring of project ownership to an individual or a group appointed by a pre-
vious owner. Third, according to Raymond, claiming ownership occurs in situations 
when the previous owners abandon the project without transferring the ownership to 
anyone. This may be a result of the owners losing interest in exercising their “right recog-
nized by the community” and abandoning the project. Examples of the second and third 
method can be often found within Debian, where various packages often change their 
maintainers. See also: Andrew M. St. Laurent, Understanding Open Source and Free 
Software Licensing (O’Reilly 2004) 174.
299 According to Raymond (2000), the social status of a particular community participant 
depends on the value of contributions (See: Eric S. Raymond, Homesteading the Noosphere, 
at: http://www.catb.org/~esr/writings/cathedral-bazaar/homesteading/). It is often 
the case that the most valuable contributors have the most to say about the development. 
By-laws should regulate such a meritocracy, not substitute it. Also, various authors, such 
as Levy (1985), suggest that there exists a hacker ethic, consisting of norms such as “all 
information should be free”. (Steven Levy, Hackers: Heroes of the Computer Revolu-
tion, (New York, Dell, 1985). See also: Eric S. Raymond, A Brief History of Hackerdom, at: 
http://www.catb.org/~esr/writings/cathedral-bazaar/hacker-history/index.html; Eric 
S. Raymond, How to Become a Hacker, at: http://www.catb.org/~esr/writings/faqs/
hacker-howto.html). See FN 217; some communities use ethics as a criterion of granting 
recognition to project owners. Communities should adopt by-laws of their umbrella 
organizations in line with the ethics of community participants.
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Apart from taking care of license proliferation and incompatibilities, 
communities should include in their policies regulations that stimulate licen-
sors not to revoke their licenses. For example, communities could require 
from some or all contributors to provide additional pledges not to revoke the 
licenses. Also, copyright assignments to umbrella organizations could be 
used more often to concentrate copyrights to the project in one entity.300 It is 
crucial, however, that such an organization is at the same time legally bound 
to continue making the project available for the community as Free Software. 
Otherwise, such a concentration might pose a threat to user freedoms. So, 
the by-laws of umbrella organizations should explicitly regulate the exercise 
of copyrights to the project held by the organization and the rules for trans-
ferring them from community participants to the organization. For example, 
the by-laws could bind the organization not to revoke the license or other-
wise guarantee that the organization will not misuse the copyrights.
A good licensing policy and institutionalization, such as by incorporating 
an umbrella organization with sufficiently elaborate by-laws, are necessary 
conditions of a properly organized software community. But they are not suf-
ficient, and the remaining necessary conditions are non-legal. Namely, appro-
priate management structure, communication channels, infrastructure for the 
project, etc., should be adopted. Each community should adopt these mea-
sures on the basis of their specific needs, while taking into account the teach-
ings of management studies (in particular project management) and the tech-
nology currently available.301 Actually, these non-legal arrangements may 
prove more efficient in resolving many inefficiencies of the current frame-
work than any legal arrangements. In particular, a community can be prop-
erly organized without a formal incorporation of an umbrella organization.
But discussing the non-legal issues further is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. In this thesis we focus on legal issues, and we analyse non-legal issues 
only to the extent that it allows us to identify the practical impact that legal 
rules may have on the freedoms under various circumstances. We should 
only remind that while designing a community’s structure, participants 
should make it an efficient source of properly working Free Software pro-
grams. The organization of the community should stimulate the community 
copyleft mechanism. It should also promote competitiveness in the Free Soft-
ware market by effectively covering integration costs, by stimulating dis-
300 See: Bruce Byfi eld, FSFE’s Fiduciary License Agreement is no panacea, at: http://www.linux.
com/feature/60129. See the Fiduciary License Agreement itself at: http://www.fsfeu-
rope.org/projects/ftf/FLA.en.pdf.
301 See e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, Why Law, Economics, and Organization?, at: http://papers.
ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=255624; Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Govern-
ance, at: http://www.aeaweb.org/annual_mtg_papers/2005/0107_1645_0101.pdf;  Oliv-
er E. Williamson, The Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure: From Choice to Contract, 3 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 171 (Summer 2002). See also: Giampaolo Garzarelli, 
Open Source Software and the Economics of Organization, at: http://ideas.repec.org/p/
wpa/wuwpio/0304003.html.
Towards_an_Improved_def.indd   195 23-02-2010   10:49:36
196 Chapter 6
tributors not to impose restrictive contract on users, by allowing the warran-
ties and services market to operate, as well as by minimizing the likelihood 
of restricting the freedoms using the architecture.
Here, we may conclude that we end up with the proposal of three 
improvements that lead to proper organization of software communities.
(1) The communities should continue to elaborate good licensing poli-
cies.
(2) The communities should continue to follow the policies, for exam-
ple by incorporating umbrella organizations that regulate the exer-
cise of project ownership accordingly.
(3) The communities should organize themselves according to the 
teachings of management studies.
These improvements should be provided for within all communities. We 
remark that many communities have already introduced these improve-
ments. As far as such communities are concerned we propose that they keep 
up the good work, while other communities follow their example.
6.2.2 Regulation of eGovernments
For the adequate protection of user freedoms, the introduction of eGovern-
ments should be regulated. Most importantly, governments should be pro-
hibited from introducing Closed eGovernments. To that end, an explicit obli-
gation of governments not to use closed standards should be provided for in 
the law.302 If a Closed eGovernment is already operating, governments 
should be mandated to transform it to an Open eGovernment as soon as 
possible. It should be made possible to perform this transformation by intro-
ducing a Semi-Closed eGovernment. Namely, whenever a closed standard is 
already used in government communications, or if it is allowed as a narrow 
exception, governments should be obliged to provide for a translation facil-
ity. This boils down to using an open standard substitute with any closed 
standard used in eGovernment. Only in such a way, the governments could 
minimize the spill-over effects resulting from Closed eGovernments.
Apart from the above described specific legal obligations, more general, 
though still legally binding, guidelines for introducing Supra-Open eGov-
ernments should be provided for. Generally, such an extreme Open eGov-
ernment does not have to be mandated,303 but if the government decides to 
302 It could be coupled with narrow exceptions, subject to obligations such as the “comply or 
explain and commit” obligation. For an explanation of this obligation see: EZ, at:  http://
www.ez.nl/Onderwerpen/Betrouwbare_telecom/Open_Standaarden_en_Open_Source_
Software/Ontwerptekst_instructie_Comply_or_explain_commit (in Dutch).
303 It is advisable to mandate the introduction of Supra-Open eGovernments only if it is 
proven that the limitations and restrictions of user freedoms cannot be effectively 
removed using the other improvements that we propose in this chapter.
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introduce it, it should be performed diligently. Otherwise, it could affect user 
freedoms negatively. Most importantly, if governments acquire rights to soft-
ware, they should be required to make sure the rights allow for its unencum-
bered development, distribution, and use. Regulation of eGovernments 
should also cover the performance of the legal audit of licenses by the gov-
ernment. Here, the guidelines can build upon already existing community 
policies. The government may even collaborate in their drafting with com-
munities active in a given jurisdiction. Government audit of licenses should 
be transparent, and its results should be made available publicly. Addition-
ally, the guidelines should regulate Free Software licensing performed by the 
government itself. In particular, the government should be obliged to coor-
dinate any license drafting with already existing community efforts, in order 
to prevent further proliferation and incompatibilities of licenses. The guide-
lines should also oblige the government to procure Free Software under a 
more popular and compatible license if there are two equivalent programs 
available.
Moreover, guidelines for eGovernments should cover government par-
ticipation in Free Software development, if the government engages in such 
a participation. In order to promote proper organization of communities, the 
government should adhere to such communities that are found to be most 
properly organized already, or to such communities that promise to organize 
themselves properly, in particular by showing commitment to follow good 
licensing policies. So, the government should elaborate criteria for assess-
ment of existing Free Software projects, perform a survey of them, and iden-
tify projects maintained by properly organized communities. The criteria 
should include both legal issues, as well as issues related to project manage-
ment and the quality of software. Thereafter, the government should exam-
ine how it is possible to participate in the identified communities. The gov-
ernments could also support the community copyleft mechanism. For that 
purpose, the guidelines should lay down procedures for governments to be 
followed when contributing to community projects.
Furthermore, governments should be obliged to scrutinize contracts 
with distributors who deliver software to the government. The governments 
should not be allowed to accept restrictions of user freedoms included in 
such contracts, if they are not coupled with prevalent benefits. In any case, 
governments should not accept restrictions which have a spill-over effect on 
other users. The government should require in particular that the software 
delivered is free of any architectural restrictions on user freedoms. For an 
effective removal of the restrictions the government should be allowed to 
collaborate with the communities in the development and distribution of 
Free Software. The collaboration may encompass the creation of substitutes 
to services or devices that restrict the freedoms. Additionally, governments 
should stimulate the market for warranties and additional services related to 
Free Software by requiring that Free Software delivered to the government is 
accompanied with such benefits.
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Here, we may conclude that we end up with the proposal of two improve-
ments that lead to the introduction of Open eGovernments.
(1) Governments should be legally prohibited from introducing Closed 
eGovernments. A swift transformation from existing Closed eGov-
ernments to Open eGovernments should be provided for.
(2) If the government decides to introduce a Supra-Open eGovern-
ment, guidelines should be provided in order to perform this dili-
gently, so that user freedoms are not affected negatively.
The first improvement can be performed by the legislative (both in the terms 
of providing or clarifying the obligation to use open standards in the appli-
cable law, as well as in the terms of legislating effective measures for the 
performance and enforcement of such an obligation). The second improve-
ment requires that the government diligently exercises the dominium and the 
imperium  powers, although it is also possible that such guidelines are pro-
vided for in the legislative.
6.2.3 Free Software legislation
Many inefficiencies of the current framework, such as license proliferation 
and incompatibilities, license revocability, and the inter partes nature of 
licenses can be addressed by the legislative. Precisely speaking, we propose 
to amend the law if the other improvements that we propose in this chapter 
fail to remove these limitations and restrictions. Then, the copyright law, 
contract law, or corporate law could provide for various default terms relat-
ed to Free Software. For example, if a copyright holder published a program 
under certain circumstances, users would be allowed to exercise their free-
doms as a matter of law. Terms of use provided for in the legislation should 
be compliant with the FSD and mirror one or some of the most popular mod-
el licenses. This could contribute to a decrease of the number of licenses and 
to an increase of their compatibility. The consequences of the applicability of 
such a law could be made irrevocable, or the law could allow the copyright 
holder to claim back the default copyright protection only under specific 
narrow exceptions. This would affect license revocability.
Also, the freedoms could be turned into erga omnes rights as a result of 
the legislation, which would affect its current inter partes nature. How to do 
it exactly depends on the current status of the applicable law. In any case, 
adequate protection of user freedoms requires enhancement of the enforce-
ability of copyleft clauses. Generally, if the applicable law does not provide 
adequate standing for licensors and users in copyleft enforcement cases, it 
should be amended to provide for such a standing explicitly. The law should 
not require that all licensors stand in order to enforce copyleft, and it should 
be allowed for a user to pursue such a case without having to rely on licen-
sors. Users, being the intended beneficiaries of copyleft, should be allowed to 
invoke the same legal claims as licensors (copyright holders). Additionally, 
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if the applicable law does not contain such a provision, remedies for copyleft 
infringement should explicitly include specific performance, that is the per-
formance of copyleft obligations.
Moreover, if in a particular jurisdiction private enforcement of copyleft by 
licensors or users would constitute too much of a burden, other measures 
should be explored. For example, it should be made clear that copyleft 
infringement can be treated as a breach of copyright, which in many jurisdic-
tions leads to criminal liability.304 This would allow for a more effective copy-
left enforcement. However, in order to maintain balance and not impose free-
doms on users who do not want them at all, copyleft should not be enforced 
ex officio, but only upon a motion of an interested party (a licensor or a user). 
In other words, either a licensor or a user should be required to initiate any 
copyleft enforcement procedures. The law should also not interfere, if the par-
ties reach a settlement compatible with user freedoms.
Here, we may conclude that we end up with the proposal of two 
improvements that address inefficiencies such as license proliferation and 
incompatibilities, license revocability, and the inter partes nature of the 
licenses.
(1) The law should be amended with provisions related specifi cally to 
Free Software (such as the ones discussed in this subsection).
(2) Such a law should be enforced by the government using its imperium,
as well as the judiciary branch.
We propose to implement both these improvements only if the other 
improvements proposed in this thesis fail to remove the respective ineffi-
ciencies of the current framework.
6.2.4 Restriction of software-related patents
Adequate protection of user freedoms requires that software-related patents 
cannot be used to restrict them. There are patent laws that exclude computer 
programs from the patentable subject matter in one way or another. The EPC 
and Polish law are important examples. Also, many stakeholders, not only 
Free Software advocates, often propose that such provisions are provided 
for or expanded to make it clear that software-related patents cannot be 
granted. So, these provisions, where they exist, should be strictly followed. 
All drafters of amendments to patent law should seriously consider limiting 
304 See, e.g., Polish Copyright Act Art. 116, which criminalizes unauthorized distribution of 
verbatim or modifi ed copies of copyrighted works. A qualifi ed type of this crime is pros-
ecuted ex offi cio, while generally its prosecution requires a motion of the copyright holder 
(or a collecting society). Distribution of a Free Software program in breach of its license 
(such as in breach of copyleft clause) constitutes unauthorized distribution within the 
meaning of this provision (especially given the automatic termination in case of a breach 
provided for in many Free Software licenses).
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the patentable subject matter by finding a proper balance between the inter-
ests of all stakeholders, including the developers, distributors, and users of 
Free Software.
Apart from observing or providing for the provisions such as above, the 
quality of patents should be improved. It should be made more easy to 
oppose a patent application and to invalidate already granted patents on the 
grounds that the patentability criteria are not met.305 Also, patent offices 
should be equipped with sufficient resources to be able to scrutinize incom-
ing applications diligently. Patent laws that allow to grant patents without 
performing any scrutiny of claimed inventions, or which allow that only a 
minimal scrutiny is performed, should not stand. Obviously, many patent 
offices will not be able to perform a thorough scrutiny of all applications, 
which are being filed in an increasing number. So, the offices should be 
encouraged to collaborate with each other to exchange patent information 
and expertise. The collaboration should be expanded to allow involvement 
of experts from other patent offices (or maybe even from the general public) 
in the review of applications and in submitting prior art. In particular, patent 
offices should closely observe community efforts related to patents and sup-
port them where possible.306 As a result of gathering and combining patent-
related information from various sources, examiners would be able to scruti-
nize applications more diligently.
We indicate that patent holders themselves are most fit for identifying 
that their patents are infringed. So, it is advisable to introduce a legal obliga-
tion for patent holders to notify their patents to alleged infringers, if they 
want to be allowed to enforce these patents. In other words, enforceability of 
a patent should be conditioned upon such a notification. For this purpose, a 
special repository of software should be established.307 Projects submitted to 
such a repository would benefit from the following safe harbour regulation. 
Within a certain period after a project (or its improvement) is submitted, 
every patent holder would be required to notify any infringement alleged in 
relation to the project.308 After notification, the project would be given an 
additional grace period for developing a workaround or to remove the pat-
ented technology completely. If the infringement is not notified, or if the 
workaround is not objected by the patent holder, there should be a statute of 
limitations on the enforceability of the patents in question against every 
305 WIPO (Standing Committee on the Law of Patents), Report on the International Patent Sys-
tem, (3 February 2009, SCP/12/3 Rev. 2), p. 56-57.
306 WIPO (Standing Committee on the Law of Patents), Report on the International Patent Sys-
tem, (3 February 2009, SCP/12/3 Rev. 2), p. 54.
307 This repository does not have to be restricted to Free Software only.
308 Holders of newly granted patents could be given longer time in order to scrutinize all 
projects present in the repository to date. At the same time applicants for new patents 
should be obliged to perform an analysis of the repository before submitting an applica-
tion and indicating how their claimed invention differs from the programs found in the 
repository in order to allow for more effective review of the applications. Such a reposi-
tory would constitute an important source of prior art.
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developer, distributor, or user of the project.309 Namely, the patent holder (1) 
would not be allowed to obtain an injunction against them, or (2) would not 
be allowed to claim any royalties or damages, or (3) both.310
Within such a safe harbour, conciliation or arbitration procedures should 
be performed in case the proposed workaround is not found satisfactory for 
patent holders, or if someone questions the applicability of the notified pat-
ent towards a particular project. In case the parties find it helpful, negotia-
tions should be supported by a mediation in order to allow them to agree on 
a patent license which would be satisfactory from the point of view of user 
freedoms. Thereafter, the licensed patent should be included in a patent pool 
available for any interested party who would like to use it in relation to Free 
Software. For that purpose, model patent licenses should be elaborated.311 It 
should be discussed whether such licenses could provide for patent royal-
ties. Indeed, it may be the case that not all royalties are incompatible with 
user freedoms. For example, a capped sum depending on revenues might 
allow to exercise user freedoms without major problems.312
Here, the question arises, how to provide for such a safe harbour in prac-
tice? In order to be effective, the safe harbour should be based on a firm legal 
basis. In order to affect patents worldwide, the legislatives of all jurisdictions 
should act together. Definitely, such a worldwide patent law reform will not 
be an easy task.313 But it may suffice for some major jurisdictions to perform 
309 This proposal is similar to the already existing “notice and take-down” regulations, exist-
ing under the DMCA Sec. 512, the E-Commerce Directive, and in the Directive’s national 
implementations. Instead of a statute of limitations, a license of right could be provided 
for.
310 Similar limitation of rights of patent holders has been endorsed by the IBM in their con-
tribution towards the discussion about the European Community Patent. It was devel-
oped after one of the proposals made by EPO and called “Soft IP” (See: IBM, The European 
Community Patent revisited Discussion paper from IBM, at: http://www.epip.eu/confer-
ences/epip02/lectures/European%20Interoperabily%20Patent%201.1.pdf).
311 See the GPLv3 and its patent clause.
312 See:  David Worthington, TomTom can license FAT without violating GPL, at: http://www.
sdtimes.com/blog/1364; see also: David Worthington, Experts: Microsoft’s FAT licensing 
terms might violate GPL, at:  http://www.sdtimes.com/link/33327.
313 The discretion of national legislatives to limit patents are subject to such provisions as the 
Paris Convention Art. 5A or TRIPS Arts. 30 and 31. The Paris Convention Art. 5A would 
apply if the safe harbour is found to be an abuse-prevention measure. Then, in order to 
comply with that provision, the safe harbour should result in compulsory licenses rather 
than other measures (Art. 5A.3). A compulsory licensing system effective towards all 
users of Free Software might prove problematic to implement. However, the safe harbour 
may be provided for as an exception subject to TRIPS Art. 30 or 31 (i.e., not as an abuse-
prevention measure). A statute of limitations on the enforcement of patents towards a 
specifi c repository of software does not seem to fall outside Art. 30. Also, in order to 
escape from the strict requirements of Art. 31, the safe harbour should focus on measures 
stimulating unencumbered negotiation of patent licenses, as well as facilitating worka-
rounds of patents. Only if the above fails, the use of patents should be subject to authori-
zations granted in conformity with Art. 31, possibly with the use of competition law insti-
tutes.
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it, in order for the rest to follow. For example, the current (2009) discussion 
about the European Community Patent can provide a good forum for pre-
senting the concept of the safe harbour. Namely, the safe harbour can be 
implemented at the pan-European level without affecting national patent 
systems. The Community Patent system could give patent holders a choice 
whether to pursue the Community-wide patent subject to the safe harbour, 
or to apply for national patents that would not be subject to such a regula-
tion for the time being.314
In the meantime, before the law is amended, the necessary prerequisites 
for the safe harbour can be created by the communities using private order-
ing. For that purpose, the communities should cooperate in the setting of the 
repository described above (or in the transformation of the already existing 
Free Software repositories accordingly). They should also draw the attention 
of patent offices to it, in particular to make the repository an official source of 
prior art. Additionally, the communities should attempt to gather a critical 
mass of patent holders that contribute their patents to users of software.315
Here, we may conclude that we end up with the proposal of three 
improvements of software-related patents.
(1) Patent laws should be reformed to limit the scope of patentability 
of software or to provide that already existing exclusions of soft-
ware from the patentable subject matter are strictly followed.
(2) Regardless of the reform, patent quality should be improved.
(3) A safe harbour should be established by appropriate legislation in 
order not to allow enforcement of patents against user freedoms.
These improvements can be implemented by the legislative, but involvement 
of the government using its imperium and dominium powers would most 
probably be necessary as well. The communities should become involved 
too.
6.2.5 Promotion of open standards
Adequate protection of user freedoms requires that open standards are pro-
moted. This implies improvements directed at SSOs. Most importantly, SSOs 
314 It has been proposed to implement the IBM’s proposal in much the same way. (See: IBM, 
The European Community Patent revisited Discussion paper from IBM, at: http://www.epip.
eu/conferences/epip02/lectures/European%20Interoperabily%20Patent%201.1.pdf)
315 Patent holders who gather so-called “defensive patent portfolios” should be interested in 
creating defensive patent pools together with other such patent holders. At the same 
time, patent holders who use their patents offensively might be interested in the existence 
of a repository where a big number of potential targets of their claims could be easily 
located. But even if it would make it easier for them to pursue alleged infringements, the 
information about prior art and the support of all participants in the repository might 
also make it easier for alleged infringers to defend themselves effectively.
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should make sure that the standard setting procedure is open to all interest-
ed parties. They should also amend their internal regulations to provide for 
an explicit obligation of participants not to restrict standards. This prohibi-
tion should refer to trade secrets, scrambling of interoperability information, 
and lock-ins, but most importantly it should cover patents. For that purpose, 
SSOs should diligently define what patents they consider to be material to 
standards. Participants should be obliged to notify any such patents (and 
pending applications). SSOs should also require that the participants offer 
patent licenses compatible with the freedoms. If an SSO fails to develop an 
open standard despite the above improvements, this fact should be commu-
nicated to the public in order to make everyone aware that the standard is 
closed.
SSOs that strictly adhere to the above recommendations might not be 
attractive for all market players. Also, SSOs cannot easily bind third parties, 
who do not agree to follow the internal rules of SSOs. For these reasons, a 
safe harbour for standards should be provided for by the legislative, in a 
similar manner as discussed above in relation to software-related patents. 
Namely, patent holders should be obliged to review standards of selected 
SSOs (or a repository of standards could be organized). They should be 
required to notify any patents they find material to standards being designed 
within certain deadline. Without such a notification or after the deadline 
passes, enforcement of these patents should not be allowed. The safe har-
bour should also stimulate licensing of patents under terms compatible with 
the freedoms, and creation of patent pools available for any party interested 
in the exercise of the freedoms. It is additionally advisable to propose certifi-
cation of the licenses, in a similar manner to certification (scrutiny) of soft-
ware licenses performed by the OSI or the FSF. At the same time, exceptions 
from the rights of patent holders should be provided for if a patent is 
infringed in order to provide for interoperability.316
The above improvements should be carefully implemented in order not 
to remove incentives that stimulate many stakeholders to participate in a 
standard setting. As we already observed, future patent royalties are an 
incentive for some stakeholders. Although royalties might not be in conflict 
with freedoms, the conditions imposed by patent holders are. So, while pro-
viding for these improvements a substitute monetary incentive should be 
provided for and the patent royalties incentive should be removed. This can 
be performed by governments when introducing eGovernments. Most 
importantly, governments should be obliged to use multi-purpose open 
standards whenever possible. This would stimulate a wider use of open-
standards-based software without causing a risk of a lock-in to any particu-
lar vendor. It would contribute to a creation of a market for products of many 
vendors. Government demand, and the spill-over effect it has on the overall 
316 Such exceptions can be similar to the decompilation right already present in the Software 
Directive or other software copyright regulations.
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market demand, would promise vendors a return on investment, a monetary 
incentive. But it is crucial that after a given standard is chosen for eGovern-
ment, the law should limit the enforceability of patents towards anyone that 
uses the standard. Otherwise, patent holders would benefit both from gov-
ernment demand and from patents, which would have a destructive effect 
on user freedoms.
But the government can promote open standards in many other ways 
too. Governments can increase their awareness to standard setting, as well 
as their participation in it. They may require SSOs to follow procedures that 
lead to open standards. Government involvement does not have to be limit-
ed to standards used in government communications. Also, the legislative 
can extend the applicability of internal rules of SSOs to non-participating 
parties. Additionally, the government should stimulate more cooperation 
between patent offices and SSOs. They should be required to exchange infor-
mation, which could help patent offices to identify prior art, while at the 
same time it could help the SSOs to avoid designing standards encumbered 
with patents.
Here, we may conclude that we end up with the proposal of three 
improvements of the standard setting.
(1) Subject to the above reservations, SSOs should be reformed to guar-
antee that they design open standards only.
(2) A safe harbour for standards should be established, in a manner 
similar to the safe harbour for software discussed in the previous 
subsection.
(3) The government should stimulate the design and popularity of 
open standards in particular by selecting multi-purpose open stan-
dards for eGovernments and by limiting enforceability of patents 
with regard to standards used in eGovernment.
The first improvement can be provided for by the communities. The com-
munities should increase their participation in SSOs and initiate the neces-
sary reform. The first improvement can be introduced by governments 
simultaneously, since governments often participate in SSOs. Additionally, 
the governments could stimulate SSOs by using their imperium, as well as 
the legislative. The other two improvements can be performed by the legis-
lative, as well as by a diligent exercise of the imperium and dominium powers 
of the government.
6.2.6 Internationalization of the framework
For an adequate protection of user freedoms, any differences between 
national laws should not be allowed to restrict them. So, the legislatives of 
each jurisdiction should scrutinize their laws and undertake harmonization 
efforts. This can encompass including Free Software issues in the agendas of 
such supra-national organizations as the EU, WIPO, and WTO. But legisla-
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tive procedures at the national and international level are time consuming. 
In the meantime, the communities could provide for the necessary tempo-
rary improvements. Amending licenses to make them more independent of 
particular jurisdictions (such as the GPLv3 as compared to GPLv2) should 
be promoted. Also, if a particular jurisdiction is found to protect the free-
doms better than others, the licensors should be stimulated to use choice-of-
law and choice-of-forum clauses which point to such a jurisdiction. Never-
theless, license drafting and forum shopping cannot guarantee that the 
applicability of a particular national law is avoided. Many laws contain man-
datory rules and many courts can find their jurisdiction despite a choice-of-
forum clause (or if such a clause is invalidated).
So, it is advisable to explore additional measures that could deal with 
applicable laws that still contain restrictions of user freedoms. This can be 
made by treating the regulatory framework of Free Software as lex mercato-
ria.317 Lex mercatoria is usually understood as a system of rules and relations 
between the rules that is independent of any specific national law. It is 
believed to be applicable in a uniform way across jurisdictions. Such a sys-
tem is in particular capable of circumventing restrictions that follow from an 
applicable law. If a court is allowed to apply lex mercatoria, it either does not 
have to follow its national law strictly, or it may interpret the national law by 
accounting for a specific rule from the lex mercatoria.318 Indeed, nowadays 
the concept of lex mercatoria has been often used in the international trade, 
especially in disputes where none of the parties could accept the applicabili-
ty of any particular national legal system.319
Free Software licensing and project ownership as exercised within the 
communities have created a set of customs and trade practices that can be 
treated as lex mercatoria. But mere existence of such a lex mercatoria does not 
make national laws inapplicable. The courts would not apply any such rules 
instead of national legal rules, unless there is an explicit regulation that 
allows or requires them to do so. We are aware of such laws that allow courts 
to refer to equity, or allow them to account for custom, trade practices, etc. If 
a particular applicable law does not contain such provisions, it should be 
amended accordingly. In any case, courts should be given clear guidelines 
317 Wikipedia, Law Merchant, at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lex_mercatoria#The_medi-
eval_Law_Merchant. For an interesting critique of the existence of lex mercatoria in the 
medieval times see: Stephen Edward Sachs, From St. Ives to Cyberspace: The Modern Distor-
tion of the Medieval ‘Law Merchant’ 21 American University International Law Review 
685 (2006), also available at: http://ssrn.com/id=830265. For various other defi nitions of 
lex mercatoria see, e.g., Bernadetta Fuchs, Lex mercatoria w międzynarodowym obrocie 
handlowym [Lex mercatoria in international trade], 17 et.seq. (Zakamycze, 2000) 
(in Polish).
318 See: Przemysław P. Polański, Customary Law of the Internet (TMC Asser Press 2007) 
111 et seq., 347 et. seq.
319 For a far analogy in criminal court decisions see, e.g., F. O. Raimondo, General Princi-
ples of Law in the Decisions of International Criminal Court and Tribunals 
(2007, Ph.d. thesis at University of Amsterdam).
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that when deciding cases related to Free Software, due account of the lex mer-
catoria should be performed. Lex mercatoria can be more easily applied before 
arbitral tribunals. So, the communities should consider exploring arbitration 
of Free-Software-related disputes. However, there are limitations of this 
direction, since arbitration is possible if only parties agree, and usually it is 
required that arbitration clauses and agreements are executed in writing.320
Here, we may conclude that we end up with the proposal of three 
improvements of the regulatory environment.
(1) Free Software issues should be included into agendas of interna-
tional organizations that are able to stimulate harmonization of na-
tional laws.
(2) Before the international harmonization is performed, Free Software 
licenses should be amended to become more independent of par-
ticular jurisdictions in order to stimulate their uniform application.
(3) Courts should be allowed and required to look into customs and 
trade practices developed in the Free Software scene when decid-
ing on disputes related to user freedoms. Treating the regulatory 
framework as lex mercatoria could be one way of reaching this goal.
All these improvements require a cooperation between the government 
(acting through all its branches) and the communities.
6.3 Construction of a proposal of an improved framework
In this section we use the sixteen improvements proposed in the previous 
section for the construction of an improved regulatory framework of Free 
Software. Above, we grouped the improvements in the following six classes: 
(1) proper organization of the communities (three proposed improvements), 
(2) regulation of eGovernments (two proposed improvements), (3) Free Soft-
ware legislation (two proposed improvements), (4) restriction of software-
related patents (three proposed improvements), (5) promotion of open stan-
dards (three proposed improvements), and (6) internationalization of the 
framework (three proposed improvements).
Each of the classes includes two or three specific improvements, all of 
which have been explained in the previous section. Together, the proposed 
improvements address all limitations and restrictions of the freedoms (the 
inefficiencies of the current framework) discussed throughout the thesis. 
Strictly speaking, the implementation of the proposed improvements can 
affect the inefficiencies so that the impact of the inefficiencies on the rules 
that protect the freedoms is minimized, or the inefficiencies are removed 
320 New York Convention Art. II.
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completely. We speculate on the provisional impact of our proposed frame-
work in Section 7.3.
In Figure 6.1 we present the complete proposal of our improved regula-
tory framework. This framework includes all rules included in the model, 
and all relations between the rules (see Figure 3.9). It also includes all 
improvements that we proposed in this chapter.
1
11
Figure 6.1: Our improved framework as proposed in Chapter 6
For the sake of clarity, in Figure 6.1 we present only the relations between the 
improvements and the inefficiencies. We do not present all relations between 
the rules existing in the current framework that we already identified in 
Chapter 3.
6.4 Chapter summary
The model of the current framework that we reconstructed in this thesis (see 
Chapter 3) includes the default rule and many other rules. The other rules can 
be divided into two kinds. Rules of the first kind grant users their freedoms 
and attempt to protect the freedoms. They are based on the default rule, which 
gives exclusive control over programs to their copyright holders. These are: 
(1) the grant of freedoms, (2) the right to fork, (3) copyleft, and (4) the hacker immu-
nity. Rules of the second kind limit or restrict the freedoms. They cause the 
inefficiencies of the current framework. These are: (1) license proliferation 
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and incompatibilities, (2) license revocability, (3) inter partes nature of the 
licenses, (4) software-related patents, (5) contracts with distributors, (6) lia-
bility rules, (7) non-legal regulators, (8) closed standards, and (9) the regula-
tory environment.
The current framework operates in the world of software communities 
and eGovernments. Both the communities and eGovernments affect the 
framework. The communities are able to overcome or minimize many of 
the inefficiencies, but only if they are properly organized. However, even 
properly organized communities are unable to overcome all inefficiencies, 
while many of them are only avoided, not eliminated by the communi-
ties. Then, eGovernments can affect the framework in both directions and 
sometimes they are neutral towards the framework. This depends on how 
eGovernments are introduced precisely. Our analysis of the operation of the 
framework in the world of software communities and eGovernments has 
(re)established the conclusion that under the current framework user free-
doms are not sufficiently protected.
In this chapter, we discussed various improvements of the framework 
and we proposed an improved framework. The improved framework con-
sists of improvements that we selected as most appropriate. We grouped the 
improvements under the following classes: (1) proper organization of the 
communities, (2) regulation of eGovernments, (3) Free Software legislation, 
(4) restriction of software-related patents, (5) promotion of open standards, 
and (6) internationalization of the framework. The model of the current 
framework, amended with all the improvements constitutes our proposal of 
an improved framework.
So, we provide the following answer the RQ3, which was “How to 
improve the regulatory framework so that it adequately protects user freedoms, as 
articulated by Stallman, in the world of software communities and eGovern-
ments?”
In order to improve the regulatory framework so that it adequately pro-
tects user freedoms in the world of software communities and eGovern-
ments, the framework should be amended with all improvements proposed 
in this chapter in the manner discussed in detail hereto. We briefly reference 
all improvements below.
(1) Proper organization of communities. The communities should 
continue to elaborate good licensing policies. The communities 
should also continue to follow the policies, for example by incorpo-
rating umbrella organizations that regulate the exercise of project 
ownership accordingly. Additionally, the communities should or-
ganize themselves according to the teachings of management stud-
ies.
(2) Regulation of eGovernments. The law should prohibit govern-
ments to introduce Closed eGovernments. A swift transformation 
from existing Closed eGovernments to Open eGovernments should 
be provided for. If the government decides to introduce a Supra-
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Open eGovernment, guidelines should be provided in order to per-
form this diligently, so that user freedoms are not affected nega-
tively.
(3) Free Software legislation. If the other improvements proposed in 
this thesis should fail to protect the freedoms adequately, the law 
should be amended with provisions related particularly to Free 
Software (i.e., default terms of use that mirror popular Free Soft-
ware licenses, possibly irrevocable, and copyleft obligations effec-
tive erga omnes).
(4) Restriction of software-related patents. Patent laws should be re-
formed to limit the scope of patentability of software or to provide 
that already existing exclusions from the patentable subject matter 
are strictly followed. Also, patent quality should be improved. Ad-
ditionally, a safe harbour should be established by appropriate leg-
islation and community efforts in order not to allow enforcement of 
patents against user freedoms.
(5) Promotion of open standards. SSOs should be reformed to guaran-
tee that they design open standards only. Also, a safe harbour for 
standards should be established, in a manner similar to the safe 
harbour that would restrict software-related patents. Additionally, 
the government should stimulate the design and popularity of 
open standards in particular by selecting multi-purpose open stan-
dards for eGovernments and by limiting enforceability of patents 
with regard to standards used in eGovernment.
(6) Internationalization of the framework. Free Software issues 
should be included into agendas of international organizations that 
are able to stimulate harmonization of national laws. Before the 
harmonization is performed, licenses should continue to be amend-
ed to become more independent of particular jurisdictions, in order 
to stimulate their uniform application. Also, courts should be al-
lowed and required to look into customs and trade practices devel-
oped in the Free Software scene when deciding disputes related to 
user freedoms. Treating the regulatory framework as lex mercatoria 
could be one way of reaching this goal.
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7 Conclusions and further research
In this chapter we complete our research by answering the Research Ques-
tions (in Section 7.1) and the Problem Statements (in Section 7.2). In Section 
7.3 we speculate on the provisional impact of our proposed framework. We 
also identify issues for further research (in Section 7.4).
7.1 Answers to research questions
In this thesis we formulated three Research Questions. In the course of our 
analysis, we answered all RQs. The answers were presented in Chapters 4, 5, 
and 6, respectively. The answers were formulated at the end of each chapter 
as a summary of more detailed findings presented throughout the analysis. 
In the thesis we also presented many intermediate conclusions that should 
be read together with the answers and findings. Below, we highlight the 
essence of the answers in the summary form. For details, we refer the reader 
to the extended answers given at the end of corresponding chapters.
RQ 1: In what way do software communities affect the current regulatory 
framework concerning the protection of user freedoms, as articulated by 
Stallman?
Software communities affect the current regulatory framework concerning 
the protection of user freedoms in the following nine ways.
(1) License proliferation and incompatibilities. Properly organized 
communities are able to perform the legal audit necessary to over-
come license proliferation and incompatibilities between Free Soft-
ware licenses.
(2) License revocability. The fact that a program is properly main-
tained by a community may simply make licensors unwilling to 
revoke licenses because of the benefi ts of community maintenance.
(3) Inter partes nature of licenses. Properly organized communities 
are able to provide for the community copyleft stimulation. This min-
imizes the limitation that follows from the inter partes nature of the 
licenses.
(4) Software-related patents. Some properly organized communities 
stimulate some patent holders not to enforce their patents. Howev-
er, software-related patents remain an important threat in the world 
of software communities.
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(5) Contracts with distributors. Properly organized communities pre-
vent distributors to impose too restrictive contracts on users. Alter-
natively, such communities constitute a substitute source of soft-
ware available without contractual restrictions.
(6) Liability rules. Properly organized communities provide for an ef-
fective maintenance which leads in particular to a reduction of the 
number of defects in programs. This minimizes the negative effect 
that liability rules may have on user freedoms.
(7) Non-legal regulators. Properly organized communities perform 
quality audit or otherwise control the development of Free Soft-
ware so that the software is maintained on an ongoing basis.
(8) Closed standards. Properly organized communities may contrib-
ute to a slowdown in adoption of closed standards. Some commu-
nities may even decrease incentives for the designers to make 
closed standards.
(9) Regulatory environment.  As any other entities, communities op-
erate in a regulatory environment where many national laws have 
to be taken into consideration. But the exercise of the freedoms in 
the communities is regulated by customs and trade practices to a 
material extent.
RQ 2: In what way do eGovernments affect the current regulatory framework 
concerning the protection of user freedoms, as articulated by Stallman?
eGovernments affect the current regulatory framework concerning the pro-
tection of user freedoms in the following four ways.
(1) Closed eGovernments. Closed eGovernments affect the frame-
work negatively from the point of view of user freedoms. Precisely 
speaking, they affect the grant of freedoms, liability rules, non-legal 
regulators, and closed standards. Given the likelihood of the spill-
over effect, these rules are affected with regard to software used in 
government communications, as well as to other software.
(2) Semi-Closed eGovernments. If the government proceeds diligent-
ly, it may succeed in the introduction of a Semi-Closed eGovern-
ment. Such an eGovernment enables users to exercise user free-
doms despite the fact that closed standards are used in government 
technologies. But given its limitations it should be taken under con-
sideration only as a transitional eGovernment from a Closed eGov-
ernment to an Open eGovernment.
(3) Open eGovernments. Open eGovernments are capable of avoiding 
the negative effects on the framework that are a result of Closed 
eGovernment. Still, they do not affect most of the rules, they are 
merely neutral towards them. Open eGovernments only promote 
open standards as compared to closed standards, and they do not 
remove closed standards from the framework.
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(4) Supra-Open eGovernments. The government is capable of affect-
ing the framework to a greater extent by introducing a Supra-Open 
eGovernment. However, the exact outcome of such an eGovern-
ment depends much on how it is introduced precisely. Also, even 
Supra-Open eGovernments are not able to overcome such limita-
tions and restrictions as license revocability, inter partes nature of 
the licenses, software-related patents, liability rules, closed stan-
dards, and the regulatory environment. Affecting these limitations 
and restrictions is possible if only apart from the dominium, the gov-
ernment additionally employs the imperium or other branches (the 
legislative and the judiciary).
RQ 3: How to improve the regulatory framework so that it adequately protects 
user freedoms, as articulated by Stallman, in the world of software com-
munities and eGovernments?
The current regulatory framework should be improved by implementing 
sixteen improvements belonging to the following six classes of improve-
ments, so that the resulting new framework adequately protects user free-
doms in the world of software communities and eGovernments.
(1) Proper organization of communities. The communities should 
continue to elaborate good licensing policies. The communities 
should also continue to follow the policies, for example, by incor-
porating umbrella organizations that regulate the exercise of proj-
ect ownership accordingly.
(2) Regulation of eGovernments. The law should prohibit govern-
ments to introduce Closed eGovernments. A swift transformation 
from existing Closed eGovernments to Open eGovernments should 
be provided for.
(3) Free Software legislation. If the other improvements proposed in 
this thesis should fail to protect the freedoms adequately, the law 
should be amended with provisions related particularly to Free 
Software (i.e., default terms of use that mirror popular Free Soft-
ware licenses, possibly irrevocable, and copyleft obligations effec-
tive erga omnes).
(4) Restriction of software-related patents. Patent laws should be re-
formed to limit the scope of patentability of software. A safe har-
bour should be established in order not to allow enforcement of 
patents against user freedoms.
(5) Promotion of open standards. SSOs should be reformed to guaran-
tee that they design open standards only. Also, a safe harbour for 
standards should be established, in a manner similar to the safe 
harbour that would restrict software-related patents.
(6) Internationalization of the framework.  Free Software issues 
should be included into agendas of international organizations that 
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are able to stimulate harmonization of national laws. Before the 
harmonization is performed, licenses should continue to be amend-
ed to become more independent of particular jurisdictions, in order 
to stimulate their uniform application. Also, courts should be al-
lowed and required to look into customs and trade practices devel-
oped in the Free Software scene when deciding disputes related to 
user freedoms. Treating the regulatory framework as lex mercatoria 
could be one way of reaching this goal.
7.2 Answers to the problem statement
In this thesis we formulated a twofold Problem Statement. In order to answer 
the Problem Statement we formulated a Research Goal and three Research 
Questions. The Research Goal is to develop a new, improved regulatory 
framework that would be capable of resolving the inefficiencies in the pro-
tection of user freedoms identified by analysing the Problem Statement. In 
the previous section we presented answers to the three Research Questions 
that led us to the proposal of an improved regulatory framework. By formu-
lating the proposal of an improved framework presented in Chapter 6, we 
reached the Research Goal of the thesis. We also answered the Problem State-
ment, and we presented each part of the twofold answer in Chapters 4 and 5 
respectively. We reproduce these answers below in brief.
PS 1: What are the relations between user freedoms and software communi-
ties?
Software communities enter into relations with all nine inefficiencies (i.e., 
limitations and restrictions) that we included in the model of the current 
framework. Properly organized software communities materially minimize 
the inefficiencies, in a manner described in more detail in Chapter 4. As a 
result, such communities help users to exercise the freedoms in practice. 
However, there are three inefficiencies that remain an important threat of 
user freedoms, despite the communities. These are: (1) software-related pat-
ents, (2) closed standards, and (3) the regulatory environment.
PS 2: What are the relations between user freedoms and eGovernments?
There are three main relations between user freedoms and eGovernments.
(1) Closed eGovernments are capable of restricting user freedoms ef-
fectively, despite the protection provided for in the framework, and 
despite the positive effect on the freedoms that properly organized 
communities may have.
(2) Semi-Closed eGovernments enable users to exercise their freedoms 
despite the fact that closed standards are used by the government. 
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But their introduction requires much diligence. Still, such eGovern-
ments do not remove the limitations and restrictions to which users 
are exposed in a world without eGovernments.
(3) Open eGovernments are capable of avoiding the additional restric-
tion of user freedoms that is a result of Closed eGovernments. But 
they are mostly neutral towards the framework, although they ma-
terially affect closed standards. Only Supra-Open eGovernments 
are able to minimize all existing limitations and restrictions mate-
rially. Similarly to Semi-Closed eGovernments, the introduction of 
Supra-Open eGovernments also requires much diligence. How-
ever, any Open eGovernment is still  unable to remove all existing 
limitations and restrictions of user freedoms, unless the imperium or 
the legislative and the judiciary becomes involved.
7.3 Provisional impact of our proposed framework
Our proposed framework consists of all rules and relations existing in the 
current framework, and of the sixteen improvements that we proposed to 
implement. The implementation of the improvements can lead to two conse-
quences. First, as a result of the implementation new rules are created that 
substitute the rules that caused the inefficiencies. This means that the latter 
rules are completely removed. Second, the implementation leads to an intro-
duction of new rules that will exist in a framework together with the rules 
that lead to the inefficiencies. This means that the rules that lead to the inef-
ficiencies will not be removed completely, but they will be in a relation with 
the rules introduced as a result of the improvements. Naturally, for an ade-
quate protection of user freedoms such a relation should lead to a minimiza-
tion of the inefficiencies to the largest possible extent.
Whether the implementation of our proposed improvements leads to the 
consequences of the first or of the second kind depends on how the imple-
mentation is performed. The final effect of the improvements requires fur-
ther research, most probably empirical research. Here, we are only able to 
speculate about the provisional impact of our proposed framework. Below, 
we analyse (1) what rules could be created if the improvements are to be 
implemented, and (2) how these new rules would impact the rules existing 
in the current framework. Then, we present (3) our speculative conclusions 
on the provisional impact of our proposed framework.
7.3.1 Rules created if the improvements are implemented
In Chapter 6 we proposed sixteen improvements in the current framework 
and we grouped them in the following six classes: (1) proper organization of 
communities, (2) regulation of eGovernments, (3) Free Software legislation, 
(4) restriction of software-related patents, (5) promotion of open standards, 
and (6) internationalization of the framework. Below, we attempt to identify 
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the rules that could be created if each of the improvements is to be imple-
mented.
The proper organization of communities  class consists of the following three 
improvements: (1) elaboration of licensing policies, (2) following the poli-
cies, and (3) organization according to the teachings of management studies. 
All these improvements can be undertaken by the communities, without 
engaging the government. Communities are able to regulate their partici-
pants, not third parties. They may do so using the law, but they may also 
regulate using such non-legal regulators as the norms. If the above improve-
ments are introduced using the law, the communities will include licensing 
policies and organization in their by-laws, such as the by-laws of umbrella 
organizations. So, we may expect that the following legal rule could be cre-
ated as a result of the implementation of all three improvements included in 
the proper organization of communities.
Licensing policies.  Project owners are not allowed to accept (to the offi cial version of the 
project) contributions that do not comply with the project’s licensing policy.
We remark that the above rule has already been introduced in communities 
that have elaborated licensing policies and organized themselves accord-
ingly. We also remark that there may be other rules (legal rules or norms) 
that could result out of proper organization of communities. Given the fact 
that these rules depend on particular communities, it is not possible to iden-
tify them here. Determination of these rules calls for further research on com-
munities and their organization.
The regulation of eGovernments  class consists of the following two 
improvements: (1) a legal prohibition to introduce Closed eGovernments, 
and (2) an obligation to diligently introduce a Supra-Open eGovernment. 
The first improvement can be performed by the legislative. The second 
improvement requires that the government diligently exercises the dominium 
and the imperium  powers, although it is also possible that such guidelines 
are provided for in the legislative. Both these improvements boil down to 
imposing certain legal obligations on governments (public administrations). 
So, we may expect that the following two legal rules could be created as a 
result of the implementation of the improvements included in the regulation 
of eGovernments.
Prohibition of Closed eGovernments. The government is not allowed to use closed stan-
dards and is obliged to use open standards.
Guidelines for Supra-Open eGovernments. If a decision to introduce a Supra-Open 
eGovernment is made, it should not cause or support ineffi ciencies in the protection of 
user freedoms.
The Free Software legislation  class consists of the following two improvements: 
(1) amending the law with provisions related specifically to Free Software, 
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and (2) enforcing such a law. We remark that we proposed to implement these 
improvements if other improvements proposed in this thesis should fail to 
provide for an adequate protection of user freedoms. In such a case, Free Soft-
ware legislation is able to address many inefficiencies of the current frame-
work in many different ways. So, it may result in many different new rules in 
the framework. Let us provide an example. Namely, if it is found that the 
inter partes nature of licenses has to be regulated in the law in order to allow 
for better enforceability of copyleft, a following legal rule could be created.
Extended copyleft enforceability. Every user is allowed to enforce obligations of the 
licensees under copyleft.
The restriction of software-related patents class consists of the following three 
improvements: (1) a reform of patent laws, (2) an improvement of patent 
quality, and (3) a safe harbour for user freedoms. The rules that will follow 
from the first two improvements will differ depending on the actual patent 
law that is improved as well as on the balance reached between the interests 
of all stakeholders. As a result, many different new rules may appear in the 
framework, each limited to affect a given jurisdiction, so that all of them 
together provide for an adequate protection against software-related patents 
worldwide. Drafting of all such rules requires further research. Here, we can 
perform a provisional identification of a legal rule that may result out of the 
third improvement, that is of a safe harbour against software-related patents. 
It could be the following legal rule.
Safe harbour against software-related patents.  Users are allowed to exercise all six activ-
ities covered in the FSD despite such activities constitute an infringement of a patent, 
under condition that the patent holder failed to meet patent enforceability criteria speci-
fi ed by the safe harbour provisions applicable to the program in question.
The promotion of open standards class consists of the following three improve-
ments: (1) reform of the SSOs, (2) a safe harbour for standards, and (3) gov-
ernment stimulation of open standards. The rules that will follow from the 
first improvement are highly dependent on the particular SSO that is going 
to be reformed. So, many different new rules may appear in the framework 
as a result of reforming many different SSOs. The second improvement can 
be expected to result in a legal rule similar to the above described rule that 
will result from the safe harbour against software-related patents. Namely, 
we may expect that the following rule could be created.
Safe harbour against patents material to standards.  If compliance with a standard 
requires the use of a subject-matter covered by a patent, users of programs that use the 
standard are allowed to exercise activities covered by the FSD, under condition that the 
patent holder failed to meet patent enforceability criteria specifi ed by the safe harbour 
provisions applicable to the standard in question.
In particular, developers are allowed to develop Free Software that uses such a standard, 
and distributors are allowed to distribute this software.
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The third improvement included in the promotion of open standards class can 
be expected to result in a legal rule that would be a refinement of the above 
rule named “prohibition of Closed eGovernments”. Namely, the following 
rule could be created.
Prohibition of Closed eGovernments (refi nement). The government is not allowed to use 
closed standards and is obliged to use multi-purpose open standards.
Alternatively, the following rule could be created as a result of the third 
improvement included in the promotion of open standards class.
Limited enforceability of patents material to standards. If compliance with a standard 
requires the use of a subject-matter covered by a patent, users of programs that use the 
standard are allowed to exercise activities covered by the FSD with regard to these pro-
grams if the standard has been offered and accepted for the use in an eGovernment.
In particular, developers are allowed to develop Free Software that uses such a standard, 
and distributors are allowed to distribute this software.
The internationalization of the framework  class consists of the following three 
improvements: (1) inclusion of Free Software issues into agendas of interna-
tional organizations, (2) amendment of Free Software licenses, and (3) 
requiring courts to take customs and trade practices of the communities into 
consideration when deciding on disputes related to user freedoms. There is 
no specific rule that can be construed as a result of the first two improve-
ments. Rather, these improvements are a means for implementing other 
improvements proposed in this thesis. For example, an international orga-
nization can prepare a model Free Software legislation or it may serve as a 
forum for discussing the exact rules for a safe harbour against software-
related patents. As far as the third improvement is concerned, courts serve 
as means for implementing (applying) existing legal rules. Also, a legal rule 
requiring courts to look into customs and trade practices of software com-
munities will also be highly dependant on the court procedure of the par-
ticular jurisdiction that will implement the improvement. It requires more 
research to identify how such rules will be drafted in particular jurisdic-
tions. Here, we cannot provide any description of the rules that could fol-
low from the improvements included in the internationalization of the 
framework class.
Here, we may conclude that we expect at least eight rules to be created 
as a result of our sixteen proposed improvements. One of these eight rules 
(prohibition of Closed eGovernments (refinement)) is a refinement of anoth-
er of them (prohibition of Closed eGovernments). The former includes the 
latter, so we will further discuss only the former, which gives seven new 
rules altogether. It should be expected that the final number of rules will be 
higher than seven, since here we are only analysing the provisional impact 
of our improved framework. The exact number and the formulation of all 
these additional new rules is subject to many circumstances that are beyond 
the scope of this thesis. Further research, in particular empirical research, is 
necessary in order to do so.
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7.3.2 Impact of the new rules on the existing rules
Below, we analyse how the new rules that we identified in the previous sub-
section may impact the rules existing in the current framework. We will anal-
yse the impact of the following seven new rules: (1) licensing policies, (2) 
prohibition of Closed eGovernments (refinement), (3) guidelines for Supra-
Open eGovernments, (4) extended copyleft enforceability, (5) safe harbour 
against software-related patents, (6) safe harbour against patents material to 
standards, and (7) limited enforceability of patents material to standards.
The licensing policies rule is a result of the improvements belonging to the 
proper organization of communities class. So, it will have an impact on the fol-
lowing six inefficiencies of the current framework: (1) license proliferation 
and incompatibilities, (2) license revocability, (3) inter partes nature of the 
licenses, (4) contracts with distributors, (5) liability rules, and (6) non-legal 
regulators. The licensing policies cannot regulate actors outside of the com-
munities and they should not be expected to have too strong an impact on 
community members either. So, it is unlikely that the licensing policies will 
completely remove any of the above inefficiencies from the framework. But 
although these inefficiencies will remain in the framework, we can expect 
that their negative impact on the freedoms would be minimized due to prop-
erly organized communities, as this is the case in such communities that 
already operate. Members of properly organized communities will be the 
direct beneficiaries. It should be also expected that as projects that are devel-
oped and distributed by properly organized communities become popular, 
the above mentioned inefficiencies will stop to affect many other users mate-
rially as well.
The prohibition of Closed eGovernments (refinement) rule is a result of one of 
the improvements included in the regulation of eGovernments class, refined 
according to one of the improvements included in the promotion of open stan-
dards class. So, it will have a direct impact on the inefficiency that is a result 
of closed standards. But this impact is generally limited to software used in 
government communications only. Given the spill-over effect of eGovern-
ments on software used outside of government communications, especially 
if the government chooses multi-purpose open standards, it may be also 
expected that this rule will affect users of such other software as well. So, 
closed standards will not be removed from the framework completely, but 
the prohibition of Closed eGovernments may materially minimize the nega-
tive impact that closed standards have on the freedoms.
The guidelines for Supra-Open eGovernments rule is a result of one of the 
improvements included in the regulation of eGovernments class. So, it is capa-
ble of affecting many different inefficiencies of the framework. The guide-
lines should in particular regulate how the government becomes involved in 
the development and distribution of Free Software. It means that the soft-
ware resulting from such an involvement can be free of many inefficiencies 
that result from circumstances controlled by the government. Whether these 
inefficiencies will remain in the framework depends on the exact content of 
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the guidelines. Since this requires further empirical research, we are unable 
to determine the exact impact of the guidelines in this thesis. However, we 
may provide an example. Assume that the guidelines will prohibit govern-
ments to accept restrictive contracts on Free Software procured for eGovern-
ments. In such a case the inefficiency that is a result of distributor contracts 
could be removed from the point of view users of such software, while it 
may still apply to software used outside government communications.
The extended copyleft enforceability is an example rule that could be cre-
ated as a result of the implementation of improvements included in the Free 
Software legislation class. This rule addresses a specific inefficiency of the cur-
rent framework, namely the inter partes nature of the framework. As a result 
of this rule, the inter partes nature would no longer constitute a burden for 
enforcing copyleft obligations. This means that we could remove the inter 
partes nature from the framework if the extended copyleft enforceability is 
implemented.
The safe harbour against software-related patents is a rule directed specifi-
cally at software-related patents. It does not remove these patents from the 
framework, but it limits their enforceability to the extent such an enforceabil-
ity would constitute a threat to user freedoms. We remark that a complete 
removal of software-related patents – in such a way that they do not affect 
Free Software users at all – may be a result of other improvements included 
in the restriction of software-related patents class.
The safe harbour against patents material to standards is a rule similar to the 
safe harbour described above. It is a result of one of the improvements 
included in the promotion of open standards class. This rule does not remove 
the respective patents from the framework and it does not make it impossi-
ble to make a closed standard using patents. However, it prevents patent 
holders from enforcing such patents against users of Free Software.
The limited enforceability of patents material to standards works in a similar 
way. This rule also results from an implementation of the improvements 
included in the promotion of open standards class. It prevents patent holders 
from enforcing their patents in relation to programs that use standards cov-
ered with their patents provided that these standards have been offered and 
accepted in an eGovernment. This rule expresses a view that the government 
cannot support monopolies more than necessary. Thus, under this rule pat-
ent holders could not benefit from both the patent monopoly and the market 
power resulting from government demand (and the user demand induced 
by the government). Offering a technology to an eGovernment would 
require that patent rights are not enforceable towards the developers, dis-
tributors, and users of Free Software that makes use of that technology.
7.3.3 Conclusions on the provisional impact of our proposed framework
Here, we may conclude that the provisional impact of our proposed frame-
work will be that at least seven new rules are created. Other new rules may 
follow depending on how the improvements are implemented exactly. The 
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new rules will enter into relations with the rules currently active in the 
framework. Six out of seven new rules that we identified above will limit the 
negative effect of the respective inefficiencies in such a way that the free-
doms will be adequately protected. Only one of the seven new rules (extend-
ed copyleft enforceability) can be expected to remove its corresponding inef-
ficiency from the framework (the inter partes nature of the licenses).
7.4 Further research
The proposal of an improved regulatory framework presented in this thesis 
includes improvements grouped in the following six sets: (1) proper organi-
zation of the communities, (2) regulation of eGovernments, (3) Free Soft-
ware legislation, (4) restriction of software-related patents, (5) promotion of 
open standards, and (6) internationalization of the framework. In the above 
section we identified the provisional impact of our proposed framework, 
which consists of the creation of seven new rules, and of a removal of one 
inefficiency. Additional new rules may be created as well depending how 
the improvements are implemented exactly. So, the formulation of specific 
legal or non-legal regulators that would constitute the implementation of all 
improvements proposed in this thesis requires that the research is contin-
ued. In particular, there is a need for more empirical research that will pro-
vide more findings about circumstances for which the improvements are to 
be implemented. We indicate the following example areas for further 
research.
(1) Free Software licenses and their impact under different jurisdic-
tions. The exact scope of obligations that follow from different li-
censes should be determined (such as the scope of copyleft clauses) 
so that the communities are able to account for the obligations (and 
the resulting incompatibilities) in all jurisdictions properly. This 
would also allow for a formulation of specifi c recommendations for 
amending licenses to become more jurisdiction-independent and 
effective.
(2) Organization of the communities. The ability of various commu-
nities to provide for proper maintenance of Free Software should 
be analysed and compared. A set of model organization structures 
should be identifi ed. The best ways of adopting these structures in 
communities should be determined. In particular, it should be de-
termined whether the organization of the communities should be 
regulated using the law, or whether the norms are suffi cient.
(3) Government role in the framework. The ability of governments to 
become involved in the development, distribution, and use of Free 
Software should be studied in order to elaborate an adequate model 
of participation. At the same time governments should perform a 
survey of existing eGovernments in order to identify all closed 
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standards currently used and possibilities of providing for transla-
tion facilities so that all existing Closed eGovernments are trans-
formed into Open eGovernments.
(4) Particular national laws. Particular national laws should be stud-
ied in order to identify all specifi c limitations and restrictions in-
cluded therein. In other words, the research performed in this thesis 
should be repeated with regard to each national law separately. 
This would allow to propose specifi c Free Software legislation for 
each of the national laws.
(5) Patent reform.  A thorough scrutiny of all existing patent laws and 
the practice of their application should be performed. Proposals for 
their reform should be elaborated. New ways of scrutinizing patent 
applications should be explored in order to increase the effective-
ness of patent offi ces and to increase patent quality.
(6) Standard setting.  Particular SSOs and procedures that they follow 
should be analysed and compared. All circumstances that prevent 
SSOs from adopting open standards should be identifi ed and ap-
propriate reforms of particular SSOs should be designed. Govern-
ment awareness and involvement in standard setting should be in-
creased.
(7) Lex mercatoria. Customs and trade practices of software communi-
ties should be analysed and particular rules that follow from them 
identifi ed. Appropriate means for taking these rules into account 
when deciding disputes should be designed.
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 Summary
This thesis concerns the protection of users of computer programs known as 
Free Software. It is based on the premise that a worldwide regulatory frame-
work should be adopted to protect the users. In this thesis, a model of the 
current framework is reconstructed and its operation analysed in the world 
of software communities and eGovernments. The thesis also proposes an 
improved framework, intended to protect the freedoms of users more ade-
quately than in the current framework.
In Chapter 1 I provide an introduction to the analysis of the current 
framework, by presenting the scene of play together with the actors and the 
audience of that scene. This leads to one of the most important findings, viz. 
the control of the working of the programs (and essentially the protection of 
the user freedoms) require(s) that two conditions are met. The conditions 
are: (1) access to source codes of the programs, as well as (2) access to the 
specifications of standards used by the programs to interoperate with other 
programs. Then, by looking at the software communities and eGovernments 
in relation to user freedoms as defined by Stallman, I formulate a Research 
Goal and the Problem Statement. Thereafter, I formulate three Research 
Questions to be answered by analysing the current regulatory framework 
and by proposing an improved framework. Finally, I present the research 
methodology to be used in the analysis.
In Chapter 2 I provide definitions and basic notions that are used 
throughout the analysis. These are (1) Free Software, (2) Open Source Soft-
ware, (3) open standards, (4) software communities, and (5) eGovernments. 
In particular, I explain what are the subject matter, the requirements, and the 
addressees of the Free Software Definition. It leads to the finding that Free 
Software refers to computer programs available together with the rights to 
use, develop, and distribute them. In other words, the Free Software Defini-
tion requires that users are allowed to exercise all activities covered by copy-
right.
In Chapter 3 I reconstruct a model of the current regulatory framework 
of Free Software. I include in the framework rules that regulate (1) the access 
to software and standards, and (2) the relations between the rules. As a 
result, the model reconstructed in Chapter 3 consists of rules that enable 
users to exercise their freedoms, as well as the rules that limit or restrict users 
in exercising them (the latter jointly referred to as the “inefficiencies”). The 
inefficiencies are: (1) license proliferation and incompatibility, (2) license 
revocability, (3) inter partes nature of licenses, (4) software-related patents, (5) 
contracts with distributors, (6) liability rules, (7) non-legal regulators of soft-
ware, (8) closed standards, and (9) regulatory environment. I complete Chap-
ter 3 by a conclusion that many of the inefficiencies are not sufficiently 
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addressed by the model. It follows that the freedoms are not sufficiently pro-
tected under the current framework.
In Chapter 4 I analyse how software communities affect the protection of 
user freedoms under the current framework. This is done by identifying 
relations between the communities and the model of the framework. The 
analysis of software communities leads to a conclusion that properly orga-
nized communities are able to gather and manage resources necessary 
to minimize many limitations and restrictions of the current framework 
materially. However, the inefficiencies as such remain. The inefficiencies that 
are the least affected by the communities are: (1) software-related patents, 
(2) closed standards, and (3) the regulatory environment.
In Chapter 5 I analyse how eGovernments affect the protection of user 
freedoms under the current framework. I perform this analysis separately 
for Closed eGovernments (i.e., eGovernments based on closed standards) 
and for Open eGovernments (i.e., eGovernments based on open standards). 
It leads to a conclusion that the limitations and restrictions of the current 
framework continue to exist in the world of eGovernments. However, eGov-
ernments are able to affect how the inefficiencies of the current framework 
impact user freedoms. They may do so in both ways. Generally, Closed 
eGovernments lead to further restriction of user freedoms, despite the pro-
tection inherent in the current framework, and despite any positive effect 
that the communities might have on the freedoms. Conversely, Open eGov-
ernments are mostly neutral towards the limitations and restrictions, 
although they affect some of them to a benefit of the freedoms.
In Chapter 6 I propose an improved regulatory framework of Free Soft-
ware. The proposal originates from the findings and conclusions presented 
in previous chapters. It is started by a recapitulation of all identified ineffi-
ciencies of the current framework and a discussion about possible improve-
ments of each of them. Then, a selection of the most appropriate improve-
ments is performed. The improvements are grouped under the following 
headings: (1) proper organization of communities, (2) guidelines for eGov-
ernments, (3) Free Software legislation, (4) restriction of software-related 
patents, (5) promotion of open standards, and (6) internationalization of the 
framework. I then add the improvements to the model of the current frame-
work, and present the relations between the improvements and other rules 
in the model. As a result, I construct the proposal of an improved regulatory 
framework.
In Chapter 7 I finalize the research. I recall the answers to the three 
Research Questions, as well as the answers to the Problem Statement (each 
of them is given after a relevant part of the analysis in previous chapters). 
The chapter ends with an identification of issues for further research.
Towards_an_Improved_def.indd   230 23-02-2010   10:49:40
 Samenvatting – 
Op weg naar een betere rechtsbescherming 
van Free Software
Dit proefschrift gaat over de bescherming van gebruikers van de zogeheten 
“vrije software” (Free Software). Het gaat uit van de premisse dat er, om die 
gebruikers te beschermen, een wereldomvattend regulerend kader zou moe-
ten worden aangenomen. In dit proefschrift wordt een model van het bestaan-
de kader gereconstrueerd en de werking daarvan geanalyseerd in de omge-
ving van “software communities” en “eGovernments”. Er wordt daarnaast 
een verbeterd kader voorgesteld, dat tot doel heeft de vrijheden van de gebrui-
kers een meer adequate bescherming te bieden dan het bestaande kader doet.
In Hoofdstuk 1 geef ik een inleiding op de analyse van het huidige kader aan 
de hand van een schets van het speelveld, van de actoren en van de toe-
schouwers van dat speelveld. Dit leidt tot een van de belangrijkste constate-
ringen, namelijk de controle over de werking van de programmatuur (en in 
essentie de bescherming van de vrijheden voor de gebruiker) vereist (ver-
eisen) dat wordt voldaan aan twee voorwaarden. Deze voorwaarden zijn:
– toegang tot de broncode van de programmatuur; en
– toegang tot de specificaties van de standaarden die de programmatuur 
gebruikt vanwege de interoperabiliteit met andere programmatuur.
Na aandacht te hebben besteed aan de “software communities” en “eGovern-
ments” in relatie tot de vrijheden voor de gebruiker zoals gedefinieerd door 
Stallman, worden het onderzoeksdoel en de probleemstelling geformuleerd. 
Hierna formuleer ik drie onderzoeksvragen die ik wil beantwoorden door 
het analyseren van het bestaande regulerende kader en door een verbeterd 
kader voor te stellen. Ten slotte geef ik aan met behulp van welke onder-
zoeksmethodologie ik mijn analyse uitvoer.
In Hoofdstuk 2 behandel ik definities en begrippen zoals ik die ik in mijn 
analyse gebruik. Dit zijn:
– vrije software (Free Software);
– Open Source Software;
– Open standaarden;
– Software communities; en
– eGovernments.
Ik leg in het bijzonder uit wat de essentie is van de vrije software definitie 
(Free Software Definition), en om welke vereisten en geadresseerden het 
hierbij gaat. Dit leidt tot de conclusie dat vrije software (Free Software) com-
puterprogrammatuur betreft die beschikbaar is tezamen met het recht om 
deze te gebruiken, te ontwikkelen en te verspreiden. Met andere woorden, 
de vrije software definitie (Free Software Definition) vereist dat gebruikers 
alle auteursrechtelijk relevante handelingen mogen verrichten.
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In Hoofdstuk 3 reconstrueer ik een model van het huidige regulerende kader 
voor vrije software (Free Software). Ik behandel in het kader tevens de regels 
over:
– de toegang tot software en standaarden; en
– de relaties tussen de regels.
Het resultaat van deze reconstructie is een model dat bestaat zowel uit regels 
die gebruikers in staat stellen om hun vrijheden uit te oefenen, als uit regels 
die gebruikers uitsluiten of beperken in de uitoefening van de vrijheden (de 
laatste regels worden gezamenlijk aangeduid als de “ondoelmatigheden”). 
De ondoelmatigheden zijn:
– proliferatie van de licentie en incompatibiliteit;
– herroepbaarheid van de licentie;
– het inter partes karakter van de licenties;
– softwaregerelateerde octrooien;
– contracten met distributeurs;
– aansprakelijkheidsbepalingen;
– niet-juridische regelgeving van software;
– gesloten standaarden; en
– regelgevende omgevingen.
Ik sluit Hoofdstuk 3 af met een conclusie dat veel van de ondoelmatigheden 
niet voldoende worden bestreken door het model. Hieruit volgt dat de vri-
jheden met het bestaande kader niet voldoende worden beschermd.
In Hoofdstuk 4 analyseer ik hoe de software communities onder het bestaan-
de kader de bescherming van de vrijheden van de gebruiker beïnvloeden. 
Zij doen dit door het stellen van relaties tussen de communities en het model 
van het kader. De analyse van software communities leidt tot een conclusie 
dat goed georganiseerde communities in staat zijn om bronnen te vergaren 
en te organiseren, die noodzakelijk zijn om veel uitsluitingen en beperkin-
gen van het bestaande kader aanzienlijk te minimaliseren. Echter, de ondoel-
matigheden als zodanig blijven bestaan. De ondoelmatigheden die het minst 
worden geraakt door de communities zijn:
– softwaregerelateerde octrooien;
– gesloten standaarden; en
– regelgevende omgevingen.
In Hoofdstuk 5 analyseer ik hoe eGovenments met het bestaande kader de 
bescherming van de vrijheden van de gebruiker beïnvloeden. Ik voer de ana-
lyse uit voor zowel de “Gesloten eGovernments” (d.w.z. eGovernments 
gebaseerd op gesloten standaarden) als voor “Open eGovernments” (d.w.z. 
eGovernments gebaseerd op open standaarden). Dit leidt tot de conclusie 
dat de uitsluitingen en beperkingen van het bestaande kader in de wereld 
van de eGovernments blijven bestaan. Echter, eGovernments zijn in staat om 
invloed uit te oefenen op de wijze waarop het bestaande kader inwerkt op 
de vrijheden van de gebruiker. Beide kunnen dat bewerkstelligen. Over het 
algemeen leiden Gesloten eGovernments tot een verdere beperking van de 
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vrijheden van de gebruiker, ondanks de bescherming die eigen is aan het 
bestaande kader, en ondanks positieve effecten die communities zouden 
kunnen hebben op de vrijheden. Daarentegen staan Open eGovernments 
doorgaans neutraal tegenover de uitsluitingen en beperkingen, ofschoon zij 
sommige daarvan beïnvloeden ten faveure van de vrijheden.
In Hoofdstuk 6 stel ik een verbeterd regulerend kader voor vrije software 
(Free Software) voor. Dit voorstel volgt uit de bevindingen en conclusies 
zoals weergegeven in de voorafgaande hoofdstukken. Het begint met het 
recapituleren van alle gestelde ondoelmatigheden van het bestaande kader 
en een discussie over mogelijke verbeteringen van elk daarvan. Vervolgens 
wordt een selectie gemaakt van de meest aangewezen verbeteringen. Deze 
worden gegroepeerd onder de volgende noemers:
– goede organisatie van communities;
– richtlijnen voor eGovernments;
– vrije software (Free Software) regelgeving;
– beperking van softwaregerelateerde octooien;
– promotie van open standaarden; en
– internationalisering van het kader.
Ik voeg daarna de verbeteringen toe aan het model van het bestaande kader 
en geef de relaties aan tussen de verbeteringen en de overige regels van het 
model. Het resultaat dat ik dan ontwerp is mijn voorstel voor een verbeterd 
regulerend kader.
In Hoofdstuk 7 sluit ik het onderzoek af met zowel de antwoorden op de 
drie onderzoeksvragen als de antwoorden op de probleemstelling (waarvan 
bij elk gegeven antwoord wordt ingegaan op betreffend relevant deel van de 
analyse zoals deze in de voorafgaande hoofdstukken is behandeld). Het 
hoofdstuk eindigt met het aangeven van punten die verder onderzoek recht-
vaardigen.
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